1 AUGUST 1868, Page 5

A SUPPRESSED PRUSSIAN DESPATCH.

GENERAL LA MARMORA has chosen a singular time for making a great addition to the secret history of the last Italian campaign. It is understood in Italy that a great struggle has for months past been going on between the Prussian and French Governments for influence in the Penin- sula, the King and the Piedmontese siding with France, the people generally with Prussia. This is the moment selected by General la Marmora to bring against Prussia the charge to which of all others her Government is most liable, and which of all others most annoys Italians,—the charge of rough arrogance in the treatment of its friends. The General com- plains that in a report by the Prussian Head-Quarters' Staff -upon the campaign which ended in the victory of Sadowa, the Italian Army was treated with unmerited disrespect, doubt even being thrown, as we understand the General; upon its courage. It appears, however, that General la Marmora had originally read only a French translation of the report, in which every dubious expression had been sharpened and ex- aggerated; and the Prussian Government instantly telegraphed to Florence not only that explanation, but a formal disavowal of .any intention to offend ; while the North German Gazette was ordered to publish an article full of compliments to the gallantry and devotion of the Italian Army. General la Marmora, driven from this point, admitted the inaccuracies of the French translation, but professed himself dissatisfied with the original German, and produced in support of his charge an unpublished despatch from Baron von Usedom, transmitting to him Count von Moltke's plan of the campaign. A translation of this document has been forwarded to London by the able corre- .spondent of the Standard, and well deserves the study of all who were interested in that marvellous campaign. It con- tains nothing whatever to justify any personal susceptibility on the part of the Italian General, but it is unmistakably couched in the tone rather of a superior than an ally, and it ends with a thinly concealed menace that unless adopted the alliance of Italy would be considered valueless, that is, in diplomatic danguage, would not be rewarded in the event of victory. General la Marmora might have reasonably felt annoyed for -the dignity alike of the Army he commanded and the country be served ; but his act in not only rejecting the plan, but leaving it undiscussed and unanswered, still requires historic explanation. An enormous scheme like that proposed in the despatch, signed by the representative of a great monarchy, -ought to have been most fully considered, however arrogant its tone or impracticable its tenor, and we do not wonder, though we greatly regret, that one of the sternest and most upright soldiers in Europe should have been accused of 'suppressing the despatch in deference to French counsels, and publishing it to further French schemes for a new -alliance.

The despatch, said to have been drawn up by Count von Moltke, and certainly signed by Baron Usedom, proposed to -General la Marmora a scheme of operations as daring as that which terminated in Sadowa, and which if successful would not merely have defeated, but have utterly destroyed the Austrian Empire. Nothing so comprehensive or, from some -points of view, so unscrupulous has in our time been proposed by a regular monarchy, and we do not wonder at the mingled terror and rage with which the Government of Vienna re- garded the "intrigues" of its hereditary foe. Count von -Moltke proposed two movements to General la Marmora,- 'who, be it remembered, was Premier and Foreign Secretary, as well as Commander-in-Chief,—first, that the Italian Army, avoiding the Quadrilateral altogether, should move into the open country, and march direct upon Vienna ; secondly, that General Garibaldi, with a strong Volunteer force, should land on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, and call Hungary to arms. "The information received by the Prussian Government leads it to believe that such a force would meet with a most cordial reception from the Sclavonian and Hungarian popula- tions," that the Croat and Hungarian regiments would refuse

to bear arms against a force welcomed by their countrymen, and that from Prussian Silesia a body of Hungarian exiles might be pushed forward to join the Italian force. Every blow, writes the Prussian, would then "be levelled at the heart of Austria."

It is impossible, of course, for a journalist at a distance to express, it is very difficult for him even to form, an opinion as to the merit of the first portion of this enormous project, which, had it succeeded, would have blotted out Austria from the list of States, and made of Germany a single empire under the Hohenzollern. All we can say is that wild as the scheme of passing the Quadrilateral may appear to outsiders, it was deliberately proposed by a man who has proved himself the first strategist in Europe ; that it would have placed the Italian Army in a position in which it must either conquer or perish ; and that victory would have utterly disabled the Archduke's Army, which, after Custozza, was rapidly withdrawn for the defence of the capital. In spite of Von Moltke's authority, however, General la Marmora, who best knew his own army, and what it could do and not do, was probably in the right in rejecting a plan which, while it promised all things for Prussia, promised little for Italy, which unless utterly worsted was sure in any event of Venetia. We can easily imagine that the General, at once Premier and Commander-in-Chief, felt that this was a point for himself, and himself only, to decide, that counsel or discussion would be worse than nugatory. But the second suggestion was strictly political, and involved no very enormous risks, It was undoubtedly favoured by many Hun- garians, who by taking part in the invasion from the North staked their lives upon its success ; it might in the than temper of Hungary have been fully successful, and had it been successful it would have produced results to which those which followed Sadowa were trifling. It is difficult to conceive that a plan so promising and so enormous should have been rejected merely because the General thought himself treated as nobody ; that it should not have been explained to the King, or discussed at least with a Committee of the Cabinet. It is quite possible that its rejection was wise; that General la Marmora knew that such a widening of the

war would have called Napoleon or Russia into the field ; that he needed the Volunteers as a reserve in the event of his own

defeat; that he distrusted Italian ability for so great an expedition over sea, or that he dreaded a victory which would have made united Germany Italy's next-door neighbour. But

the statement made by himself, as we understand his speech,

that he took the responsibility of leaving the despatch unanswered, seems to us to tell heavily against the claim of the General to count among great statesmen, and is certainly no sufficient ground for a charge against the Prussian Govern- ment.. If they were self-opinionated in proposing such a plan, so at least was their correspondent in rejecting it without due consideration. He says himself that it required for its execution absolute secrecy, and seems to resent the subsequent transmission of the plan through ordinary channels ; but this argument, though applicable to the march on Vienna, was surely exaggerated when applied to a revolutionary enterprise, which could not have been kept secret for a week. On that point, unless he has reasons to produce not yet revealed, the General would seem, for the first time in his life, to have permitted his sense of what was due to Italy to be overcome by a keener perception of what was due to himself.

The whole affair has now, outside Italy, only a historical meaning, and the interest of the despatch for the world now seems centred in the proof it affords that Prussia in challeng- ing Austria laid both hands on her sword ; that her Govern- ment really intended, if need were, to extinguish the Southern

Empire. Hungary could not have been called to arms with- out promises of autonomy, nor could Prussia and Italy have met under the walls of Vienna without the creation of a single and a complete German Empire. Moreover, to secure this grand result, the ruling men in Berlin were willing to appeal to the Revolution, and even to encourage soldiers in throwing down their arms. We cannot wonder that a statesman like Von Beust, aware of these facts, if not from Italian at least from Hungarian sources, should have postponed everything to

reconciliation with the Diet, or that Napoleon should doubt whether Von Bismarck, is really so moderate in his policy as he now professes to be, or finally, that both in Berlin and Paris the maintenance of a hold over Italy should be considered a matter of the very first importance. If the war were between Austria and France on the one side, Prussia and Russia on the other, Italy might yet hold the balance of military power.