THE UNEASINESS OF ENGLISH OPINION.
MR. WARD, the young Member for Crewe, stated a few days ago his intention of resigning his seat. Mr. Ward, the young Member for Crewe, has since then changed his mind, and intends for the present to keep his seat. That seems a very simple incident, hardly worthy of a newspaper report, but it is one which the Government will do well to bear seriously in mind. It can hardly be doubted, whatever may be the truth or falsehood of the Radical stories about the action of " headquarters " in the matter, that the managers of the Unionist party at Crewe thought there was danger of losing the seat, that friendly pressure of some kind was brought to bear upon Mr. Ward, and that he, as a sound party man, felt it right to postpone his personal convenience or pleasure to the general wish of those who had supported him. And there can hardly be a doubt that the first reason why the Unionists dreaded a defeat was their conviction that the recent action of Government in foreign affairs had dulled, if it had not destroyed, the enthusiasm of a large section of their supporters. We know nothing of the local politics of Crewe—which for us as for most men is simply a great railway station—but we believe that this conviction existed, that it was well founded, and that it deserves the serious attention of Lord Salisbury. Public opinion, more especially among Liberal Unionists, is growing doubtful and uneasy. There is no hostility to Govern- ment for its home policy, and no trace of a revival of confidence in its opponents, but there is a feeling, not yet crystallised or formulated, that in foreign affairs there has been something which, until it is more clearly explained, looks like partial failure. This feeling, curiously enough, is accentuated by the perfect confidence felt upon one point in Lord Salisbury. Nobody of experience or know- ledge doubts for a moment that he is heartily opposed to the Sultan's policy, that he grieves over the blows inflicted upon humanity, or that he would see with pleasure the Turkish Empire restored by a wise and peaceful partition to the domain of civilisation. Therefore the broad fact of the present situation, the rehabilitation of Turkey as a potent factor in Eastern affairs, the elevation of the Sultan from a cowering tyrant into a great potentate with power- ful and victorious armies at his disposal, is read as proof, that Lord Salisbury has failed to carry out his own policy which is also the policy of the British people. It is quite conceded that the facts are not yet fully known, and that his failure may have been unavoidable. It is fully agreed that he was bound to try what he could do with the Concert, and that quitting that combination without the very gravest reason would have been at once risky at d unwise. It is believed that he may have reasons for his actions stronger and more pressing than any which have been stated in Parliament, and that upon the validity of those reasons he is far better qualified to judge than the majority of his critics. Nevertheless, the brutal fact remains that there has been failure, and the British public, which, as Matthew Arnold once wrote, "hungers for a little success," is uneasy, discomposed, dis- satisfied, and very likely at any by-election to stay away from the polls. It is not yet out of temper, it does not formulate clearly to itself its grounds of dissatisfaction, it has no alternative policy about which it is in any way eager, but it is losing hope, its enthusiasm is decaying, and it is ceasing to feel that it could not bear a defeat of the party it so recently placed in power. It is in the mood of a man who is dissatisfied with a servant but is not inclined to dismiss him, who does not scold, who does not swear, except perhaps inaudibly, but who has begun to think in the recesses of his mind that if the servant dc- parted the loss would not be so irreparable as he had fancied a year ago After all the table is not well laid, and though that may be the footmen's fault, or the result of circumstances, or a consequence of pure accident, still his business is to lay it, and it is not well laid. To say that if an election were held to-morrow the Government would be defeated would be to go far past the truth, but that much voting would be perfunctory and silent, and that the majority would be decreased, is, we think, beyond question. The origin of the change of feeling is perfectly clear. The people do not care particularly about the Greeks, whom they regard in a great measure as traders, and for some inscrutable reason, being traders themselves, rather despise. They certainly will not run any great risk for the sake of Greece ; while as to Crete, if only the Turks werewithdrawn they would hardly give its fate five minute-' consideration. But that, after all that has happened, the Sultan and his Pashas should be stronger than ever, that British ships should be engaged in operations which tend incidentally and accidentally to Turkish advantage, that the Sultan should, after the Guildhall speech, be able to claim Great Britain as among the protectors of the integrity of his Empire, and therefore, as he considers, of his throne, this is to the elector gall and wormwood. He must blame somebody for such a result of the use of British ironclads, and naturally he does, in a vague and reluctant but still perceptible way, blame the Foreign Secretary, who is also Premier, and who has been left so perfectly free a hand.
The dissatisfaction has not as yet gone very far. It is held in check by a consciousness of ignorance, by an almost universal recognition of Lord Salisbury's merit as a political thinker, and by the total absence of any acceptable or even endurable alternative ; but it exists, it will affect Parliament, and it will have to be reckoned with. How it should be met, and if possible removed, is a question rather for Lord Salisbury than for any journal. or indeed any outside authority. We should ourselves say that the responsibility laid upon him is too crushing, that discontent is concentrated injuriously upon his head, and that the Government would be stronger if he divided the immense functions now in his hands in such a way that either the Premiership or the Foreign Office should be held by a Member of the Lower House ; but he may see insuperable objections to that arrangement. If it cannot be made, we are perfectly certain that the defence of the Foreign Office in the Commons should be entrusted always, every night, and avowedly to the same Cabinet Minister, who should know everything, and should be permitted far more latitude of speech than can be con- ceded to any Under-Secretary of State. We have nothing to say against Mr. Curzon, except that affairs are getting too serious for him, and that he has never on any one occasion convinced any hearer of the merit of the Govern- ment policy, unless he was in fact convinced already. While that policy had only to be stated Mr. Curzon was quite sufficient; but much more than that is now required ; the House and the country have to be reconciled to the policy, and carried heartily with the Government. The votes prove nothing. Nobody is going even to try to upset the Government; but there is a quantity of fluid discontent to be got over, and if possible dispersed into vapour before it crystallises, and that is work which would task a much greater chemist than Mr. Curzon. And in addition to that change, as a consequence indeed of that change, we would ask Lord Salisbury whether it would not be possible to depart in some degree from the policy of reticence. It is an excellent policy now and then, and the country as a rule is not inquisitive; but at present its ignorance makes it listen to unfavour- able surmises, while the jealousy of the Imperial Courts, so far from being soothed away by it, seems every week to increase. The Continent could hardly dislike England more acutely if Lord Salisbury were as frank as Lord Palmerston, or as "rash" as Prince Bismarck, or as liberal of information as he himself probably would be if he had to defend himself in the House of Commons. The question at issue is no longer Crete, which we have been assured will be autonomous till the assurance nauseates, but the victorious advance of an Asiatic and barbarous Power, armed with splendid material resources, upon a little European State, armed, we fear, with nothing except the conviction of scholars that without it there would never have been a Europe. What are we going to do about that ? We quite expect to hear that we can do nothing, because Germany will permit nothing to be done; but at least let us hear it at full length, with reasons which it is possible to accept, and without such a quantity of references to the Concert, which, after all, is only omnipotent—at sea at all events—so long as we are tied to accept its resolutions as law. There is danger, we dare say, in speaking out ; but there is also danger in a silence which leaves at least one-third of the party in power half-hearted in following its chiefs, or following them chiefly because it sees nothing to hope for in the Opposition. The public greatly prefers Lord Salisbury to Sir William Harcourt as the actual wielder of power ; but that preference, believe us, is not, in a time of unusual difficulty and stress—and we never remember the omens to have been more sinister—sufficient to make a Govern- ment strong.
Previous page
