311/. GOLDWIN SMITH ON THE COLONIES.
ONE of the many unspoken beliefs of the philosophic Radicals has at length found open utterance. In a letter to the Daily _Yews, written with characteristic force and plainness, Mr. Goldwin Smith recommends England to give up her colonies. Whether self-governed or still administered from London ; whether in the tropics or in the 'temperate zone ; whether peopled by Englishmen, like Australia and the Cm:lades, or filled with the half-civilized descendants of slaves, like the West Indies, or occupied by swarms of powerless Asiatics, like Ceylon ; whether rising kingdoms, like New Zealand, or military barracks, like Gibraltar or Malta, he would surrender all. He holds their retention to be injurious to the colonies and to the mother country : to the colonies, because they are kept in pupilage, enabled to disregard conservative principles, and restrained in their natural and therefore healthy development ; to the mother country, because we gain nothing from them, and because they all over the world involve us in incessant conflict. Let us emancipate them all, and rely for our greatness on ourselves. It is well that an opinion secretly held by a large class should be openly discussed, and we are grateful to Mr. Goldwin Smith for an opportunity of showing that our colonial empire, on its existing principles, benefits the mother country and the colonies.
1. And first as to the mother country, for that, though not the point for cosmopolitan thinkers, is the first question for English statesmen. Human insight is too feeble for politicians to do great acts in order to secure an ultimate benefit to the whole world. All they can attempt, except on moral questions, like slavery, on which they have higher guidance, is to do the best they can for their own land, satisfied that in the general harmony of the Providential scheme, no one country can benefit by any just act without the remainder of the world sharing in the advantage. if England gains a new freedom, Europe must thereby acquire a new aspiration ; if She becomes richer, the remainder of the world finds more and cheaper capital available for its own rapid development. And to the mother country we hold that the advantage of the colonies is almost inestimable. We say nothing of the enormous additions theybring to our trade, for they might, as independent states, bring even more. India would not, for the natives, even if they could keep up the order essential to trade, are fierce and unreasonable protectionists; but we propose to leave India out of the discussion. Nor will we speak of the direct advantage to England from the tribute which the colonies really pay to hundreds of private families, for, except again in India, the amount is scarcely of serious importance. Nor will we lay any exaggerated stress on the opening the colonies afford to our surplus population, for Mr. G-oldwin Smith would reply that the surplus population could betake itself to independent states instead of the colonies, and with far greater inducements. We take our stand on two arguments broader as it seems to us even than these—the alliances our colonies ensure, and the effect we believe them to exercise upon the national tone. The colonial system yields us in every part of the globe strong and faithful allies, united to us by a tie which, by a singular felicity, gives us at all times, and under all circumstances, their assistance, without, in any corresponding degree, embarrassing our counsels. Take the Australian example. So long as we remain in our present relation to that great continent, we have in its growing population a power which secures to us a paramount influence in the Pacific and in the Indian Archipelago. Any menace to our trade there would injure and outrage Australia as much as ourselves, and we secure, without moving a soldier, hundreds of thousands of armed and brave men, ready to do battle in our cause. Separated, Australia would fight as heartily for herself, but nothing would bind her to secure our interests. In a war with France, for example, Australia is now a great allied power, sheltering our fleet, adding to our squadrons, helping us with Bailors and volunteers, throwing open her ports to us and not to our enemies. Separated, she would be a neutral, with her ships—and Australians own many— carefully withdrawn, her volunteers useless, her ports closed for any supply of the munitions of war. Yet, while affording us this assistance, she imposes nothing upon our counsels, sends no ambassador to interfere with the final arrangements, makes no stipulation for her share of the common advantages to be gained. Even in the case of Canada the advantages, though less, are still enormous. The Canadians, with their hearty loyalty, furnish a direct addition for American purposes of three millions of souls. It is true we have to fight for them, but surely the gain is at least more than equal to the loss. Imagine a war with America, with all American traffic passing as usual through Canadian ports, and every vessel which escaped the blockade retreating at its ease into neutral Canadian harbours. Mr. Smith will perhaps assert that we may have all these advantages from independent allies, and, under certain exceptional contingencies, we might. But all history teaches us that colonies once made independent drift further and further from the parent State, learn to regard her with ignorant or envious eyes, and end by concentrating on her all the jealousy inherent