During the whole time nothing has occurred which should in
reason have deepened the stinging sense of defeat,for France has been left free, and even encouraged in a career of foreign enter- prise. She has repaired her misfortunes, has increased her wealth, and has immensely enlarged her means of self-defence. Not only has her Army been doubled in effective strength, but her frontier has been covered with lines of strong places, and Paris has been made the most unassailable fortress in the world. As safe as she can be made, under the Government of her own choice, fairly prosperous and influential, if not commanding in Europe, France should be beginning to forget her natural rancour, and to regard Sedan as she regards Waterloo,—as a disagreeable historic event. On the other hand, Germany, in which also a new generation has grown up, has enjoyed sixteen years of peace, prosperity, and high consideration among the nations of the world. Her population has increased by a fifth, her organisa- tion is as strong as ever, and she has found permanent working alliances which may fairly be considered to double her effective power. France has not interfered with her in any way, no object dear to Germans has been thwarted, and the strain kept up on her resources, though great, is not greater than her increase in population and income. Her external policy has been, on the whole, directed with success, and her great Minister, still alive and still in power, is regarded all over earth as the most formidable person of his generation. Ships, Colonies, and commerce have followed in the wake of victory, and the German competition is now the one dreaded by the traders of all lands. Everything that could soothe the pride, or satisfy the aspirations, or reward the patience of Germans has been theirs for sixteen years; and they might be expected to regard France, if not with friendship, at least with the friendly tolerance which men feel for their equal& in society.
That, we say, might be expected ; but that is not the situation. France and Germany were probably never nearer a spring at each other's throats, and this from a new develop- ment of popular rather than official rancour. All hope of such an agreement as might insure tranquillity to Europe has for the present passed away, and the two great Powers are now exhibiting the jealous and angry suspiciousness of each other which in modern Europe precedes, if it does not actually produce, open war. The truth is, a new fear has entered into the heart of each people, and has revived all previous rancours. The Germans know that their strength, whether it would enable them to conquer France or not, is amply suffi- cient to resist France ; but they know also that the huge Slav Power upon their eastward would now take advantage of any French attack to gratify a hatred which every year begins to make more obvious. The recent action of Russia, the collapse of the Three Emperors' League, the series of decrees expelling or impoverishing the German colonies beyond the Vistula, the accumulation of cavalry towards her Western frontier, the recrudescence of Old Slav feeling in the great cities, the obvious reliance upon France,—all these things have convinced Germans that the Romanoffs only wait a signal which Republican France will give. They doubt in their hearts, with all their power and all their alliances, whether they are strong enough to defeat two such mighty armies acting together, and know well that if they do, it can only be by an exertion such as cripples a race for a generation. They therefore watch all developments of feeling in France with the close attention born of a secret fear, and they see, or think they see, signs that it is most hostile. They declare even this week, and in semi-official papers, that Germans are no longer safe in France, and they arranged that their Ambassador should not be present in Paris on July 14th, lest he should be insulted. They believe that France sends spies into their fortresses not to increase her knowledge against a future day, but with the intention of immediately utilising the informa- tion so obtained. They assert that the vast popularity of General Boulanger is due exclusively to the French idea that he is to be the hero of the revanche, and they ask why
France and Russia, natural enemies because of the historic relation of each to Poland, should now be acting together in every Court of Europe, if it be not for some secret link against a common foe, who can only be the German nation. They read the diatribes against them in the French newspapers with a new sense of their reality, and work themselves up to such a point of watchfulness that they suspect some planned treachery, and see in the proposed mobilisation of three Corps in the interior of France reason sufficient to proclaim war. Are we, they are asking, to allow France to be twenty days ahead of us in preparations I The three Corps might, if France is utterly
unscrupulous, rush Belgium. Alarm of this kind, partly well founded, partly based upon terrifying rumour, soon generates hate, and it is without surprise that we Bee grave German journals which seldom publish what Prince Bismarck dis- approves, solemnly warning France that there are limits even to German patience. On the other hand, the French are at least as apprehensive as their opponents. It is their foible when excited to see men as trees walking, and they are excited now. Prince Bismarck's speeches on the renewal of the Septennial Bill, his dissolution of Parliament, and his demand for more men, left an indelible impression in the French mind that he expected war, that he was preparing for it, and that he had thought out plans for the destruction of France. Since that period, Frenchmen have watched him with an ever-increasing jealousy, have voted heavy demands for new armaments in silence, have attacked their own Govern- ment whenever they suspected it of deference to Berlin, have sedulously proclaimed Russia their only ally, and have raised General Boulanger into a hero, because they thought he would, from hostility to Germany, sufficiently protect the country. Their most injurious conduct towards their German guests is traceable to a belief that every German has been a soldier, and is therefore certain to place his knowledge at the disposal of the German War Office, while the boycotting of German trade, especially in wine, is an effort to cut off the sources of a wealth that may be utilised for war. The French, in fact, expect invasion, and their alarm and wrath have reawakened the rancour which had seemed dying away, but which has been kept smouldering by the spectacle of the continued attachment of Alsace, so conspicuously mani- fested in the election on the Septennial Bill. They would go to war at once if they only dared, and expect war even if they resolve not to proclaim it.
It is possible the envenomed feeling in both countries may die away without producing an explosion ; but there is no reason for calculating on such a change. Nothing can alter the German situation except successful war, and the con- tinuance of apprehension does not develop friendship. The absurd hatred of Englishmen for Frenchmen which existed from 1805 to 1815 was due to continued terror, as well as frequent provocation, and only began to die away when Waterloo had assured England of her safety. The Germans will always regard French enmity as a threatening factor in the situation, and nothing can be foreseen, except war, under which French enmity will grow less. We fear that for years to come it is upon the judgment of statesmen rather than peoples we must rely for continued peace, and the statesmen, both in France and Germany, may be growing weary of the strain. We see no trustworthy evi- dence as yet that they are, but we see much that they have determined, if the need arises, to be in time to meet it. That new modern dread of being late in the work of mobilisation is, unhappily, a great addition to the chances of war. So much may be accomplished in a fortnight, that statesmen are ready to sacrifice anything rather than be behindhand, and may, on occasion of some unforeseen accident, declare further diplo- macy useless, because, if they attempt it, " our enemy may be mobilised and in motion before we are in the field." If it were nearly certain that " first blood " always implied victory, the temptation to hit out prematurely would be indefinitely strengthened.
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