Hot Line to Paris

DE GAULLE

From DEV MURARKA

MOSCOW

FROM the beginning to the end, President de Gaulle's visit has been a triumph of public relations. His every appearance has been drowned in cheers from the crowd. Wherever he went people turned out in large numbers, and his reception in the provincial cities has been particularly warm. No doubt some of this has been done to discourage him from being ironical in public, as he was when addressing a rain- soaked crowd from the balcony of the Moscow Soviet. He thanked the Russians for allowing him to speak to a few of the heroic people of Moscow.

Everywhere and always he spoke of the people in warm, flattering terms. Almost always he spoke of Russia and not the Soviet Union, thus lending a touch of mystic communion to his meetings. But he took care also to talk to the workers in the factories and the places he visited. By now he is a familiar figure to millions of Soviet citizens thanks to the .massive exposure given him by his hosts.

Significantly, as his tour progressed, the theme of 'One Europe' gave place to one of Franco- Soviet relations. No doubt he sensed that the image of a heroic anti-Hitler France was much more evocative to the Russian mind than an abstract theme of European unity at a time when Europe is still straining to contain the Germans. But perhaps he also derived pleasure from evok- ing the spirit of war-time camaraderie and the sense of mission in Europe if not the whole world. It will be a long time before the dignified and strangely appealing figure of de Gaulle will fade from the public memory in the Soviet Union.

The trouble is that any real political gains from the talks still remain elusive. At the time of writing the visit is not yet over, nor has the final communiqué been published. But unless all that is known about the talks is entirely misleading, in the political field the meeting of the minds has been of a very limited nature. Here the immediate results will be little, whatever the long-term sig- nificance. The two long meetings which the General and his advisers had in the Kremlin with Brezhnev, Kosygin and other members of the collective leadership were notable more for defining the limits of their new relationship than for fresh departures.

When the flood of de Gaulle's grandiose vision of Europe had receded a little, the baffled Soviet leaders asked him if he had any concrete pro- posals. The General had none. Equally surprising were his gentle references to the United States and Germany. Although the Russians had assumed that he would be anxious not to offend his Western allies while here, the cleverness with which he proceeded to be winsome to them even while in Moscow was a little unexpected.

But the Russians want the help of de Gaulle, while he wants their support, and he is going to get it. Nothing can dissuade the Russians from their current conviction that an opening to Europe has been created via Paris, and they are possibly inclined to exaggerate its value. There is talk of a hot line between Paris and Moscow. l'he Russians have laid particular emphasis on regular high-level consultations between the two countries, possibly at the level of Foreign Mini- sters, or even higher. Technical co-operation and trade between them is to be stepped up.

All these results were foreseen and so were the

difficulties. Nevertheless, in a sense, the Russian pleasure at the success of the visit is entirely justified. A great political leader with a reputation for being difficult with his allies has put his seal of approval on the general obiectives of Soviet policy in Europe. Such an endorsement helps Russia enormously in establishing its claim that Soviet foreign policy has only peaceful intentions.

De Gaulle has been careful not to endorse the Soviet plea for a European security conference. But the Russians may well feel that once a dialogue between Paris and Moscow has opened up, the other European countries will feel bound to be drawn in, and this may lead eventually to a conference on the line the Russians desire.

Of greater importance is the Russian belief that despite the scepticism and criticism (as well as relief) with which de Gaulle's visit has been viewed in Europe, for the first time it has pro- duced a mibility of ideas at the highest level, and that their dissemination may prove to be fruitful. Even in the course of defining the limits of their policy, two sides are always inclined to shift their frontiers. Thus for de Gaulle it may have been something of a surprise that the Russians appear to be so determinedly set in their views about Germany. Nevertheless, it is within the realms of possibility that if more ideas are freely exchanged, the Russians will be prepared to con- sider new proposals, as de Gaulle would, too.

The real achievement of the visit is not there- fore in any concrete agreement of a political nature. It is in the promise it holds for the

future. Once or twice the General let himself use the word 'alliance,' though not in a political con- text, Still, from the way he has talked about Franco-Soviet relations it is clear that short of a formal treaty he is seeking a fairly close relation- ship.

Nor should the incidental benefits of the visit be overlooked. Before the General arrived and during his stay, Moscow particularly has been swept by a wave of Francophilia. There have been exhibitions, films, recitals, all either im- ported from France or concerned with it. The most impressive of them is the exhibition in the Pushkin Gallery on 'Rodin and his Times,' a subtle tribute maybe to de Gaulle himself. This has created a new awareness of Russian links with the past where cultural contacts with France are concerned. Even de Gaulle ought to be satis- fied with the fact that he has succeeded in once again projecting a powerful image of France on the Russian mind.

De Gaulle therefore can return to Paris happy that he has carried out a task with great aplomb as only he could have done. Politically too, he has every reason to be satisfied. The Russians have given him the benefit of every doubt and demanded little in return. He has succeeded in forming an independent line of contact with Moscow which is useful in peace and could be even more useful in a crisis. De Gaulle, far from feeling embarrassed about the chequered career of historical relations between the two countries, himself recalled the age of 'War and Peace,' as he called it. It was a brilliant and appropriate expression of an indefinable feeling which has survived wars and revolutions. It may not always last, but while it does it will be a phenomenon indeed. Europe has little to fear from it, and even less, to lose.

`Stop shoving me around!'