1 DECEMBER 1877, Page 7

THE STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION.

THAT the pro-Turkish journals should assert with mono- tonous regularity that the country is with them, and eager to see the Ministry adopt a "decided " emilte, is only

natural. Some of their conductors probably believe it, and the remainder think the assertion one of the common-places of party warfare. It is, however, more surprising to hear of serious politicians who believe firmly that the resistance to a war policy comes only from a class, which almost by an acci- dent happens to include many journalists ; that it would dis- appear the moment the leaders showed themselves decided ; and that a dissolution, preceded by a warlike manifesto, would result in a heavy majority for Lord Beaconsfield and Mr. Hardy. That opinion, held as it is, is so dangerous, that it is worth a careful examination, and the more so because it has one undoubted fact in its favour. It is usual with the English people, when asked by its Government whether it will go to war, to say yes. The nation, though not military, is warlike, is apt in excited times to fret under a policy of inaction, and possesses a political instinct which teaches it that when once the Government threatens war, it is best in most cases to sup- port it, whatever the sacrifice involved. In this particular case, moreover, this readiness to fight might be expected to display itself with unusual quickness. It is felt, so far as it is felt, more strongly in London than the provinces; and London, though it by no means governs the Empire, often gives it a cue. It is displayed by the Army, which has retained the tradition of its last European war ; and it is approved, though with latent reserves about alliances, by a large section, per- haps a majority, of the class which, in ordinary times and upon other subjects, controls local opinion.

Nevertheless, we doubt greatly whether the politicians who believe that the nation would support a Cabinet pledged to war with Russia are sufficiently informed, and would ask them to consider gravely the grounds of their opinion. They are right, we imagine, only up to a point just short of that at which support would be effective. The Army, though We are far from underrating the value of its opinion upon a ques- tion as much military as political, in an English electoral con- test does not count at all. "Society," though extremely power- ful, is by no means omnipotent, and on this occasion is divided into two bedies, nearly equal perhaps in number, but very unequal in zeal and determination. Those who are opposed to such a war are finally opposed to it. They will wage no war with Russia until the Turks are out of the field, and alliance with that race an impossibility. If they are to fight, they will fight after the burial of the Sultanet. If a war policy is announced, all Liberal "society," without distinetien between the "Professors" and the wealthy, will resist as one man, the old Whigs, with the Cavendiehes at the head of them, being on this point as trustworthy as Mr. Gladstone or Air. Forster. It will not be a question of one orator of genius stumping the coun- try, though those who underrate the influence of Mr. Gladstone when absolutely convinced and roused to the full height of Itils powers do not understand the British electorate, but every Liberal Member, man of influence, and journalist will do his utmost to avert a struggle which, if it did not end in calamity, must end in disgrace. On the other hand, the approving section of society, even if the more numerous—which we doubt, for " society" is not confined to London—has reserves in the depths of its mind, and wishes for war, if art Egyptian policy is impossible, if there are guarantees that Germany will be neutral, and if trustworthy and powerful allies have been secured before-hand. Even while provoking war, its members praise the official neutrality, and fidget themselves with ideas of what might happen if England and RuSsia were completely occupied in a long and costly campaign. Bismarck might appear at the mouth of the Rhine. A great many of them, moreover, "would rather be without Turkey." They do not go farther than that. They pro- fess either a cynical indifference to Turkish oppression, or an ignorant confidence that the Christians are just as bad, but at heart they are doubtful whether even in a struggle with a bad Power it is right to seek the alliance of a worse. They would rather kill the bear, if they can, without the hyaena's help, and do not like enlisting murderers even to beat burglars. Their doubts injure their energy, and de- prive them of the advantage of the complete convictien which animates their opponents. Nor are they at all sere that the Music-hall opinion, of which they nevertheless make much, is exactly equivalent to popular opinion. They do not instinctively reverence London" cads." If they must go bolo* intelligent opinion, they like to have with them the opinion which, though unintelligent, has behind it in the last resort the weight of physical force.