in the foreign policy of a half-recognized State. The colonial relation, wisely regulated, keeps friendship warm. The Americans, as people of independent States, have learnt to hate us ; the Canadians, as people of a self-governed colony, are ready to war in our behalf. We will say nothing of the spirit of loyalty, of the thousand sentimental ties which are broken by independence, for Mr. Goldwin Smith may possibly hold all those ideas to be mere emotions, unworthy of philosophical discussion. We reason the matter simply on political grounds, and affirm that the tendency of colonies is to be warm allies, and the tendency of independent States to be coldly hostile, and the difference is well worth an expenditure which probably costs us less than keeping up fortified coaling stations all over the world. Canada may be very costly, but it is not so expensive as Aden. The case of the tropical colonies, which seems weaker, is, in reality, even stronger. The emancipation of the West Indies and the Mauritius, Ceylon and British Guiana, only implies their transfer, against their own consent, to Powers who may any day be our enemies. Mr. Goldwin Smith says the West Indies are a mere burden, and will certainly be a perpetual source of embroilment with the Confederate States, and therefore he would give them up, to be seized by the Confederates, who would re-establish slavery, and repeal all our work for the last half-century. We might guarantee their independence? Certainly, but that involves a promise to fight for it just as much as our colonial connexion does, with the additional absurdity that we should be fighting for men on whom we could not reckon as allies. Moreover, independence, if it is to be of any real value, must be complete, and the dominant class in the West Indies might choose to join the Confederacy, and so at once increase an alien's strength, extend the area of slavery, and undo the difficult task we have so recently achieved. This argument seems to us almost irresistible, but it is a trifle compared with one which, though it cannot be estimated in money, or weighed in reckoning up political influence, will appeal at once to every thinking man in the land. The strength of England lies in the character of Englishmen, and to lower ourselves from an empire into a kingdom is permanently to lower the British tone. It is because we are a race invested with imperial power that we display the courage, and endurance, and self-restraint which are the attributes of aristocracies. Every educated Englishman knows that he is one of a class which reigns, which has personal and individual responsibilities to the future, and with the knowledge he gains the strength—call it pride, or nerve, or what you will—which moulded the Roman cha
racter, and makes the Englishman the calmest as well as the haughtiest of mankind. The sergeant who last year coldly
accepted death rather than kotow to a Chinaman,-.was of a
spirit which is formed only by imperial associations, and which, however fantastic its exhibitions may occasionally be, is the great secret of our strength. Much has been said of the calmness, and self-restraint, and disposition to abide by the law displayed by our middle classes in the Trent affair, and it is certain that we are the only race who listen calmly to
the pleading of our own orators against ourselves, who accuse our own proconsuls of the acquisitions they have made, and re-elect speakers who tell us day after day that we are blood-seeking idiots. Doubtless, we might have more of this quality with advantage, but if we are, as we undoubtedly are, the most self-fearing of nations, it is because we have learnt in the government of many races, affected by many interests, to put off parochial prejudices, to investigate opinions, to forbear until certain that we are palpably in the right. The possession of empire educates, and the State which is without it is like a man who has never mixed among men, never governed a household, never been compelled to consult others, and therefore deems, as the Federal Government does just now, that his own interests, and will, and ideas, are the only guides for his own action. With the loss of our colonial empire the tone of the national imagination would be hopelessly lowered. Our politics would be those of a great vestry; our projects would cease to be world wide ; our very trade would be dwarfed by the thought that nowhere out of England could the Englishman feel secure of the protection of his flag. We say nothing of the impression made upon other nations, of that great change in their imaginations which de Tocqueville argued so strongly would result from the loss of India. That might cost us but one great war, but we believe that the effect on our own minds, the result of a perpetual introversion of thought, would fatally injure the national character, and the national disposition for executing unselfish tasks. It is not the man who has nothing to think of but himself who is the noblest among men. Children are an expense like colonies, and have to be thought for, and helped, and protected, long after they have attained manhood ; but Mr. Smith will hardly argue that, therefore, celibacy is a better training than marriage. If a grand national tone, and a consciousness of high responsibility, and the existence of cordial alliances, and the habit of wielding restricted power,—if all these causes tend to make nations strong, then are the British colonies a benefit to the mother country.
2. None of these arguments apply, of course, to colonies retained in subjection only by force. They, except under very exceptional circumstances, must always be a source of weakness. We sincerely trust that the next time a colony desirous of emancipation, and competent to govern itself without fear of foreign aggression, demands its freedom, it will be arranged like any question between two friendly states by quiet negotiation. Nay, we would even provide by act of Parliament that a two-thirds vote repeated for three successive Parliaments, should at any time enable a colony of British blood to claim such a treaty of separation. But while we admit to the full the expediency of allowing a full-grown colony to withdraw, we utterly deny that withdrawal can be for its own benefit, either morally or materially. The first result of such a step would be heavy taxation, for a nation, to keep its trade, must in these days have a fleet, and even if we compel the colonies to keep up a second army, they are still spared the expense of a fleet. The second will be to plunge them at once, while still only half-educated, into a sea of democratic experiments. Mr. Goldwin Smith says, "The nominal subjection of the colonies to the British crown masks the want of a conservative element in their institutions, and makes them free to plunge into the excesses of universal suffrage," but he misses altogether the true point. The colonies have made their legislatures democratic, and the States will continue them such, but separation will make the other branch of the Government democratic also. It must never be forgotten that a British colony cannot have a democratic Executive, i.e. an Executive to which in the last resort the people can dictate. They may overturn the Ministry as often as they please, but the Governor, and the Governor's prerogatives, are as much beyond their reach as a King would be, indeed more so, for a dynasty might be terminated by violence, but no succession of murders could terminate the unending line of British viceroys. All politicians, except Mr. Goldwin Smith, have recognized the independence of the Executive as a strong conservative element, and as such it is regarded by the popular instinct. The Parisian Reds shouted "Down with King Veto !" be cause they felt instinctively that the immovable and independent King, however limited his powers, placed a limit on Revolution, and exercised, by the mere fact of his existence, a distinct political pressure. It is this sense of pressure from without, of a force to be reckoned with other than the mere will of the people, which is the true Conservative element in Commonwealths, and it is this which the colonists gain from their British connexion. Moreover, every one of the moral advantages which belong to the citizen of an empire, belongs also to colonists. The Canadian is a member of a mighty historical federation, able to rise to posts beyond his parochial sphere, affected by interests greater than his own, bound to act in conformity with circumstances which he cannot rule, trained, in short, to the political grandeur of view and self-restraint in action which are the first qualities of high political States. There is no aristocracy in Canada, as Mr. Goldwin Smith justly observes, and no means at present of making one ; but the entire people is undergoing an aristocratic training, acquiring from its connexion with Europe the very tone which a resident aristocracy would by degrees impart. The connexion with Great Britain, as now maintained, brings them all the advantages of an empire without its cost. So sensible are they of these facts, that when brought, as in Canada, to the test, they decline independence, and start up in arms to maintain what seems to them an invaluable nationality. Doubtless, as they grow strong and feel that they may possess a separate weight in the world, they will long for independence, perhaps demand it, and no true friend of Great Britain would advocate its refusal. But the demand must come from them, not from us ; the son must quit the family roof, not be kicked out, guiltless of all offence, into the world. Mr. Goldwin Smith agrees with the elder Weller, that the way to make a boy hardy is to thrust him into the gutter, but politicians are not yet prepared for that bit of cockney philosophy. If political training and exemption from the worst evils of war, and light taxation, and a responsible but firm Executive are advantages to a young State, the colonies will continue to value as they do their cool and pleasant shelter " neath the vast shadow of that guardian throne." There is one of Mr. Smith's arguments to which we have not endeavoured to offer a reply. Canada, he says, excites the cupidity of the North, the West Indies will embroil us with the South, reinvigorated Spain will demand her Gibraltar, and France, he might have added, thirsts for the Channel Islands. And what then? Is Mr. Goldwin Smith going to give up his purse, or his watch, or the smallest morsel of uselessness in his possession, because the strong beggar looks greedily at it, and may possibly make a clutch ? We trow not ; and until he has reduced himself to that pleasing and Christian frame of mind, he had better refrain from supporting political arguments by appeals to English cowardice. Russia may one day struggle with us for the possession of India, but her greed as little impairs our right as our greed strengthens it. The colonies, however acquired, are ours, and our duty is not to shake them off in a fit of lethargic timidity, but so to govern them that they shall regard our rule as the first of political blessings, and when we part.— as we must at last—may regard us as men regard fathers who have been wise guides as well as cordial friends.
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