BOOKS.

LORD PALMERSTON.*

[SECOND NOTICE.]

Wm" Sir Henry Bulwer's accounts of diplomatic affairs, the amusing part of this book,—at least for politicians,—begins. The first volume, giving Lord Palmerston's political diaries and private correspondence while he was still a mere second-rank politician, and much more of a man of fashion than a politician,

is prolix and rather dull. Lord Palmerston's mind was so borne, so little active in any region but that of politics and pleasure, that if

Sir Henry Bulwer had been as skilful a biographer as he is a memoir-writer and diplomatist, he would have cut this part very much shorter than he has done, would have written a good deal more himself, and let Lord Palmerston write a good deal less. But directly he enters upon the field of Lord Palmerston's diplomacy, the book becomes to our minds extremely entertaining. Sir Henry knows enough of the leading personages of diplomacy on all hands to give us picturesque little glimpses of their personnel,—as when he sketches the situation in Constantinople in 1837, describes the Europeanizing Sultan Mahmoud, his Grand Vizier, "the jolly

ferocious old gentleman who, though every now and then is temporary disgrace, still kept his foot as Grand Vizier on the neck

of every subordinate ;" and Reschid Pacha, the polished bureau- cratic foreign minister, of audacious imagination, but physically timid, and while braving future dangers, disposed to crouch before that which was close at hand. What can be better than the glimpse Sir Henry Bulwer gives us of the French and English ambassadors,—rivals at Constantinople,—the Frenchman, an admiral, Admiral Roussin, a man of alert, sailor-like habits ; the Englishman an able, indolent peer, Lord Ponsonby, who attended little to the ordinary business of the embassy, but who worked hard under great excitement, and could "take up and pursue with the force of a strong will any object which presented itself to his imagination in striking colours" ;—and both in such a panic about the Russians that their first thought on rising from bed was to run to the window and see if the Russian fleet had arrived ;—

" The Turks about the Serai were divided into two parties ; the one, wishing for present peace at all hazards, urged the Sultan to place himself fairly under the protection of Russia ; another, imbued with a bolder and more patriotic spirit, preached incessantly a combination to destroy Mehemet Ali. A new rumour every day was in circulation. The French and English ambassadorial residencies were then fixed within a stone's throw of each other at Therapia, a small village fronting the entrance into the Black Sea; and the two Ambassadors, Admiral Roussin and Lord Ponsonby, each went to his window on getting out of bed, the one at six in the morning, and the other at six in the after- noon, prepared to see without surprise the Russian fleet anchored under their eyes. It was perhaps the only point on which those representa- tives of the two countries agreed. Both men of energy and ability, the one a philosopher, the other a fine gentleman, self-willed, and assuming rather to direct their respective Governments than to be directed by them, were united by a common apprehension, in which each encouraged the other."

Nor can anything be much more amusing than Sir Henry's account of his own first political success in the negotiation of the Com- mercial Treaty of 1838, and his little passage-at-arms with his

friend, the Secretary to the French Embassy,—" a charming man, who sang beautifully, was very gallant, was excellent in calenz- bourgs, an excellent classical scholar, and had an unhesitating good opinion of himself." This gentleman began by throwing a

great deal of cold water on the attempts of Mr. Bulwer to master the commercial-treaty question, telling him he would be a year in learning the true position of the question, and another year in pre- liminary negotiation with Turkey, before he had gained the posi- tion which the French Embassy already occupied. When, how- ever, Mr. Bulwer, who veiled his business-like disposition by earning for himself also a reputation as a romantic and eccentric poet, got his treaty signed in the course of a few months, he had the pleasure of this good-humoured personal triumph over his friend the French Secretary :—

"The next morning also this fact was known, to the utter horror and surprise of my friend and colleague. Est-il possibk mon cher, que vous noes avez fora ce Quel tour? Serdement noes coons trouve' possible ce que vous aver cru impossible.'—' Mais que faire?'—Nothing more easy, my dear fellow ; here is a copy of our treaty; do you have another copy made, and sign it to-day, and then let the journal at Smyrna (a. journal in the French pay) say that this happy result was entirely brought about by Admiral Roussin' s influence and your great knowledge of commercial affairs.' The Secretary, as usual, laughed heartily, shook me by the hand, and followed my advice."

