THE ITALIAN QUESTION.
ALTHOUGH the excitement derived from the war and its splendid accompaniments is gone ; although the greater part of the legions who lost and won have gone home, the interest and anxiety in- spired by the Italian question have not abated ; nor has the great element of uncertainty been eliminated from our calcula- tions. The intentions of Sovereigns and Pontiffs are still obscure, and it is one of the questions of the hour how much the people, who have forborne with such magnanimity, will bear. It was a hard task to drive the Austrians beyond the Mincio, but a far harder task is theirs who have to prevent the reencroachments of civil and ecclesiastical despotism, to maintain order during a period of suspense, and to reconcile the legitimate wishes of the people, who have escaped an Egyptian bondage, with high reasons of State similar to those which led to the unlooked-for Peace of Villafranca. It would be strange, indeed, if free Englishman did not feel a strong interest inthe gallant civil struggles of small states striving to be as free as themselves ; and it would augur ill for the public spirit of the English nation were it to refrain, should a fair opportunity offer, from exerting its utmost influence to secure the freedom which the Italians have won.
The Italian question, at this moment, naturally divides itself into three parts ; for Naples is out of court, and Lombardy is an- nexed to Piedmont ; and although there may be disputes at Zurich about frontier lines and the amount of the debt of the Austrian Empire which will fall upon the shoulders of Lombardy, still Victor Emmanuel is, and backed by France will remain in pos- session of the reward of his public spirit and Italian chivalry. We need have no fears for Lombardy. The three parts of the question which are at the mercy of the unforeseen are the future of the Duchies and the Romagna, and the relation which Venetia in the hands of Austria shall bear to the rest of Italy.
The position of the Duchies gives rise to serious apprehensions. Take the case of Tuscany. The Grand Duke Leopold has abdi- cated, and his son the Grand Duke Ferdinand regards himself as the rightful possessor of the Dukedom. These facts, as we infer from an official announcement in the 3Ioniteur, have been officially announced at the court of the French Emperor. But Ferdinand the Fourth has no locus standi ; he is in the position of the young Stuart Pretender at the court of the French king ; his subjects disavow his claims ; national guards are organized and regular troops are arrayed to resist their enforcement ; stronger than these, in a moral sense, a Tuscan Assembly based on a wide suf- frage has met, and from the tone of Baron Ricasoli's opening statement, and the tenour of all the information we receive from Tuscany, there can be no doubt that, whatever may be the ultimate resolves of that Assembly, a resolution to recall Ferdinand IV. from a self-imposed exile will not be one of them. What then ? Will his return be enforced by arms ? Will part of the 50,000 French troops still in Italy be employed to enthrone the Grand Duke ? We have heard in our Blouse of Commons Lord John Russell twice express his belief that the Emperor of the French would not employ his victorious troops on the ignoble errand of escorting back the Dukes against the wishes of the people. We have the word of Baron Ricasoli that, before he quitted Italy, the French Emperor frankly gave assurance of two things—" 1. That there should be no armed intervention.-2. And that regard should be paid to those legitimate wishes of the people which should be expressed." From the same authority we learn that Victor Em- manuel gave the like assurances, and that these solemn declara- tions have been repeated to the Tuscan delegates in Paris and London. It is true that the reported object of Count Reiset's mission—namely, to promote the restoration of the Grand Dukes —jars painfully with these Imperial assurances ; but it is quite conceivable that the French Emperor should deem it his duty to execute, if possible, that sinister clause in the Villafranca treaty, which requires the return of the Grand Dukes, and that having tried and failed, he should still keep the promise which he vouchsafed to the Tuscan delegates. And if such is the position of Tuscany, the Duchier of Modena and Parma must be similarly situated, because they won their freedom by the
same means, and have maintained, as Tuscany has maintained, internal order under the most trying circumstances. In all the Duchies, Assemblies have been convoked to give that expression to their wishes which the Emperor Napoleon has promised to re- spect. In all, the best, the noblest, the most accomplished, the most public-spirited have been elected to sit in the representative chambers. If, therefore, foreign intervention be withheld, there is no reason why these gentlemen should not decide legitimately upon the future of their country. Whence, then, the present uneasiness ? It can only arise from fear of that very interven- tion which we are told is not to take place. Hence the prepara- tions for resistance, the opening of negotiations for a military league, the summoning of Garibaldi to take command. It is quite clear that if intervention be attempted it will not only taint the character of high personages, but will lead to a bloody and a cruel war. The small states of Italy have shown that if left to themselves they can govern themselves, and that their leading men will be animated by the noble sentiment expressed by Ri- easoli, in his opening speech, "that the municipality without the nation would at this time of day be an absurdity."
