LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
THE DECLARATION OF LONDON.
[To THE EDITOR Or THE "SPECTATOR."] you permit me to say something on the subject of the food supply of this country in the event of war, and the Declaration of London, because I agree entirely with Mr. Atherley-Jones in his letter published in your last issue, that the subject is one which deserves full consideration, though I cannot accept his conclusion that no reasonable person could hold it to be for the interest of this country that the Declara- tion should be ratified ? Of the foodstuffs brought to this country, far the largest portion—I believe about 90 per cent. —is brought in British ships, and this, in the event of war, would of course be liable to seizure, not as contraband, but as private property of the enemy at sea. With this foodstuff the Declaration of London has nothing to do. As now, so after the ratification of the Declaration, we must look to our Navy to protect this branch of trade.
The foodstuffs brought in neutral bottoms, though much less than that brought in British ships, is nevertheless of great importance to the country, and in the event of war the pro- portion would probably increase.
No doubt there is a considerable body of opinion and practice in support of the view that foodstuffs can be treated as contraband only when intended for the supply of the armed forces of the belligerent. But the opposite opinion— namely, that foodstuffs may be treated as absolute contra- band (i.e., may be seized whether intended for the support of the civil or military inhabitants of a country)—has been put forward and acted upon by great nations to a much greater extent than is admitted in Mr. Atherley-Jones's letter. To say nothing of the action of Napoleon during the great struggle with Britain, the doctrine was acted upon by us in 1793 and in 1795, when we seized all vessels laden with pro- visions which were bound to French ports, alleging as a sufficient justification that there was a prospect of reducing the enemy to submission by famine. In 1885 this doctrine was asserted to a full extent by France during her hostilities with China, when she declared shipments of rice destined for any port north of Canton to be contraband of war, alleging as sufficient excuse the importance of rice in the feeding of the Chinese people as well as of the Chinese armies. This action on the part of France is said to have brought about complete cessation of shipments of rice to China, and so, whether justifiable or not, effected the purpose in view; and, what is very noteworthy, the German Government refused, when solicited by its own merchants, to protest against the action of France on the tround that the step was justifiable as increasing the diffi- }el:titles of the Chinese and as tending to shorten the war. Again, Russia in 1904 placed provisions on a general list of ,contraband, and, although she subsequently withdrew it under pressure, she did so without any admission of its illegality, and after having inflicted great injury upon our- selves and other neutrals. Furthermore, the doctrine is not unknown that, irrespective of treaty, a belligerent govern- , raent has the right, as against all neutrals, to determine what is and what is not contraband.
From what I have said it is plain that there is a great 'Tariety of opinion and practice on the question of how far foodstuffs can be treated as absolute contraband; and it is obvious that if we were engaged in a war, our enemy would remember that we are, above all other nations, dependent on sea-borne provisions, and that he would be under the strongest temptation to adopt the doctrine which would justify the seizure of all foodstuffs in neutral bottoms.
To this great peril we are exposed if the Declaration of London remains unratified, and from this great danger we are delivered if the Declaration be ratified. For, whatever may be said about it, this is plain : that no nation who was a party to it can ever declare foodstuffs to be absolute contraband. But then it is said that the definition of it as conditional con- 4raband is open to serious objection. I cannot think so. Article 33 provides that " conditional contraband is liable to capture if it be shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government department of the enemy state, unless in the latter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of the war in progress." Now this seems to me perfectly reasonable and just. If corn be destined for the armed forces or for a Govern- anent department of the enemy, it is reasonable that it should $e subject to seizure. Article 34 has been much relied upon as creating a difficulty ; but it is an article dependent upon, and not enlarging, the effect of Article 33. It states certain presumptions with regard to goods being conditional contra- band. These presumptions are : Firstly, if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or secondly, if they are con- signed to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy Government; thirdly, if the goods be con- signed to a fortified place belonging to the enemy or, fourthly be consigned to some other place serving as a base for the twined forces of the enemy ; and, lastly, it is provided that ;where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent.
Now taking the four presumptions of what I may call guilt of the goods in question. Is not each one of them reasonable P If the goods are consigned to an enemy authority, who can doubt that they are intended for war P But supposing it can be shown that they are not destined for the armed forces or for the Government department of the enemy state, then the presumption is rebutted and the articles are held to be inno- ent. I will not pursue the inquiry further, but I will only observe that every one of the presumptions in question is only important so far as it tends to show that the goods are con- ditional contraband under Section 33; that every one of these presumptions may be rebutted on evidence of fact, and that where they do not apply, the presumption of innocence arises.
Moreover, Article 35 would protect from seizure a vessel bearing foodstuffs to a neutral and neighbouring port, such as those of France, Holland, or Belgium, whence it might easily be transported to this country.
Looking, then, at the Declaration of London simply as regards its effect upon the supply of foodstuffs to this country by neutral bottoms in case of war, it appears to me that a cogent case is made out for the ratification of the Declaration.
May I add that no nation is so deeply interested in the ascertainment and codification of international maritime law as Great Britain ; that, according to the best opinion which I can form, the other provisions of the Declaration are as a whole strongly in our favour; and that I feel that if England were, after all that she has done by way of negotiation at The Hague and in London, to resile from the position which she has hitherto taken up, and neglect to ratify the Declaration, she would expose herself to the merited contempt
of the other great nations of the world, and delay indefinitely the progress of international relations of friendship.—I am,
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