DEWEY'S DISCOURSES ON COMMERCE, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS.

MR. DEWEY is favourably known for the elegance and spirit of a Sentimental Journey which he made in Europe a few years ago. His present publication possesses much of these charac- teristics, but is chiefly distinguished for the originality of his subject, which is really sermons on trading morality, and for the views of American notions of commerce the Discourses inciden- tally offer. The book is also remarkable for the general good sense by which the conclusions of the preacher are characterized— requiring no superhuman self-denial, or even very extraordinary virtue, in the trader. He is to use, Mr. DEWEY considers, any peculiar skill or any peculiar information which he may possess; but he is not to deceive by concealing any fault of quality, not usually supposed to exist ; or to demand more for a commodity than the understood market-price. This, however, is stating the preachers views with so dry a brevity that they must seem trite. Let him therefore speak for himself.

Besides, it is not only expedient and right, but it is inevitable, that indivi- dual power and talent shoul4 come into play in business. A man's sagacity, it is obvious, he must use ; that is to say, his mind he must use—for he has no- thing else to go by. He may use it unjustly, to the heinous injury of his weaker neighbour ; but still he must use it. Stiehl° with regard to the power acquired by a large property or by a monopoly, it is inevitable that it should be used. To some extent the possessor cannot help using it. Wealth has credit; and monopoly, usually implying scarcity, carries an enhanced price with it; and such results are unavoidable. Finally, superior actual knowledge may and must be used to sonic extent. In every department of business, superior know- ledge is gained by attention ; and it may and must be acted upon, albeit to the hurt or injury of those who know less, or have devoted less time and thought to the subject. A man has made an improvement in some machinery or manu- facture, and he is entitled to some reward for the attention he has given to it ; the government will give him a patent. A man has been to India or to South America to acquaint himself with a certain branch of business, and he comes home and acts upon his knowledge; and he has a perfect right to do so. He is not bound to communicate his knowledge to his brother merchants who are en- gaged in the same trade ; and, perhaps, his knowledge so much depends upon actual observation and experience, that he cannot communicate it. In like manner, a trader may obtain a superior knowledge of business, and of the facts on which it depends, by a close observation of things immediately around him, and he must act upon it; he cannot employ himself in going about to see whether other men have got the same enlarged views. Is.'-or have other met any right to complain of this. The unskilful painter or sculptor, the ignorant lawyer or physician, might as well complain that their more distinguished brethren were injuring their business, and taking all the prizes out of their hands.

A PREACHER'S DEFINITION OP VALUE.

What is the just price of an article? A man has something to sell ; he wishes to deal honestly ; the question then is, what shall he ask ffir it ? If he can settle this question, all is plain. How shall be settle it ? what is it that determines a price to be just ? Evidently not any abstract consideration of value. There can be no such thing as abstract value. The worth of a thing depends on the want of it. Originally, it is true, i. e. hi the first rude state of society, men, in exchanging the products of their labour, would naturally esti • mate the value of each al tide by the labour required to produce it. But even this estimate, though approaching nearest to It, would not present us with an abstract and absolute value ; and it would soon be disturbed by circum- stances effectually and beyond recovery. Labour would not be an accurate measure of value, because one man's labour, through its energy and ingenuity, would be worth far more than another man's. That primitive rule, too, inac- curate as it is, would soon, I repeat, be disturbed by circumstances. For sup- pose that one man bad manufactured axes mid another shoes, circumstances would inevitably arise that would give one or another of these articles a facti- tious value. In the winter season, when protection was needed for the person, and in the summer, which was favourable to the felling of timber, the value of those articles must be constantly fluctuating ; it would be factitious; it could not be determined by the amount of labour. And as we depart further from those primitive exchanges, we find circumstances, numerous, complicated, and very artificial, which affect value. The wants, fancies, and fashions of so- ciety; the state of crops and markets, and of trade all over the world ; the va- riations of the seasons; the success or failure of fisheries ; improvements in machinery ; discover:es in art ; and the regulations of government ; all these things, suit many more, conspire alternately to fix and disturb, from day to day, that ever fluctuating thing called price. It is nut any one man's judgment or conscience that can ascertain the value of any thing, but millions of individual judgu eats go to make up the decision. It is in vain to say that such and such things are worth little or nothing, that they are unnecessary or useless, or that they confer no advantage proportionate to their cost : that is not the question. What will they fetch? is the question. You may, in a fit of generosity or a scruple of conscience, sell them for less ; but the moment they are out of your bands, they will rise to the level of the market ; you have lost the difference, and gained nothing for your generous principle. In fine, the value of a thing is the market.price of it. This is the only intelligible idea of value, and the only reasonable adjustment of price.

NATURAL MONOPOLY.

That a man should set himself by dexterous management to get into his pos. session all the corn in market, in order to extort an enormous price for it, is felt to be oppressive and wrong. But there is often a monopoly, to a greater or less degree, resulting from simple scarcity ; and in this case, that enhancement of price which is so odious, is perfectly inevitable; nay, it may be even beneficial ; for high prices lessen consumption, and may prevent famine. But at any rate, high prices in a time of scarcity are inevitable. Even if all the corn or all the coal were in the hands of one man, and he should sell the half of his stock to the wholesale dealers at a moderate rate, and hold the remainder at the same rate to keep the price down, still, I say, the moment the article left his hands, the law of scarcity would prevail and raise the price. Monopoly, therefore, compels and of course justihea an enhanced price.