$ * The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston; with Seleetions from his Diaries and Correspondence. By the Right Hon. Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, 31.P. London : Bentley. Vols. I. and II.

We are bound to say that these little glimpses of the interior life of diplomacy are not extended by Sir Henry Bulwer beyond the fair requirements of his subjects. He sticks, on the whole, very close to his extremely lively narrative of Lord Palmerston's policy, and little scenes like these, which very considerably en- liven the volume, are really only subsidiary to the description of Lord Palmerston's personal character as a foreign minister. Fos example, this business of the commercial treaty, though "com- menced without instructions from him, and brought to a conclusion without his sanction,"—it is wonderful how independent some of these embassies are on matters of secondary importance,—brought Lord Ponsonby and Mr. Bulwer nothing but the most. cordial praise and encouragement, and was promptly ratified without the expression of a single jealous scruple.

We have given this as a specimen of the entertaining and instructive glimpses which Sir Henry Bulwer allows us into the interior of diplomatic life, but we should add that in fact almost the whole of the second volume consists of such lights on the interior of diplomacy, for it is almost made up of Lord Palmer- ston's private correspondence with the ambassadors and sec- retaries at foreign Courts, especially with those at Paris. If only Parliament could read these private letters instead of the public despatches, honourable members would find their study of foreign politics not only a great deal more enter- taining, but a vast deal more instructive. Of course, how- ever, if they could do so, these frank communications could no longer be written, and we should be cut off even from the instruc- tion we now have in studying the history of the past by the light of these pithy, candid, highly intelligible communications ; and what would be worse still, the various diplomatic representatives would have to infer their chiefs' real views from the very doubtful and cautious language of formal diplomacy, instead of knowing it from the most sharp and unmistakable instructions. This volume really contains the short history—told in this condensed and familiar form—of Lord Palmerston's two struggles with France, about the affairs of Belgium after the rupture with Holland, and about the affairs of Turkey during her struggle with Mehemet Ali. In both cues he won a complete and decisive victory, and in neither can it be said that his trumpet ever once gave an uncertain sound.. Yet in both cases, as it appears to us, in spite of the somewhat startling character of his private letters on these subjects, his policy was really safe and prudent, and scarcely ran a single risk. Nothing in this volume seems to show that he was, in his old age, inconsistent with his former diplomatic self in abandoning Denmark in 1864. Then he had not a single great ally, and would have had a most formidable enemy. In 1831 with reference to Belgium, and in 1840 with regard to Turkey, he took care to have all the great powers on his side, except France, and it was not difficult to predict that France would be overmatched and know she was overmatched. And it is precisely this absolute confidence,—the strong, contemptuous sense of a man of the world who sees he has all the cards in his own hands,—which. makes Lord Palmerston write so positively and with so little nervousness in both these cases. He was never disposed to dictate where there was any danger of his having no power to do so. With regard to the Polish revolution of 1831, his sympathies were evidently strongly with the Poles, but he never stirred a finger to help them. He knew he had not the condi- tions of success. And as it seems to us, Lord Palmerston, though he was one of the boldest of Ministers when he had a clear grasp of the conditions of the case and knew he could succeed, was a cautious and by no means audacious minister when the odds were nicely balanced, and he felt as a man of the world real doubts as to his own prospects.

What contributed to inspire him with the fullest confidence with regard both to the Belgian quarrel and to the Turkish quarrel, was that his adversary had committed herself openly, in both cases, to his own view of the case, and was intriguing fos an end which she did not dare confess,—in the first instance, though not for the partition of Belgium between France and Holland, which she knew to be impossible, yet for some minute gain of territory to herself (like the Duchy of Bouillon) which might stop the mouth of the warlike Opposition, and give Louis Philippe's Government an air of success and prestige,—in the second instance, for some appearance of concession to Mehemet

