TOPICS OF THE D.Y.
A REVIEW OF THE WAR.
ON September 5th we wrote : " We and the French have got the wolf by one ear and the Russians have got him by the other, and though he may use his teeth with terrible effect, if we have the hardihood and patience to hold on we shall finish him in the end. And we shall have the hardihood and the patience." It was perhaps premature to write that a fortnight ago, but at the present moment it represents the situation pretty accurately. During the past week the wolf has been struggling specially hard to drag his head out of French and British jaws, but he has not yet succeeded. As we write his paws are planted firmly on the river Aisne, and he is making a desperate effort to wrench himself free. If he succeeds, he will either retreat to rest before making another leap, or else he will at once begin another rush for- ward, when we and the French will again have to catch and hold him. This is the state of the war at the moment, but so quick are the changes that ours may be an altogether out-of-date presentment of the situation in the western theatre of the war before these pages reach our readers' hands. To abandon metaphor, what has happened since our previous issue is that the movements the beginnings of which we chronicled as we wrote on the morning of Friday week have developed, as we believed they would develop, not into a ruse de guerre to draw us on, or into a concentration on the centre which would enable the Germans to break through the French line en masse, but into a decided movement to the rear. The Germans have retreated along the whole of their line, which once stretched from Verdun to the environs of Paris, or rather have undertaken a swinging movement with a position a little north of Verdun as the pivot, a move- ment involving, of course, a much wider sweep, and so a much greater giving of ground on the German right than on the centre or the line near the pivotal point. The Germans have already evacuated Amiens, Soissons, Rheims, and Nancy, and, speaking generally, hold the line of the Aisne. While the Germans were falling back from the line of the Marne the French and British attacked them vigorously, and thus there was almost an exact repetition of what happened when we and the French had to fall back after the battle of Mons to the line Paris-Verdun. In the earlier part of the German retreat the Germans lost a great many guns and prisoners, and there was a good deal of confusion, and probably a shortage both of food and ammunition. Gradually, however, the Germans, with their wonderful discipline and power of organization, re-established their line, and by vigorous, and in many cases heroic, counter-attacks held back their pursuers while the main part of their Army got away and created a series of entrenched positions along the Aisne.
The French and British losses in this work of forcing back an unbroken enemy were very severe. It now remains to be seen whether the Germans can hold their position, or whether we can carry it or outflank it. It would, of course, be ridiculous for us to advance any opinion as to the proper way of dealing with the situation. We can only express the hope, on one side, that we shall not hammer our- selves to pieces against a brick wall, and, on the other, that the French Generalissimo will not hesitate to make an appeal to the Allied Armies to carry the position by direct attack if he should hold that to be necessary. It is here that the quality of judgment in war comes in- s, most rare as it is also a priceless quality. It is most important when once you have got to grips with the enemy not to leave off hammering him. You must not give him an opportunity to take breath. On the other hand, it is always a mistake to kick against the pricks. Military genius largely consists in deciding, and deciding quickly, whether it will at a particular moment pay to be adventurous or cautious. Happily, if General Joffre decides to be cautious, and merely to hold. the Germans on the Aisne, risking—for there is always the risk—a vigorous counter-attack on their part, there is still open to him the chance of enveloping the German right. Very possibly be is at that game while we write. Certainly the situation cannot be described as unfavourable for the Allies. It is distinctly favourable. At the same time, it is quite possible that before our next issue the pendulum may have once more swung in the other direction and the Germans may be again advancing. If they do, the French and British Armies and peoples will know how to bear a reverse, as they have borne the success of the past week. In any case, the situation is never likely to be as bad as it was during the retreat from Mons. Even if the Germans were to have all the luck in the world on the Aisne, and were able to start once more on the invasion of France, it would take them a fort- night to get back to the line Paris-Verdun, and they have no fortnights to throw away.
Before we leave the western theatre of the war it would be interesting to say something as to General von Kluck's sharp left turn ten days ago and his march to the north- east. The Germans tell us that General von Kluck decided to do that because he felt that he could "ignore" the beaten British Army. His calculation was not sound, for that alleged beaten Army at once engaged him, and it was in daily and nightly combats with them that he passed the week. The fact seems to be that General von Kluck acted with the usual remorseless logic of the German military metaphysician. The British Army consisted of so many thousand effectives. It had been forced to retreat after the battle of Mons, had retreated fighting for five days, and during that time had lost so many officers in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Such were the facts. The youngest Staff officer by reference to a military text-book could draw the conclusion—an army beaten in this way and losing a particular percentage of men must be held by all the rules of scientific warfare to have ceased to be effective, to be no longer an army in being. Therefore it could rightly be "ignored." Accordingly the British Army was ignored by General von Kluck, till he found that text-books some- times err, and that armies which have ceased to be in being and ought not to count refuse to give up the ghost, but attack with disagreeable persistence at the moment when, if they were decently behaved, they should be restoring their shattered moral.
