1 MAY 1959, Page 22

THE LAW OFFICERS

SIR,—In the issue of April 24 Taper drew attention to the anomalous and possibly indefensible position of that 'lawyer with political affiliations,' the Attorney-General. He professed anxiety at the Waters Tribunal's 'tame' acceptance of the notion of the Law Officer's sanctity. The more one examines the Law Officer's position, the more anxiety one feels.

There are two controls in practice on the actions of the Attorney-General—those imposed by the courts and by the. Houses of Parliament. Taper con- centrated on the latter and, it seemed, he would prefer the latter to have more control. That is to say, he wished the party lawyer to meet his con- trols, if at all, at the hands of a body dominated by his political fellows. For that very reason, one would think, the controls would be more firmly wielded if in the hands of the alternative body—the courts. At present the Attorney-General can escape Parlia- ment's direction by claiming his acts as semi- judicial, for, as the Prime Minister said and Taper

quoted, 'It would be a very bad thing if the House or Cabinet of the day tried to influence the semi judicial functions of the Law Officers. . . At the same time the Attorney-General can escape the court's jurisdiction by claiming his acts to be ad

ministrative, and probably he can duck the court's censure if his acts are quasi-judicial. It may well he

possible that he could avoid any dispute whatsoever over a given action if to Parliament he claimed it to be judicial or semi-judicial and to the courts to be administrative or quasi-judicial. There is no fixed meaning to these terms, no one to ensure con- sistency in the Attorney-General's claims, and no assurance that what is 'semi-judicial' to Parliament is not also 'administrative' to the courts of law.

To those who feel that the overreaching integrity of Members of Parliament will suffice to ensure that the Attorney-General's actions bring about justice one can only quote a well-known example. The Attorney' General of the day, having successfully prosecuted a man for treason, had also the right to decide whether that man could appeal to the House of Lords. Later the same Attorney-General was heard to say of the man, 'I gave them choice of Casement or myself. Nothing gave me greater delight than the execution of Casement.'

'In ordinary cases,' said Lord Cranworth, 'it is a just ground of exception to a judge that he is not indifferent, and the fact that he is himself a party, or interested as a party, affords the strongest proof that he is not indifferent.' It would be salutary if this requirement was extended to the Law Officers, be they administrators, semi-judges, quasi-judges or what you will.—Yours faithfully, JOHN LINDSAY Hall Moss Lane, Bramhall, Cheshire