Ali, which might give France the prestige of having protected his interests in the East, and place her before Europe as an arbiter who had power to abate the demands of the other European Powers. Lord Palmerston felt instinctively the extreme weakness. of. this desire for a seeming success in a Power far too weak to go to war boldly for a real selfish end of her own, and he despised her for playing such a game. Feeling this weakness and insincerity, he instinctively took a line almost cava- lier, and we suspect it was the most prudent one. For instance, he wrote to the late Lord Granville the following strong passage, which he took care to send through the French Foreign Office, knowing well it would be opened and read, so that he could rely

on the strong language it contained being known, without its being ,possible to resent it, or even to consider it as an intentional insult :—

Mr DEAR Gitaiivrus,--Sebastiani really should be made to under- stand that he must have the goodness to learn to keep his temper, or, when it fails him, let him go to vent his ill-humour upon some other .quarter, and not bestow it upon England. We are not used to be accused of making people dupes."

In like manner, his strong instructions to Mr. Bulwer in 1840, during the ministry of M. Thiers, were, though apparently auda- uious in the extreme, really the most prudent he could have used.

He knew Louis Philippe would far sooner dismiss M. Thiers than _go to war,—the King afterwards said to Mr. Bulwer characteris-

tically enough, "M. Thiers est furieux contre moi, parceque je in'ai pas voulu faire la guerre. Ii me dit que j'ai pane de faire la guerre ; mais parler de faire la guerre et faire la guerre, M.

Bulwer, sont deux choses hien differentes ;"—and he knew, more- -over, that if France went to war, with Austria, Prussia, and 'Russia all on our side, it could only end in an ignominious defeat, so it was really anything but rashness to speak as he did in the 4ollowing private letter of "chucking Mehemet Ali into the Nile ":

'"Mr DEAR Bormsa,—Notwithstanding the mysterious threatening with which Thiers has favoured us, I still hold to my belief that the Wrench Government will be too wise and prudent to make war ; and 'various things which come to me from different quarters confirm me in that belief. Besides, bullies seldom execute the threats they deal in ; .and men of trick and cunning are not always men of desperate resolves. But if Thiers should again hold to you the language of menace, however indistinctly and vaguely shadowed out, pray retort upon him to the full extent of what he may say to you, and with that skill of language which know you to be master of, convey to him in the most friendly and nu- -offensive manner possible, that if France throws down the gauntlet we :shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war, she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and commerce before she sees the -end of it ; that her army of Algiers will cease to give her anxiety, and that Mehemet Ali will just be chucked into the Nile. I wish you had tinted at these topics when Thiers spoke to you ; I invariably do so .when either Guizot or Bourqueney begins to swagger ; and I observe that it always acts as a sedative. I remind them that countries seldom -engage in unprovoked war, unless they have something to gain by so .doing; but that we should very soon have nearly three times the mumber of ships that France could put to sea, and must, therefore, have the command of all their interests beyond sea ; and that even if we had mot such a decided superiority upon our own bottom, Russia would be 'with us, and has a fleet equal to the fleet of France.'" On the whole, we think few histories of diplomatic negotiations were ever more vividly or pithily given than the story of the Belgian negotiations and the Turkish negotiations in the second 'volume of Sir Henry Bulwer's "Life." In it we see a Minister, prudent, shrewd, borne, clear, confident, above all things tena-

-dons of a position he had once taken up, perfectly aware that the most confident bearing is the most cautious bearing when you really have the game in your own hands, and never for a moment uncertain of what he himself wished. You see the confidence he inspired in his subordinates, and the sagacity with which they served him. You see how carefully he limited his efforts to ob- jects clearly within his grasp, you see bow much he enjoyed the

battle, and yet how little of mere personal ambition, how much of tenacity for the end in view, he threw into it. In fact, you see the

very image of the kind of Foreign Minister who was best adapted to win for England a great position in Europe,—one who hardly

-ever played a game in which he was not sure to win, who avoided -all the hazards he could, and yet played those games in which he -was sure to win with a positive, a commanding, and even a haughty and imperious mien. If Sir Henry Bulwer makes all his

suture volumes as entertaining as his second, this will be a great book.