General von Kluck's unfortunate calculation reminds one of a delightful American story of the early days of the gold rush to San Francisco, when it was exceedingly difficult to get to the Pacific coast. A New Yorker newly arrived in San Francisco met in the street a German friend from whom he had parted some months before in the Eastern States. The German greeted him cordially with the remark : " Have you come the prairie over ? " " No," said the New Yorker. " Ah ! have you come the isthmus across ?" " No, I have not." " Ah ! then you have come the Horn around ? " " No," was again the answer. Upon this the German drew himself up to his full height and passed on with the remark : " Then you are not arrived !" The German only recognized three possible ways, and, indeed, there were then only three visible ways of reaching San Francisco. The man who declared that he had not come to San Francisco by any of these three routes was prac- tically not in being. He could not have come by any other means, and therefore he was scientifically and logically not there, and must be ignored—just as General von Kluck felt that he could ignore General French's Army. Logic is a useful instrument, but it is sometimes a very bad guide, especially where the human factor is so predomi- nant as it always must be in war.
If we turn to the eastern theatre of the war, we find ourselves upon a wider and much more dramatic scene. There the combatants are not nearly so evenly matched, and therefore the tumult and shock of war are far more marked. If two railway trains of about equal weight and speed meet squarely in collision, less injury is done than one would think. The greatest railway disasters are caused when an express dashes into a stationary train or one moving very slowly. In the first case there is a resolution of forces which does not exist in the other. In the same way, if A hits out with his left and B does the same with his right, and the two fists come into contact, each, as it were, pushes the other away, and there is little damage done. It is very different when A strikes out with all his might and hits B's bead. The feeble resistance of the Austrians to Russia's persistent attacks has ended in a great victory. The latest telegrams from Russian official sources show that what has happened in Galicia is not an Austrian defeat, but an Austrian rout. Since the capture of Lemberg it is estimated that the Austrians have lost a, quarter of a. million men in killed and wounded, a hundred thousand-
prisoners, four hundred guns, and vast quantities of stores. Among the four hundred guns are thirty-six pieces of German heavy artillery and several dozen pieces of siege artillery.
That is Sedan, and something worse than Sedan, for the great Austrian Army which, helped by Germany, was to deal a crushing counter-stroke to the Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia. It would seem, however, that at present in Eastern Prussia the Russian advance is not only stayed, but that the Russians have been so much driven back that, for a time at any rate, Konigsberg is relieved. It is rumoured, indeed, that the Germans, having collected some eight hundred thousand men in the centre—i.e., around Posen —are invading Poland where it sticks out into Germany. They hope by that invasion to check the Russian advance. They are mistaken. The Russians are quite prepared to let them get to Warsaw if they can, and will not thereby be in the least deflected from the main object of their advance in Galicia. Lemberg has fallen, and when Przemysl has followed its example, as it will very shortly, why should not the Russians advance through Hungary towards Vienna ? As far as we can see, there is little or nothing to stop them. Remember that Cracow, as the crow flies, is only about three hundred miles from Vienna. If our readers will look at the map, they will see that there is something to be said for such a plan, though at first sight it seems impossible. In the first place, it is a much easier job to march to Vienna than to Berlin, and further, Vienna is comparatively a abort way from Bavaria. If the Russians were ultimately to get to Munich or Ulm—name of evil omen—the pressure upon France must at once be enormously relieved. A Russian invasion of South Germany would, indeed, have more effect in imperilling the German situation in the western theatre than even the occupation of Berlin. Another reason for moving on Vienna rather than Berlin is the existence of Bohemia. Unless all the rumours are untrue, Bohemia is ready to rise, and at least half, or rather more than half, the population would greet the Russians as deliverers. To borrow Cromwell's phrase, these, however, may be " carnal thoughts " and bad strategy. The Russians can be trusted to do the right thing in the right way. In any case, we feel sure that they will press on unmoved by temporary reverses in East Prussia, or even in North Poland, assisted in the first place by a movement from Servia, and later, we hope, by a movement from Italy northward from Trieste and the Brenner.
The mention of Servia reminds us that it is the duty of all English publicists to make people here understand the splendid heroism with which the Servians have fought. They have contributed very greatly to the overthrow of Austria, and their brave Army and nation deserve all the help and encouragement that the Allies can give. We and the French very properly guaranteed a loan to Belgium. We, France, and the Russians ought to do the same by Servia, for the little nation's finances must by this time be very nearly exhausted. If twenty or thirty millions were put at the disposal of Servia, she would not only feel greatly heartened thereby, but she would, we believe, be able to call to her arms vast numbers of the floating fighting population of Slava in the Near East. Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to mention Dalmatia and Croatia, are full of men who, as the Austrians retreat, will be delighted to flock to the Serb banners and reinforce their armies. English people have been prejudiced against Servia because of the slaughter of the Servian King and Queen. That deed was brutal and infamous beyond words, but it would be most unfair to put upon a whole people a stigma which attaches to a particular group of men—the military regicides who planned and carried out the plot. Turkish misrule no doubt has left its mark upon the Servians, and made them guileful as well as ferocious in war. They have, however, many qualities out of which a strong nation can be made, and it should be our business to help them to lay well and truly the foundations of a new and sound nationality.
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