TIIE DEBTOR.

The man is in debt ; he is obliged to look in the face people, and perhaps

poor people, whom he cannot pay. It is a situation infinitely ating and mortifying. We are a people, I know, to a proverb reckless of debt—reckless, at least, about plunging into it : but no man can be in it and find the situation an easy one. No man can without passing, I had almost said, through worse than purgatorial torments, become callous to the demand for payment. It turns the whole of life into is scene of misery and mortification—makes its whole busi- miss and action a series of sacrifices, and shifts, and subterfuges. Home itself, the last refuge of virtue and peace—the very home that has lost its indepen- dence in its splendour, that is not protected from the intrusive step and con. tetoptuous tone of the unsatisfied creditor—has lost its charm. It is no longer a sanctuary ; and is but too likely to be forsaken for other resorts. Many a

man, not only in the city but in the country, has gone down in character and self-respect, in virtue and hope, under the accumulated weight of these over- whelming embarrassments.

The only deviation from a sensible and worldly, though still a strong moral view of the ethics of trade, on the part of Mr. DEWEY, is in his decision upon the celebrated Rhoilian case,* first debated by DIOGENES of Babylon, and his pupil ANTI- PATER • apparently decided upon by CICERO *I• in favour of the Alexandrine merchant telling the Rhodians that many vessels laden with corn were on their way ; discusEed by GROTIUS, and several other modern jurists, whose leaning is against CICERO ; whilst Mr. DEWEY affirms his judgment. As the case is so skilfully put as to include the whole of mercantile morality, it may be worth while to go into it.

If the principle laid down by DIOGENES be admitted, "that the buyer should not be kept in ignorance of any thing which the seller knows," then there is an end of the case. As soon as the corn-merchant arrived at Rhodes, he should have said—" It true you are grievously distressed for bread ; grain is at a most enormous price, which you will gladly pay me ; but you are fools if you do, for a whole fleet is on its way hither, and in a day or two your markets will be supplied." Such a view, however, is totally opposed both to modern practice and theory too ; and would, if carried out, act as a premium upon idleness and ignorance, and check all individual enterprise in commerce, so far as it is stimulated by a love of gain. But even upon abstract grounds we are inclined to doubt the conclusion. Barter, los commerce,

especially wholesale commerce, from its very nature, is an en- counter of judgments; and it was open to the Rhodians to use theirs. It was clear that their distresses were known, else what brought the corn-merchant to their city ? It was highly probable

• Si (exempli gratis) vir bonus Alexandria Rhodum magnum frumenti nu. xnerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame, summaque annonm caritate : ei ideas mist, complures mercatores Alexandria solvisse, navesque incursu fru. mato mates, petentes Rhodum, viderit, dictorusne sit id Rhodiie, an silentio suum qaam plums° venditurns? "—Crete°, De Off. lib. iii. cap. 12. f Mr. Dew'y attributes the putting of the case to CICERO: but it ap• peers to base been merely decided upon by him, and seems to have been a knotty theme kw the schools.

that one having arrived, more vessels were on their way; an many minute points—such as the weather, the sail ing character and management of the ship—could be estimated, as to whether it would be better to buy the cargo at once, at the maket-price, or wait the chance of fresh arrivals. If indeed the scarcity had been so great that the Rhodians could not wait, then the silence or avowal of the corn-merchant would have made no difference—he would have the people in his power, and might demand what he pleased; nor would it have made much difference had' given his corn away, unless it would have supplied the whole detaand, for those to whom he gave it might have resold it.

It is when the consequences of DIOGENES' opinitn are fully car- ried out, however, that its error is more distinctly seen. It is only upon the chance of making high or perhaps enormous profits, that the evils of famine are, or in those times were, diminisiletl. When a scarcity occurs, surplus corn is not collected at mach cost and industry, with an attendant risk—vessels are not freighted and sailed, with the trouble and expense attached to unusual speed—on the chance of average profits, though in the end only average profits may be made. Everybody tries to be first, because (where no legal restrictions interfere) those who want an article of prime necessity are always prepared to pay those handsomely who first supply them. But although, out of the many who stir themselves in such ventures, only a few can be first, all hope they may be; all act as if they should be ; and the result is to cause as full a supply in the country suffering under scarcity, as the actual cir- cumstances of the time admit, and at a much less cost in the long run, than if people considered anybody's advantage beside their own, or acted upon the rule of DIOGENES.

We have discussed this matter upon the ground Mr. DEWEY WS it on—the ethics of commerce. As a matter of generosity or sentiment, the conclusion might be different ; and perhaps CICERO may be right in his decision, when the case is limited, as he limits it. " Sapientent et Gomm: virunt fineeinus : de ej.us deliberatione et consultatione quterimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non si hl turpo judicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit."