THE FRENCH ROYALISTS.
TN the times of Tuesday', the Paris correspondent gives L 'an estimate of the character of the next General Elec- tion in France which is of interest for another reason than that for 'which it is put forward. Owing to the present position of French parties, he tells us, it has come about that " by a singular evolution the coming elections, favourable as they are bound to be to the Republican form, will assume a sort of dictatorial character, and will be as the phrase is here, for or against N. Waldeck-Rousseau." We do not propose to consider the accuracy of this forecast, or to inquire whether it need. mean anything except that the fact that the issue is the victory or defeat of a strong Minister ordinarily imparts a " dictatorial " character to the election which is to decide it. But putting M. Waldeck-Rousseau and the coming elections altogether on one side, it is certainly true that political conflicts in France have a special tendency, over and above those of other countries, to take a " dictatorial " shape. The general is always an important element in a battle, but this is true in an unusual degree when the soldiers are Frenchmen. If it has been less tree of the political contests of recent years, it has been owing to the absence of strong characters in the political field. It was true when Gambetta was alive, it will always be true except in periods—sometimes of considerable length —when there is no conspicuous figure before the country. Why, then, in view of this special characteristic, are the prospects of a Royalist restoration so infinitesimal ? The desire to be governed by a, man rather than by an assembly ought, one would think, to be favourable to Royalist hopes. Yet this desire, evident as are the traces of it in the French people, has for more than half a century done the Royalist Pretenders no good. It found its gratification in the Second Empire, but in a form quite as hostile to Royalty as the Republic itself ; and since the fall of the Second Empire, chequered as have' been the fortunes of the Republic, no Royalist Pretender has had a• chance worth speaking of. No doubt the Pretenders themselves have contributed to their own failure. In their various ways Henry V., the Count of Paris, and the Duke of Orleans have all wanted something that was essential to the character they wished to sustain. But restored' Princes have not always been men of distinguished ability, and one at least of the men who have been most dangerous to the Third Republic was a man of no ability at all.. We must leek further, therefore, for an explana- tion.
To some extent probably the Royalists have been un- popular in France from their association in the minds of the peasantry with the abuses of the time before the Revolution. The peasant does not realise that these abuses are past beyond all danger of recall.The recollec- tion of the days when except in name he was little better than a serf has filtered down to him through intermediate generations, and he argues that if there were once more a King in Prance there would be an aristocracy, and the rights of an aristocracy, and that by degrees these rights would once more be exercised to his disadvantage. It is true that there was a King in France from 1815 to 1848, and that these consequences did not follow in any great degree. But the Bourbon and the Orleanist Restorations made little impression on the peasant's mind. They were made and overthrown without his aid. His idea of kingship is derived from an earlier period, and while this idea lasts he will remain passively hostile to any Royalist movement. It is not that he values Parlia- mentary institutions. If he did the Napoleonic legend would have had no charm for him. That it has such a charm the Revolution of 1848 showed.' His name made Louis Napoleon President of the Republic, his name secured the condoning plebiscite that made him Emperor. The disaster of Sedan destroyed the particular illusion, but we are by no means sure that if the represen- tative of the Bonapartist family were a strong man it might not revive in some unforeseen way. Happily for the Republic, there seems no present likelihood that the strong man will a and in his absence the peasant will put up with a ukic which he does not greatly believe in or greatly love. It does him no harm, and this perhaps is the highest praise he can give to an institution. Whether he will come to distrust it actively depends in part upot the relations between the Government and the Socialists, and in part upon the extent to which the Socialists succeed in reassuring him on the question of private property. A Socialist Republic will have no terror for him if he is per- suaded that his farm is safe, while if he is not rersuaded of this he will not for long tolerate any Government that he suspects of being subject to Socialist influences. But these considerations lie outside all questions of dynasty. The Socialist spectre may upset Cabinets, it will hardly again upset the Republic ; and if it did, there is little chance that a Bourbon would be chosen to lay the ghost.
Nor have the Royalist tactics for years past been of a kind to recommend the party as the natural barrier to a Socialist inroad. They have seldom refused to make common cause with the Socialists provided that their joint action could in any way injure the Republic. The result has been to exhibit them from time to time as the enemies of that established order of things which they profess to uphold. The man in the street, or in this case the man at the plough, does not understand distinctions of this subtle kind. He sees those whom he is asked to regard as his defenders acting in concert with those against whom he seeks to be protected. The explanation given him is that their alliance is only temporary, that they have a common foe in the existing Republic, and that this must be got rid of before any effective bulwark against Socialism can be set up. If the Socialists are short-sighted enough to attack a. Republic which is really doing their work, why should not the Royalists profit by their folly and use them for their own purposes ? The answer is that finesse is useless when the object is to impress large masses of people. They do not understand it, and they suspect those who employ it. The only chance that the French Royalists have ever had since the fall of the Empire lay in identifying themselves with the conservative instincts of Frenchmen. But from the overthrow of Thiers to the present time they have taken the opposite course. Instead of coming to the support of such conservative elements as the Government of the moment might happen tos, their policy has uniformly been one of destruci:sa.es They have aimed at clearing the ground in the hope that they will get the order for the building that is to be erected on it. But to make these tactics safe those with whom it rests to give the order must be in the secret. If they are not they will probably feel that the men who are seem- ingly anxious to leave them without a roof over their heads are not the men to whom it will be wise to entrust the work of rebuilding. There have been many Cabinets in France under the Third Republic, and some of them have been decidedly more Conservative than others. Have these last received any support from the Royalists in the Chamber ? Not at all. The Royalists have been as hostile to them, as willing to defeat them at the first opportunity, as though they had been the most Radical of the series. That is not the way to win the confidence of a public which sees only what is close to it, but sees that very clearly.
The Royalist policy with regard to religious questions is equally calculated to puzzle the simple spectator. In word the Royalists are devoted to the Church ; in act they treat it as a mere counter in the Royalist game. There have been two conspicuous instances of this of recent years, besides many smaller instances. The first was the appeal of the Pope to French Catholics to accept Republican institutions. That appeal may have been open to criticism as an interference on the part of the spiritual power in political matters, but the Royalist Opposition could hardly take this ground without an 9pen quarrel with the Vatican. Accordingly they simply ignored the appeal. It was in vain that Leo XIII. pointed out the injury to religion likely to be done by a Govern- ment from which Catholics stood aloof. The answer which the Royalists gave in fact, if not in word, was that the more harm the Republic did tb religion the more un- popular it was likely to become, and by consequence the more the Royalist cause would benefit. The fault of this reasoning was that it implied the entire subordination of the obvious interests of the Church to the supposed interests of the Royalist Pretender. We do not suppose that to play fast and loose with religion very much shocks the average Frenchman. But a sentiment not at all shocking in itself may be shocking in the mouth of a particular body of men, and the Royalists had so often deplored the loss at the Pope's temporal power that their virtual defiance of his spiritual authority must have seemed an act of peculiar inconsistency. The second instance is their action in reference to the religious Orders. Whatelr course these Orders might take in view of the Law of Associations, it was plain that they ought to act together. There was nothing to be gained from separate action. If some Orders could conscientiously apply for authorisation, why could not all ? 'If . some Orders thought it wrong to make such an application, why were others less scrupulous ? Yet, as we know, the Orders have been the prey of divided counsels, and the reason is believed to be that, while the_more democratic Orders have tried to remain in France, the Orders that are specially associated with the great Royalist families have become voluntary exiles,—in the hope that their virtual expulsion would damage the Republic. This is not a policy that wins respect for the party that adopts it.
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