PRIVATE-BILL LEGISLATION.*
THE second volume of this work is even bigger and bulkier than its predecessor, and, like it, is a monument of industry and
research. It is in some respects even more interesting ; but it is open to the grave reproach of being unnecessarily big, and to the graver reproach, for a work of the kind, of being un-
necessarily big because it is a defence of two lost causes. This volume consists of not far short of a thousand pages, and of these at least one hundred might with advantage have been cut out, if the writer had not taken upon himself to defend not only the present pernicious system of Private-Bill legislation, but also the present want of system of local government in the Metropolis. It is possible to sympathise with a Parliamentary counsel's desire to retain the system under which he has been brought up and flourished, and to sing its praises in a history of the system ; but it is impossible to sympathies with a writer who, in a wholly irrelevant manner, brings into a work already far too long, an elaborate panegyric on two such bodies as the Corporation of the City of London and the Metropolitan Board of Works, and that in respect of matters wholly outside of the subject of the book. What, in the name of logic and concise- ness, have the Mansion House relief funds, the " illustrious personages" who have received the freedom of the City of London, or the sums spent by the City on charity, or " patriotic " grants, to do with Private-Bill legislation ? Yet pages are spent over these matters merely for the sake of giving the Corporation a pat on the back. Still more difficult is it to know why we are treated to half-a-dozen pages of the sieges of Londonderry, which not only had not the remotest connection with Private Bills, but had the very smallest con- nection with the City of London. There also seems to be small justification for the introduction of the history of Christ's Hospital and Gresham College, merely because in the course of the history of each there has been occasion for a Private Act. Mr. Clifford, indeed, appears to think the histories of these institutions redound to the credit of the City, whereas, in fact, it is very much the reverse. The justification is the less, as history (outside Private Bills), and especially that of educational institutions, does not appear to be Mr. Clifford's forte. He describes St. Paul's School, founded by Dean Colet, as founded by the Mercers' Company; and, still worse, describes Sir Andrew Judd's Tonbridge School, which the Attorney-General rescued from the Skinners, as having been founded by them.
On the other hand, it is not the least interesting or instruc- tive part of this work which demonstrates that the Metro- politan Board was created to "prevent all or any part of the sewage within the Metropolis from flowing or passing into the River Thames in or near the Metropolis ;" that it deliberately rejected a thorough-going plan which would have done this, and deliberately adopted a half-hearted plan which was calculated to snake, and has, in fact, made, the sewage discharged into the Thames near the Metropolis actually "flow back into the Metropolis ;" so that, after the lapse of thirty years and the expenditure of six and a quarter millions of money, the work which the Metropolitan Board was to do still remains to be done. From a party point of view, it is satisfactory to be reminded that it was the Liberal creators of the Board who insisted on its carrying out a proper sewage scheme, and that it was their Tory successors who allowed the Board to carry out the miserable compromise of the present system, which will yet cost the London ratepayers enormous sums of money. If Mr. Clifford is, from the nature of the case, unsuccessful in demon- strating to us the incalculable blessings we enjoy in being governed by two such bodies as the City Corporation and the Metropolitan Board of Works, still less is he successful in his attempt to show that the system of Private-Bill legislation is the best of all possible systems. On the contrary, his able historical review of the whole field of Private-Bill legislation shows that, in point of fact, the greater the degree in which Parliament has devolved its control over the matters dealt with in such Bills on other authorities, or has obviated the necessity for Private Bills by general Public Bills, the more satisfactory the result has been to the public. The exorbitant and, except to the magnates of the earth, prohibitive charges for Estate, Naturalisation, and Divorce Bills, and even for Inclosnre Bills (in which Mr. Clifford shows that the costs often exceeded the whole fee-simple value of the lands enclosed), were abolished, and the procedure, by delegation of these subjects to the Court
• A History of Priroate-Bill Legislation. By Frederick Clifford. Vol. II. London Butterwort/ie.
of Chancery, the Home Secretary, the Divorce Courts, and the Land Commissioners, was simplified ; while the devolution of election petitions to the Judges was one of the most signal suc- cesses in the devolution of judicial functions to judicial authority. The Lower Thames Valley drainage scheme is, indeed, cited with primaVacie force by Mr. Clifford, as a conspicuous example of the ill-effects of delegation by Parliament of its private legisla- tion to outside bodies. Bat, in point of fact, what that example shows is the futility of partial delegation. In that case, the preliminary inquiries were conducted by the Local Government Board ; but they were only preliminary, and owing to a thoroughly wrong decision of a House of Lords Committee in a former case, instead of the matter being dealt with by provisional orders, the same matters were fought over again before Parlia- mentary Committees. But, on the other side, as Mr. Clifford shows, the system of provisional orders, as applied to tram- ways and electric lighting under the Board of Trade, has been a signal success in reducing litigation and the cost of litigation. We quite agree with Mr. Clifford that delegation of Private-Bill business to Judges, as proposed by Mr. Craig- Seller, is not the best expedient, though even that, if accom- panied by a judicious series of Public Acts on the model of the Lands Clauses and Railway Clauses Acts, and made compulsory, would be far better than the present system. It would at least avoid heavy coats in unopposed Bills, but it would not lessen the costs in opposed cases. The true system would be to lay down rules in general Acts, and, subject to such rates, to delegate matters which only concern a single community, borough, or union—such as water, and gas, and tramways—to the governing body of that community, subject to the control, where necessary, of the appropriate Government Department. Matters such as railways and main-drainage schemes, and river- pollution and conservancy, which concern a number of different local governments, might be left in unopposed cases to the authority concerned, and in opposed cases to the Local Govern- ment Board, Board of Trade, or Home Office, as the case might be. It is argued that these Departments would act on settled principles and fixed rules, and that the persons concerned would know beforehand on what lines the orders would run. Could there be a stronger argument in favour of the substitution of this for the present system, where the glorious uncertainty of the law is reduced to an absolute lottery, in which it is only the unexpected that happens P Any danger there might be that departmental principles would harden into immutable reglations that would stifle progress, could be easily obviated by Public Bills and Select Committees from time to time, such as that which lately sat, for instance, to inquire into the methods of the Charity Commission under the Endowed Schools Acts, or the Royal Commission now sitting on the administration of the Elementary Education Acts by the Education Department. Happily, Lord Salisbury, as he showed when he was Lord Robert Cecil, equally with Mr. Gladstone, is convinced of the importance of the abolition of the-present system of Private•Bill legislation, in the interests alike of an overloaded Parliament and an overcharged public. Strong as is the influence of Parliamentary agents, solicitors, and counsel, we do not believe that it will be allowed by the present Government to prevent the introduction of their promised reform of the present wasteful, costly, and stupid system.
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