HUMAN AUTOMATISM.
[TO THE EDITOR Or THE " SPECTATOR.") SIR,—That "A Human Automaton," in casting scorn and. blame upon brother-automatons, stands stultified in temper
and logic, will, I think, readily be granted. But is it not equally clear that he cannot fairly be found fault with for his ill-tempered and illogical self-stultification, seeing that it too has arisen necessarily, in the course of the necessary working of his machinery ? And assuredly, if ever Necessity will justify any one for anything, "A Human Automaton" (if he- be also a human being) will be justified more than amply for his self-stultifications. If I meet "A Human Automaton," and smite him on the face, what right has he to be angry with me P But then, if angry he be, what right have I to find fault with his anger, since my smiting and his anger at being_ smitten are alike necessitated ? And the series of similar questions might, of course, be continued ad infinitum..
For practical purposes, is not " Determinism " merely another name for the " Necessity " with which Bishop Butler has dealt fully and finally ?—" Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of Necessity were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches, that is, to the whole of our present life." (" Analogy," Part I., chap. vi.) Might not Determinism find its fitting place among speculative play- things such as "Achilles and the Tortoise," "The Impossibility of Motion," and other toys of the solvitur ambulando sort ?--I
am, Sir, &c., F. W. HARPER, ex-Vicar of Selby.
P.S.—Mr. Blanchamp speaks of "the ethical principles.
derivable from the doctrine of Epicurus." But the great Epicurean poet finds the germs of free-will in the primordial atoms, and thence accounts for that " indubitable " power of voluntary initiation by which we tear ourselves free from the enchainment of the law of cause and effect. Hear Lucretius t
" Denique si semper motus conectitur omnis Et vetere exoritur semper novus ordine certo Nec declinando faciunt primordia motus Principium quoddam quod fati fcedera rumpat, Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, Libera per terras uncle hoc animantibus exstat Uncle est Inc, inquam, fatis avolsa potestas Per quam progreclimur quo ducit quemque voluntas Declinamus item motus nee tempore certo Nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens ? Nam dubio procul his rebus sua calque voluntaa Principium dat."—(De Rerum Natura, 11, 251.)
Previous page
