1 FEBRUARY 1957, Page 3

ISRAEL AND KASHMIR

THIS week has seen M. Nehru defy the Security Council by his incorporation of Kashmir into India and the General Assembly sternly bidding Israel to withdraw behind the 1948 armistice line. These two cases are instruc- tive. There was not the faintest chance of the Security Council's writ being obeyed by India. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Kashmir question—and there seems no doubt that the Indian Government has been gravely at fault— Mr. Nehru regards it as a sufficiently important issue not to mind demonstrating that his preaching of international morality is for export only. Mr. Menon may find his hypo- critical trumpeting of high moral principles slightly less effec- tive in the General Assembly, relations with Pakistan may be worsened to the detriment of the whole sub-continent, but India will hang on to her portion of Kashmir and the voice of those Kashmiris who wish for local autonomy will continue to be stifled.

How different is the case of Israel! -Here the UN, by order- ing unconditional withdrawal behind the armistice line, is, in fact, exercising considerable partiality. Israel having attacked Egypt as the result of a series of prov&ations and what amounted to acts of war; it might have been thought that advantage would have been taken of the presence of a UN force in the area to bring about a permanent peace, to put an end to the raids of the fedayeen and the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. But no—Israel is asked to withdraw to the armistice line without any attention being paid to the reasons for which she crossed it, and with only the most distinctly pious hopes being expressed that, some- how or other, the Egyptians may- prove in the future to be more tractable than they have been in the past. When the delegate of Ceylon remarks that free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba is something 'the Arabs would favour given the right circumstances,' the Israelis may be forgiven for uttering a horse-laugh, if not actually .a Bronx cheer. What the UN is about in the Middle- East is the restoration of the entire Arab-Israeli imbroglio as it existed in 1949.. Once again a _ - decision is to be suspended.- Once again Arab statesmen are to shelter behind the writ of UN with no harsh reality to break in upon them or call them to account for their provoca- tions. The status qua of 1949 is to be restored—with presum- ably the same consequences in constant increase of tension and outbreaks a violence. The only thing which will have been obliterated is the Israeli military victory in the. Sinai, desert.

By , taking a narrowly, legalistic view of their task Mr. Eammarskjiild4nd the, General Assembly are not only piling up more trouble for themselves in the future, but also displaying a shocking lack- of equity. For it cannot be too • strongly-emphasised that. in hesitating to withdraw uncon- di tionally from the,Gaza,strip,and the „shores of. the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel is not giving way to any imperialist urge. What the Israelis are asking from the UN is an assurance that the fedayeen raids and the Egyptian blockade will cease, and, since they can only judge Arab intentions by the fiery utterances of Cairo radio, they want the UN to enforce these conditions. Failing such an assurance it is quite understand- able that they should prefer to trust to their own strength rather than to the Micawber-like hopes expressed in the General Assembly. * * Comparing Kashmir and the Gaza strip, it is tempting to explain the contrast by saying that Israel is a small country and India a large one. But that is only part of the truth. The reason why it was wise for Britain and France to obey the General Assembly's resolution about Suez was simply that, in this instance, UN reflected the fact that we did not have the support either of the Commonwealth or of our main allies in our intervention in the Canal Zone. Certainly, it would have been possible for us to defy the Assembly, but the gains of such a defiance—even if successful—would have been disproportionate to the price that would have had to be paid for them. In cases such as that of Israel where the issue is one of life and death, such considerations are hardly operative. If Israel consents to withdraw unconditionally from the Gaza strip and the shores of the Gulf of Aqaba, it will be because of devastating American economic pressure, not because of the intrinsic value of a UN resolution. For a nation pushed to the edge of desperation, votes taken at New York have little more than academic significance or would have, did they not reflect the power politics of the day. For, in, the case of Israel, it is certain that the UN General Assembly, has now become the vehicle of rival American and .Russian bidding for the support of the Arab States. And, of course; this situation would exist were there no UN. The only difference would be that, in that case, the Arabs would have, so to speak, no lever for putting pressure on America to _start sanctions. against Israel. Suppose that the same situa- tion existed in the. Middle East with no UN organisation to mediate between the combatants. It is scarcely conceivable that America could be put in the position of having to cut off dollar supplies to Israel in order to convince the Arabs that she was still their best friend. The UN brings things to a head instantly.- In other words, when nations are actuated by purely power motives in a question posed before UN, the very existence of such an outlet increases rather than diminishes the virulence of their intrigues. The UN then is ineffective in the case of clashes between nation's where she ,combatants feel their vital interests to be at stake, and indeed, may even aggravate the situation. To have UN troops and. observers coming between, the rivals,. presents an overwhelmingtemptation to provocation on the part of the weaker and more unstable. UN inter- vention in the Arab-Israeli dispute has deprived Arab politicians of their one normal incentive to responsibility—the fear of bringing military disaster on themselves and their countries. Would Colonel Nasser have dared to send fedayeen into Israel from the Gaza strip, if he had not been certain of being sheltered from the consequences by international action? Moreover it is not only Arab politicians who are made irresponsible by this system. A vote on the affairs of the Middle East in the General Assembly brings into play the delegates of a dozen countries who have no special concern with the area and even no special concern with peace—to judge by some of their speeches The Security Council was carefully arranged to reflect the power situation in the world—it was never envisaged that, owing to the use of the veto, the most delicate pieces of diplomatic negotiation would have to be trans- acted through the General Assembly and the Secretary-General., At the moment the welter of conflicting interests in the Assembly and the fact that both America and Russia arc bidding for the support of the 'uncommitted' States make that body quite unfitted to carry out any judicial role— especially such a delicate one as mediation between Israel and her neighbours.

In these circumstances it is no wonder that the Israelis feel little respect for the moral pressure exercised by UNO. Since that organisa- tion has failed for eight years to do anything effective to settle the dispute, there is no real reason to suppose that it will be more successful this time, and Mr. Ben-Gurion may well feel that some tangible hostages in the shape of the Gaza strip and the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba may make it easier to obtain recognition from the Arabs than all the hot air emitted by a body which has shown itself unwilling or unable. to enforce even the Security Council's 1951 resolution on free navigation through the Suez Canal.

Hungary and Kashmir are bad examples for anyone being pressed to obey the General Assembly. They are particularly bad examples when the vote to which obedience is demanded was dictated by considerations which had much to do with power politics, but little with the merits of the case. And it is hard to resist the conclusion that, in a complex case like that of Israel and the Arab States, into which so many power factors enter, it would be more practical and less confusing to insist on direct negotiations between the .parties concerned and, failing that, to leave the matter to those States which are really affected by it rather than by the erection of a clumsy apparatus which has the effect of keeping the problem permanently unsolved. To admit this is not to be hostile to the principle of international organisations, but the UN risks dying of the obvious hypocrisy it has shown in recent weeks. Mr. Hammarskjold and the General Assembly should take another look at the Middle East and ask themselves whether they are really doing their job of preventing war.