The States of the Church, it is admitted, occupy a position some- what different from that of the Duchies. Some have dreamed of divorcing them entirely from their odious union with the Papal Court ; but few have deemed this practicable, considering the relations which subsist between France and Austria and the Pope. However legitimately the people of the Legations might desire a divorce from Rome, it is not conceivable that they could obtain it in the courts of Austria and France. Bologna may be covered with placards bearing the words "Viva Vittorio Emmanuele, ii nostro Re! " but the King would not dare, at the peril of excommunication, and the censure of his political friends, to carry the Cross of Savoy to the shores of the Adriatic. The question in the Legations, therefore, is, not a divorce, but a "judicial separation." The Court of Rome does not sanction a dissolution of marriage, not even where the bride has been married without her consent; but the Court of Rome might perhaps be induced, with a little gentle pressure from her present protector, to decree a judicial separation on condition that the separated provinces paid a yearly tribute to the treasury of St. Peter. However that may be, if non-intervention is to be the rule ; if other states are not to supply the Pope with armed men ; then his Holiness will be totally incapable of restoring his au- thority himself. Their brethren in the Duchies have dis- tinguished soldiers—Garibaldi, Fanti, Ulloa—for leaders, and. the people of the Legations have Mezzocapo. Both have raised large bodies of troops, and the Legations are occupied in such a manner, and with such forces, as will prevent the Papal troops from entering the country. What, then, is to be done? Is there any other solution of the difficulty than an European Congress, which should sanction with its authority the separation of the Legations from the Papal Government in all but name, and prevent the soldiers of a cruel and reactionary party from resuming their old and detestable sway ?
The case of Venetia is sadder than that of all the rest of Italy, not excepting Naples and Rome. These may be on a level with it, but they cannot exceed it. The states of Venetia are occupied by 200,000 Austrian troops, and Venice, at least, is suffering from the fury of a reaction, made more furious by defeat in the battle-field ; the Peace of Villafranca, and of course the Treaty of Zurich, will leave Austria in possession of that strong position between the Adriatic and the mountains of the Tyrol which com- mands and overawes the whole of Northern Italy. More than this, the arrangements at Villafranca contain nothing from which one can infer the relation in which Austrian Italy will stand to the other states. If there is a Confederation, and Austria enters it as Austria, and not as Venetia ; if the fortresses are not garrisoned by Federal troops, and the Mincio only serves to cover an en- campment of non-Italian soldiers, it is plain that Austria will be able on the first favourable occasion to reassert her sway over the whole of Italy. Even without a Confederation her position will be a standing menace to the neighbouring states ; and it is towards this quarter that we must look for the greater dangers that seem to beset the Italian question. The war has broken to pieces the treaty laws which regulated the relation of Austria to Italy. Those treaty laws had an Eu- ropean sanction. It would seem, therefore, that the future re- lation of Austria to Italy should again be defined and sanctioned by the European Powers, and if a Congress did nothing more than this, Italy would have gained a great deal. Providing that the people of Italy cannot be left, as they should be left, to settle their own affairs, it appears to us that the next best solution would be found in the deliberations of an European Congress, enlightened and guided by the solemnly declared wishes of the Italian people.
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