Border Troubles
From DEV MURARKA
MOSCOW
THE Chinese decision to stay away from the twenty-third Soviet party congress has been received here with relief, if not with pleasure. The one major source of tension of the congress has thus disappeared. The Chinese would have lost anyway, even if they had come, but their de- cision not to participate may well produce a re- action among the delegates that the Chinese were seeking hegemony rather than just an audience. One story (not verifiable, but current here) claims that the Chinese demanded a guarantee that every- thing they said at the congress should be repro- duced verbatim in the Soviet press. This guarantee was not given.
In public, not even a whiff of the Soviet letter to the European Communist parties on the Chinese attitude towards Russia has appeared. But, as printed in some of the European papers last week, it appears to be authentic. It is even arguable that the letter was deliberately leaked in order to provoke the Chinese into refusing to attend the congress. But there is another more likely, though perhaps complementary, explana- tion. It has been known for some time that the Soviet leaders have no desire to force a show- down with China, which may be awkward for some of their own allies within the Communist movement and which may lose them all the gains they have made over China since October 1964. They were worried lest the final Soviet dispute flared up at the congress. The letter therefore was a device to forestall such an open debate.
In substance, the Soviet letter reveals very little that is unknown. Briefly, the Soviet thesis is that there is very little ideological content in China's dispute with Moscow. It is more a question of her traditional interests presented in an aggressive manner. The important point is made, however, that the Chinese are even more anxious to weaken Soviet power by bringing about an armed clash between the Americans and the Russians. More important still, and implied rather than stated, is the suggestion that in such an event the Chinese will take advantage of the situation to attack the Soviet Union and occupy vast tracts of Soviet territory in the Far East and central Asia.
The letter lays great stress on the fact that the Chinese are devoting considerable energy to spreading the idea of potential military clashes with the Soviet Union so that it finds acceptance with the Chinese people, and that if the clash does come about, it can be credibly blamed on the Russians. While no information is given out in Moscow about activities on the Chinese border, the letter admits the increasing frequency of border 'incidents.'
In this context, the recent contacts between Mongolia and the Soviet Union have assumed an added significance. When, last January, a high- level Soviet team, including the First Secretary, Mr Brezhnev, the Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko, and the Defence Minister, Marshal Malinovski, visited Mongolia, it was accompanied by a large number of military personnel. They went there not just to witness the signature to the renewed defence and friendship treaty, but also to inspect and plan the modernisation of the military instal- lations in Mongolia, many of them believed to be manned by Russians. It the event of an armed conflict between China and the Soviet Union, Mongolia is likely to be the proving ground of their relative military skill and strength. Mon- golia's geographical position is such that it would be essential for the Chinese to overrun it if they planned an attack on the Soviet Union. It is known also that the Chinese are still not recon- ciled to the country's independence. Thus while fear of the Chinese drives Mongolia towards a firm alliance with the Soviet Union, the Soviet interest also consists in making Mongolia a strong fortress against any possible Chinese attack.
Yet, although the Russians are undoubtedly strengthening their watch on the border, few really contemplate the possibility of an armed conflict. Certainly there is no evidence at all to show that the Russians either desire such a con- flict, or have prepared public opinion for such an outcome. The letter to the Communist parties, does, however, refer to the boundary question, and adds somewhat ominously that despite every Soviet effort the Chinese have refused to settle it. Not taking into account the 2,700-mile frontier between China and Mongolia, which in the event of a conflict must be mainly defended by Soviet
strength, the Sino-Soviet frontier stretches to a total of 3,980 miles, often over difficult terrain. So China's numerous territorial claims against the Soviet Union provide ample opportunity for con- tinuous border tension, and the Soviet Union can- not afford to take a risk.
What all this amounts to is that a fearful rivalry is building up between two of the three greatest powers in the world, one established and the other emergent. The proximity of their frontiers only makes their rivalry more capable of exploding like a powder keg. Yet the saving grace of this conflict may be the extraordinary caution which the Chinese display in dealing with those who are stronger than themselves. Pointing this out, the Soviet letter refers, of course, to the patience dis- played by China towards the Western powers. But this is equally, and deliberately, applicable to Chinese dealings with the Soviet Union. Apart from reducing their contacts to the minimum, the Chinese have concentrated on diplomacy and propaganda. If there have been occasional clashes on the border. this is in the secure knowledge that the Russians are not in the least anxious to en- large the conflict.
This practical caution on the part of China and the forbearance shown by the Soviet Union since the exit of Khrushchev sum up the pattern which is likely to prevail in Sino-Soviet relations. The battle of words will continue, but with less than full participation by the Russians. On the political front, however, the Russians will tenaciously pursue their policy of enlarging their own in- fluence, while weakening that of Peking on the Communist movement. For all practical purposes the Communist movement has fragmented, but with passing time, it is believed here, it may be that the Chinese will mostly gain national sup- port, while the Russians will be associated with the established and influential part of the move- ment. In the Soviet Union anxiety about relations with China has given way to indifference. Im- provement is sought but not expected, at least for a long time. The Russians foresee neither a break nor a rapprochement and the congress should do little to alter their outlook, therefore.
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