Then as to that opinion, which, whether democracy be a good or an evil institution, must, as our Constitntion fib*

stands, and in great crises like a dissolution, govern us all, where is the evidence in which the pro-Turk trusts ? Is it in the journals ? The greatest of all the journals, and the one which most closely represents well-to-do opinion, is definitely opposed to such a war. That it would turn round if the nation had spoken, and spoken adversely, may be true ; but it has to-day to represent opinion as it is, and the opinion is unfavourable to a pro-Turkish war. Of the three London morning papers which are really popular and bought by multitudes, one, the Telegraph, is no doubt pro-Turkish up to the point of fighting for Turkey as Turkey, and has probably benefited, and certainly not lost, by adopting that line. It would be quite fair to assume, indeed, that the kind of mind which admires the Telegraph is throughout England in favour of war. But then the Daily News, which is directly on the other side, and would resist war, has not suffered either ; while the third, the Standard, which has a special hold over moderate rural Con- servatives, and almost always says—with one or two exceptions on philanthropic points—what they say, expresses with singu- lar exactness the view which the advocates of war dislike most of all, a view compounded of dislike of Russia, sympathy with the Ottomans, as a brave though tyrannical caste unfairly assailed, and aversion to enter on war unless this country is more directly menaced than at present. The even- ing papers, the Echo excepted, are no doubt exceedingly pro- Turkish, and even warlike, but then the evening papers have to influence men who have already imbibed their ideas and information from other and earlier journals. In the pro- vinces, again, so far as we know, there is no decidedly warlike journal. We cannot, of course, pretend to speak absolutely, but so far as our own experience extends— and it covers the habitual and persistent reading of every provincial journal which we know to have an exceptional circulation—there is not an important provincial paper in England in favour of war. There are plenty very suspicious of Russia. There are one or two very desirous indeed that this Conservative Cabinet should go on. But there are none which vote decidedly for war. That symptom is not of itself, we admit, quite decisive. The daily experience' of a quarter of a century has convinced us that there are a few cases in which the journalists, though representing, no doubt, their con- stituencies, are personally much more strongly convinced than their constituents are—this we believe to be undeniably true of many fiscal and nearly all humanitarian questions—but in this instance where is the smallest sign of any scission? Where are the warlike letters I Where are the large meetings enthusiastic for Turkey, or for more decided action ? Where are the borough Members hotly condemning the quiescence of the Cabinet. Has anybody followed Mr. Gorst's courageous lead ? Lancashire, in the last election, returned only Tories. Is Lancashire eager for war, or does it not rather congratulate itself on the skill with which the Ministry of its heart—only fancy Lancashire loving Disraeli, and the possibility that Sir Robert Peel may know it 1—has avoided war. Scotland is unanimous against war, and although Irish Catholics are sup- posed to be pro-Turkish, there is little proof of the supposi- tion, and a profound certainty that any series of events which either increased German prestige or reconciled Germany and Prance at the expense of Belgium—and pro-Turks declare either of those results possible—would be most displeasing to them, Outside London, there is not any great city with a trace of strong war feeling, and we fail to find any even in rural districts in the North. The general tone is one of quiescence everywhere, and this while the majority firmly be- lieve that the Government will remain neutral, and before the recognised Liberal leaders have been excited by the danger of coming hostilities to speak out. This quiescence does not imply at present Liberal reaction. On the contrary, it implies content with the attitude of the governing Committee. But it would allow of a reaction if war were threatened, and if the Liberals were suddenly compelled to exert themselves to the uttermost, under circumstances which would restore to them, for the moment at all events, the powerful aid of their best non-commissioned officers, the rulers of the Nonconformist Churches, who on this subject would be as zealous and as united as if the end were Disestablishrnent.

We do not say, and do not intend to imply, that the majority of British electors are pro-Russian. They are not. The one policy for which no hearing can be obtained is the true policy, —that England should join Russia in compelling the Sultan to surrender dominion over all Christian subjects, and to content himself with governing such Asiatics as are willing still to regard him as their head. If the Russian Court is mad enough to offer any insult to this country, or treacherous enough to make terms which would secure its own peace and profit with- out liberating the European from the Asiatic, the higher from the lower potential civilisation, or even if it made terms distinctly menacing to our one vital interest—our claim to be safe in Egypt—the nation would be nearly unanimous for war. But looking at affairs as they stand, with no new complication added to them, and as seriously as if .a dissolution were immi- nent, we see no reason whatever to believe that a war policy would have a majority in its favour, while we see a centainty that the division of opinion would be too deep and too fierce to admit of war. And we believe the reluctance will be still greater after the fall of Plevna than before, for then the Greeks, who hitherto have displayed inexcusable want of energy, would at last put in their claim to their natural heritage. And the British horror of Turkey is not complicated by any fear of Greece.