TRENCH WARFARE. T HE close of 1915 finds vast masses of
the contending armies confronting each other in more than a thousand miles of trenches, constructed with an elaboration of design unknown in the past, and provided with arma- ments heavier and more formidable than had ever been brought into the field. In the Western theatre of war, trench warfare has continued since the battle of the Aisne with some substantial gains to the Allies, but without strategic advantage. On the Eastern front, the same situation was reached after the tremendous Austro- German drive through Galicia, rendered possible only by an overwhelming superiority of artillery materiel. The entrenched positions on the Isonzo still resist an attack which has lasted nearly seven months. At the toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula, Allies and Turks face each other in fortified lines thrown up since April 25th. Round Salonika, Franco-British forces are engaged in entrenching themselves, while similar work proceeds on the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, fortresses to which deliberate care and heavy expenditure had been devoted in peace time have quickly fallen, or have been abandoned, in Belgium, France, and Poland.
The questions naturally present themselves " Will trench warfare be the rule in the future I Have con- tinuous lines superseded the fortification of strategic points I Are fortresses no longer worth consideration I " It may seem that the art of war has reverted to the principles which guided Shi-Hwang-ti, the originator of the Chinese Wall begun in 214-213 B.C., or to those of the Romans, which Gibbon pronounced to be sure signs of military decad ence.
The causes which led to the ancient wall-fortification and to the lines in France and Flanders to-day were, how- ever, essentially different. In the one case, it was sought to create a physical obstacle which could, by passive obstruction, defy attack, or would at least delay an enemy until forces could be brought to a threatened point. In the other case, the growing power of weapons and the increase in the size of armies demanded a wide extension of the battle front. At the same time, the immense advances in all the means of transport and movement enabled rapid concentrations of troops to be made, facilitating great flanking operations, and thus dictating long fronts to a eombatant acting temporarily on the defensive. Armies, forced by these conditions to spread themselves over Tundreds of miles, and fearing, therefore, to be attacked in overwhelming force locally, would naturally seek by every means to strengthen the positions they were impelled to take up. Such means involve provision for the fullest use of artillery, machine guns, and rifles, combined with obstacles to enable an attack to be repulsed, while at the same time securing protection for the fighting line, its supports, and communications to the rear. As the same considerations may apply to both combatants; the en- trenchments stretching from the Swiss frontier to the Channel are explained. Thus arises the apparent paradox that the feebleness and the extreme efficiency of weapons have led to the same result.
Students of military history will realize that there is little new in the present situation except the scale oa which trenches are employed, and that in October, 1914, the certainty that trench warfare would supervene became evident. In one of our many theatres of war, we have seen an exact repetition of previous experience. Sevastopol was practically an open town on the land side, and must have fallen if attacked after the battle of the Alma. When, however, the Allies began preparations for a siege, the genius of Todleben found opportunity, and defences sprang up in sight of the invaders, so that Moltke could write with perfect justice : " The Allies are fixed in the Tauric Chersonese and as it were besieged by the Russians." These words accurately describe the situation in Gallipoli, where ample time was available for the con- struction of formidable defences which could be progres- sively strengthened. Sevastopol fell after three hundred and forty-nine days, because the resources and the com- munications of the defenders were inadequate. The Turco-Germans had free land communications with a railway only sixty miles distant. The Allies, therefore, failed. At Mukden, the Japanese, with about four hundred thousand men on a front of a hundred miles, attacked about three hundred thousand Russians more strongly entrenched than in any battle of the war. This great extension showed plainly what might be expected in the case of the far larger numbers employed in the Western campaign, and the field was wen by a vigorous offensive in which the Japanese showed fine generalship. The Germans, after their great retreat from the Marne to the Aisne, were not in a position to resume the offensive immediately, and their next great effort was directed towards Calais. On the other hand, the Allies had need of breathing time, and were primarily concerned in prolonging their line of defence to the Channel. In the East, the offensive of the Austro-Germans was brought to an end by the splendid resistance of the Russian armies in their retreat, and by difficulties of supply always increasing as an elaborate railway system was left behind. In the South African War, we brought one 9.2 in. gun, weighing about twenty- three tons, and several 9.45 in. howitzers, weighing about nine tons, into the field; while at Port Arthur the Japanese employed eighteen 11 in. howitzers. Past experience, there- fore, made it certain that the Germans would use very heavy artillery, with which they were known to be well provided. Writing more than twenty-five years ago,* I pointed out that fortresses of the existing types were totally unsuited to modern conditions, and that the most formidable defences were those that could be created in the field. After visiting Antwerp, Li4e, and Namur in 1890, I reported that they could not be held unless large field forces and extensive field defences could be counted upon. All subsequent experience has borne out these views, and when the Japanese had shown that 11 in. howitzers, brought across the sea, could be put in the field, there could be no doubt of the fate of these places under a German attack. The Eastern fortresses of France doubtless supplied one of the reasons which determined the German policy of " hacking " a way through Belgium, and to that extent they exercised an important strategic influence on the course of the war ; but their present strength must depend mainly upon works and armaments subsequently provided. The siege conditions, which began in October, 1914, brought high-explosive shells and machine guns into prominence. The first, with which our field artillery was not supplied, were essential for destroying obstacles and attacking troops behind parapets. The second, in which we were also deficient, were peculiarly valuable in minimizing the number of men in the first line, in bringing a sudden and • Fortification, Pad, Present, and Future, December, 1890. heavy fire to bear upon an attack, and even for, the purpose of deliberate sniping. Grenades had been found. necessary and effective by the Japanese. The real surprises of the war have not been many ; but the difficulties of exercising command over immense numbers of men have been mani- fested. Aircraft have alike increased and diminished some possibilities, and the best way of employing them had to be learned. Looking to the future, it seems certain that fortresses of the accustomed type will tend to disappear. Their value began to decline long ago, as armies became more and more mobile, and the power and means of transporting artillery developed. The fortress 'of the future will borrow forms from the excellent trenches constructed by the Germans. Wherever combatants are, even temporarily, on an approximate equality in numbers and moral, it may be expected that trench warfare will come into play. The delaying power of modern arms is so great that com- paratively slight field defences will enable an attack, not in greatly superior force, to be repulsed, and this will give time for improvement and elaboration. Against well- entrenched troops, whose flanks cannot be turned, a successful attack is possible only by the aid of a superior artillery lavishly used. This was the lesson of Plevna, where the Turkish defences would have been broken down in a day by such artillery as has been employed in France and Flanders. It follows that the impedimenta of armies will be vastly increased, and that railways, motor trans- port, and good roads will be more than ever important. Nevertheless the principles laid down by Clausewitz hold the field, and entrenchments must be looked upon as a means of enabling offensive action to be taken with increased prospects of success. Otherwise wars in which there is no marked inequality between the combatants would have to be won by a process of exhaustion, unless one of the combatants can be caught unprepared, as nearly happened in 1914. That the defence can be locally para- lysed by a prodigal expenditure of artillery ammunition has been proved in France and Galicia; but, unless this result can be attained on a wide front, no great strategic advantage can be secured. Even so, if there has been ample time to construct second and third lines, and if fresh troops are available to man them, the offensive may fail. Here, perhaps, a military genius of the first class may find his
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