CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY
Commonwealth and Foreign [To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] Stu—At the coming session of Parliament, early in 1937, the Dominion Government will find itself compelled, however reluctantly, to face the issues of defence and, by implication, of foreign policy. Reluctantly, because no issue, with the possible exception of railway unification, is loaded with more explosive possibilities than defence.
Canadian foreign policy in peacetime is naturally but an extension of domestic politics. The Government of Mr. Mackenzie King, like most Canadian governments, rests upon widely diverse sectional and racial supporters. It came to power in the autumn of 1935 with an unprecedented and nation-wide majority, which, to the casual eye, rendered it invulnerable to sectional attack. But already the process of undermining has begun. The rise of the semi-Nationalist Union Nationale in Quebec threatens the very Capitol of Liberal defence. Aberhart looms in the West, and few will care to predict what political havoc social unrest may not wreak upon the Prairie. The strength of the Liberal Govern- ment, however, lies no less in its own inherent force than in the patent division against the Opposition, with the traditional alternative—the Conservative Party—in a far worse case than itself. And if serious inroads were to be made by Radicalism in the West, there would be a renewed demand for Liberal-Conservative co-operation provincially, possibly leading even to the formation of a Dominion National Government.
In a letter to the London Times last April, Mr. J. M. Maedonnell, of Toronto, divided Canadian opinion upon foreign affairs roughly into three groups. It is convenient to refer to these rough headings here, since, though they represented nothing particularly new to Canadians, Mr. Macdonnell's letter was exceedingly timely and caused wide- spread discussion in Great Britain and Canada. It tended, in fact, to fix the terminology : (1) The Isolationists," or 100 per cent. North Americans.
(2) The " Imperialists," who still have the unquestioning attitude of 1914 towards unlimited co-operation in Imperial Wars.
(3) The " Collectivists," who are prepared to assume foreign responsibilities but only through the League.
It is, of course, impossible to estimate accurately the numerical strength of the three groups, but it may be remarked that the majority of French-Canadians, representing about 30 per eent. of the population, fall into the first category. The events of the past eighteen months, beg,iiming with Canada's own retreat upon the question of oil sanctions, and particularly the Hoare-Laval agreement, followed by the Mediterranean fiasco, have served to weaken immeasurably the " Collective" group, which was once numerous but always politically ineffectual here ; the " Isolationist " group has undoubtedly received a large accretion of supporters. At the same time, gathering war-clouds in Europe and the evident sense of crisis in London, issuing in rapid rearmament, has lent renewed strength and, particularly, new voice to the third, or "' Imperial " group. And it is almost entirely from this quarter that demand for Canadian rearmament has come.
In his speech before the League Assembly this autumn, Mr. Mackenzie King reiterated the assertion that, in the event of war, the Canadian Parliament would be called upon to decide what part Canada would take in it. Familiar as was the proposition, the " Isolationists'' were delighted, and the French-Canadian Press to a large extent took it to mean a declaration of Canada's right to full neutrality in Imperial wars. The English-Canadian Press, on the other hand, subscribing for the most part to the View that when the Empire is at war Canada is legally at war, discussed it rather as qualifying the extent of active participation by Canada—how many men, aeroplanes, and the rest, she would •srnd. And Parliament would have to decide that anyway. The " Collectivists " were disappointed at Canada's failure to stand uncompromisingly behind collective Leagus action. The Imperialist Press criticised Mr. King's speech as tending to emphasise divisive possibilities rather than Imperial solidarity.
It will be seen, therefore, how grave are the political diffi- culties confronting Mr. King's Government in connexion with defence. It will be impossible to please everybody. Quebec is always suspicious of " Imperialism," and the question is already being asked, whose defence is under consideration, Canada's or the Empire's ? And if it is Imperial defence, then does that mean that Canada will be drawn into the next Imperial " adventure " ? The shadow of conscription is still long in the Province of Quebec. Furthermore, roughly half of the dwellers in the Prairie Provinces are of non-British origin, and many share the prevailing North American disinclination to take part in the " squabbles " of Europe.
In these circumstances, it is more than likely that the King Government will represent its modest rearmament programme, already under way, as designed for purely Canadian defence rather than for Imperial military and naval co-operation. Emphasis is likely to be placed upon coastal defence, particularly on the Pacific side. Half the Canadian navy—that is, two whole destroyers—is being replaced by larger, more modern units purchased from Britain. The militia is already in process of reorganisation, and a higher degree of mechanisation is being introduced. It may be taken for granted that Canadian units will be trained to operate British types of anti-aircraft guns, for example, so that Canadian troops would find themselves at home with British equipment. An increase in the Canadian Air Force is also anticipated.
Meanwhile there has been a boom in Canadian " armament " shares, based partly upon orders from Great Britain, on a modest scale so far. But already the French-Canadian Press, which has learned something of the economic interpretation of history from Senator Nye's enquiry into the connexion between war material orders and America's entry into the Great War, is expressing misgiving over this development.
It is significant that a new and surprising interest has been shown, not least by French-Canadian papers, in the all- American peace conference at Buenos Aires. A vacant seat has long been reserved for Canada at meetings of the Pan- American Union. So far, Canada has declined invitations to attend its deliberations. Canada, however, was not invited to the Buenos Aires conference, but, oddly enough, on this occasion the omission seems to have been due to American and not Canadian considerations. It was well understood that the United States was making inquiries how best to go about having Canada invited. But the matter was dropped, since the Administration in Washington, during an election campaign, did not wish to hand Mr. Hearst the argu- ment that the Americas were being entangled in European politics through Canada and the British Empire ! This does not mean that Canada would necessarily have accepted the invitation if it had been proffered.
What does this all amount to, in terms of Canadian foreign policy and Imperial defence ? Roughly this. A large section of Canada is becoming increasingly Isolationist and North American in spirit. Another considerable section of Canada, backed by the powerful Imperial Press, would probably be ready to support Great Britain and the Empire in almost any real crisis, as' in 1914. Much depends, 'therefore, particularly with reference to " Collectivist " opinion, upon the manner in which war may arise and how it is presented to the public. But any Canadian Government would have to feel its way cautiously, and it is essential that British 'opinion should appreciate Mr. King's dilemma. That is what I meant when I said before, as I now repeat, that the next Imperial war may impose grave strains upon the Canadian confederation.
—I am, Sir, &c., YOUR CORRESPONDENT IN CANADA.
Previous page
