THE ARMIES OF EUROPE : V. BRITAIN
By CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART
jfic: Brifish Army has many points of difference from thok-' of the Continent. While they arc large, it is sinaff ; while they arc raised by conscription, it depends On"Voluntary enlistment ; while they have 'short-service, it long-service—seven years is the normal ; while thes are raised from all classes, it is drawn from the prior. In the past it largely depended for filling its ranks on those who were too uneducated and resourceless to find better-paid employment ; and while the officers were drawn frOin the other social extreme it was a family principle that • the Army was the vocation of those sons who were not likely to shine in other pro- fessions. If there has been some change in this basis, it persists sufficiently to be a handicap in days when the trend of warfare places an increasing premium on intelligence. Moreover, its social tradition tends to Make the British Army highly conservative. On the othet hand, it has to some extent escaped the narrow Professionalism of the Continental officer corps through the fact that so many of its. officers had independent means, and also to the variety of its service.
This brings us to the greatest difference between the British and the Continental Armies. While their primary purpose is the defence of their own country—a euphemism which embraces the attack on a neighbouring country— that of the British Army is the defence of, and main- tenance of order in, the British Empire. These duties have governed its basic organisation. In the nineteenth century it became so predominantly a colonial service army as to become quite unfit, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to face the contingency of a European war. Thus in 1868 Mr. Cardwell, then Secretary of State for War, established the principle that there should be a battalion at home for each one maintained abroad. Under the " Cardwell System " the units at home provide drafts for those on foreign Service, and the regiment, instead of being a fighting organisation as imm other armies, consists of linked home and foreign battalions, which never serve together but merely interchange officers and inen.
Besides finding drafts for the oversea garrisons, the home army has also to provide a potential expeditionary force, either to act as an Imperial fire-brigade in dealing with a serious outbreak in the oversea territories, or as a contribution to the collective forces ranged against an aggressive European power. This last role, if deeply rooted in British history, was only revived a few years before 1914, when an expeditionary force of six divisions was erected as part of the Haldane reforms. If its sire was puny compared with the armies that the Continental Powers could mobilise, and its equipment hardy as good as theirs, it had a definite qualitative advantage through longer training ; from its hard experience in the Boer War it had learnt the value of marksmanship, and thus in 1914 its volume of aimed rifle-fire took the Germans by surprise and created the impression that it possessed quantities of machine-guns. This fire-capacity gave it a weight beyond its numbers, and, combined with the natural " sticking-power " of the British soldier, enabled it to renew its traditional record in repelling attacks. But it showed less aptitude for the offensive, and as its numbers grew through expansion on a national scale, it tended to expend them prodigally but unprofitably. In the tank, however, it produced time most important new offensive weapon of the War ; and in the last phase this weapon, together with the improved technique which developed with experience, helped it to gain distinction in forcing entrenched positions.
After the War Britain gave up conscription, and went back from her wartime army of millions to one even smaller than in 1914. Yet in one respect this post- War army took the lead among the European Powers. Instead of being content to copy Continental ideas and practice, a new school of military thought arose which went back to an older tradition and thence went forward, via its wartime experience with tanks, to a fresh concep- tion of mobile mechanised warfare. These ideas, although at first regarded as heresy or fantasy, gradually made headway and generally won acceptance. They also focussed the attention of the military world on the experiments carried out by time British Army, and have now borne fruit in time general mechanisation of armies.
But in this translation of theory into actual equipment Britain herself has fallen behind. The political desire to postpone measures of rearmament, the inherent con- servatism of the senior Military chiefs, the inelastic re- quirements of the Cardwell System and the retarding power of India—these are some of the factors that have put a brake on material progress. Another is the characteristic British tendency to seek technical per- fection instead of going into production as soon as it has found something that will be fairly effective. The result is that the chief foreign armies have already a far larger quantity of modern mechanised troops, when Britain, despite her much smaller army, is only beginning its general re-equipment.
It was not until the end of 1935 that the War Office reached the point of embarking on a big scheme of re- organisation and modernisation. The cavalry were to he mechanised, part being equipped with light tanks and a larger part with a new kind of light motor vehicle, with large wheels and oversize tyres, that can travel across country—its looks like an adaptation of the Irish jaunting. car, the seating bCing so. designed that each man on board can jump out easily, and go instantly into action on foot. It is intended to create a Mobile Division—to take the place of the old Cavalry Division—which will consist of two mechanised Cavalry Brigades and one Tank Brigade (the British Army has only one). At the same time 28 battalions of infantry out of 136 are being converted into mechanised machine-gun units. It was originally intended to have one of these battalions in each infantry brigade, but it has now been decided to employ them as divisional and corps troops, while the infantry brigade will be reduced to three " rifle " bat- talions. These, being relieved of their heavier and more complex -weapons, will be easier to handle and to train, while their manoeuvring power is being improved by the motorisation of their transport. Although called " rifle " battalions, each of them will have fifty-two light machine-guns—one in each little section of half a dozen men—thus increasing their fire-power.
But, because the decision was left so late, and even then delayed by fresh changes of mind, the manufacture of all the new equipment required is likely to take some years. Meantime the successive emergencies in Egypt and Palestine during the past year have stripped the home army of equipment and men, leaving the expe- ditionary force a skeleton. This situation has strengthened the arguments of those who hold that the home army should be designed and used simply as an Imperial Reserve, and should give up the idea of playing a part in continental warfare, leaving to the Air Force any such intervention if it should be called for by Britain's obligations under the League Covenant or Locarno- Treaty.
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