20 APRIL 1844, Page 11

POLITICAL JUDGES.

THE practice of appointing political partisans to the bench as a re- ward for their political services is not exactly new. From the time that the Country party (the name is as old as the reign of ELI- ZABETH) grew strong enough to excite the watchfulness if not the apprehension of the Government, a lawyer's devotion to the Court party became a recommendation to the bench; and from the time that Ministerial tenure of office came to be more dependent on the support of the majority of the Aristocracy than the liking of the Sovereign, Ministers have been in the habit of retaining legal followers by the prospect of Judgeships. But under the constitu- tion of the Reform Act the abuse appears to be growing more in- veterate.

Judges chosen by the Crown or by the Minister commanding a

majority in a Boroughmonger Parliament, on account of their political subserviency, were liable to suspicion in all trials where a question affecting the prerogative of the Crown or Ministerial tenure of office was at issue. The evil of this was not ccnfined to the endangering of popular privileges : the dignity of the bench was lowered in the eyes of the public—popular confidence in the law was weakened. But, except in political cases, these Judges might be honest, and were able and learned lawyers. Whatever may be thought of Lord Mewsrmen when political questions came before him, his invaluable services to the mercantile law of England are be- yond question ; and even the most sordid and sycophantish of the Judges in the time of the two CHARLESES were able lawyers. The reason was, that the Court and the Minister had an interest in choosing sound lawyers, and had the power to do it. Even after the rise of the House of Commons into importance had rendered Ministers more or less dependent on the assistance of their legal partisans in debates, and had made such Parliamentary services a claim for promotion to the bench, nomination-boroughs enabled party leaders to place in Parliament men who had already attained to legal eminence. Partisanship was the motive that determined the choice of Law-officers of the Crown and Judges from among the Parliamentary lawyers ; but a lawyer required to be eminent in his profession before the owner of a borough thought it worth while to place him in Parliament. The principle of selection was bad, but the abilities and experience of the body from whom the selec- tion was made mitigated its bad effects. The lawyers chosen for Judges by the Court before Parliament grew strong, and by Minis- ters afterwards, were uniformly men who had characters as lawyers to support ; they had a professional point of honour, which often served in lieu of higher moral principle.

Now the case is altered for the worse. The Reform has thrown

Ministers, in their selection of the high officers of the law, upon im entirely different class of practitioners. Party leaders can no longer obtain a seat in Parliament for any man they please : they must take the kind of men who have the knack of pleasing con- stituencies,—which is rarely the case with great lawyers. For- merly, eminence in the law was a means of getting into Par- liament as a step to the bench ; now, men without any professional eminence get into Parliament, as a means of helping them to practice. Ministers must take their legal assistants in Parliament from the lawyers they find there ; and the assistance lent them by these lawyers must be repaid by the highest offices of the profession. It is no longer by hard study and extensive practice that lawyers look to reach the bench, but by dexterity in canvassing, and all the equivocal practices of political intrigue. The experience of the last dozen years shows that the evil is increasing. Mere political con- siderations, apart from professional eminence, have more frequently been the means of raising men to the bench during that period than used to be the case. All parties have alike been guilty of this abuse; for it is in a great measure a necessity of their position.

The tendency of this state of matters to degrade the bench is

obvious. In course of time men will come to be appointed who could not discharge the duties of their office fairly if they would, front sheer lack of knowledge and experience. And in point of morale such men must necessarily rank lower than the political judges of old times. The chicanery of constituency-managers is worse and more demoralizing than any professional chicanery that can be practised among the higher grades of the legal profession ; and men promoted to the bench simply on account of their poli- tical power are unchecked by the professional conscience above alluded to. The tendency of the new Parliamentary system is to *roe upon Ministers a class of Judges of equivocal reputation in their own profession. This roust necessarily react upon the bar : the majority of its members will precipitate themselves hito that career which leads most surely to distinction—especially as it is also more easy and exciting than the dry drudgery of legal, study. It would be an exaggeration to attribute the present paueity cit men of high legal attainments at the bar, and the wretchedly low condition of juridical science in England, to this cause alone ; but there can be no question that it has contributed powerfully to the deterioration of both.

That the necessity of their position has forced questionable ap- pointments upon Ministers, may be admitted as an excuse for what has been done of late years : but it cannot be admitted as a rule for the future. It is the duty of Ministers to.dii:g,7, zke means of counteracting the mischievous tendency to eo.he had and their predecessors have been yielding. It can be coui.%, for in America, where electioneering intrigue has degraden?e,voa.:Y gislative character more than here, the bench has retained A.' tegrity, and presents an honourable contrast to the general It. and low-pitched conventional morality of the republic. This is the happy result of the strict separation between the political and judicial departments of the state. Perhaps something might be accomplished here by enabling Ministers to dispense with seats in Parliament for the Law-officers of the Crown. If the Attorney- General and Solicitor-General were permitted to sit in Parliament ex officio, and express their opinions when legal questions are raised, but without the right of voting, Ministers would no longer be obliged to confer these offices upon mere partisan lawyers: they might place the best lawyers upon these steps to the bench even without asking whether they were skilful canvassers or spe- cious hustings-orators. Although, however, the good effects of such a measure admit of little doubt, the difficulty oi carrying it is but too obvious. Opposition would meet it with all sorts of popular fallacies, and probably succeed in persuading the public that its sole object was to lessen Ministerial responsibility.