AN ALARMIST ' S 'VIEW OF TILE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE.
San—You and I have often belonged to a small minority, without dis- covering afterwards that we were in error. We are in a very small one now, as alarmists with regard to the effects upon England of this last French Re- volution. I am not sure but that the extent of my apprehensions places me in a minority of one. At any rate, you do not express a fear as grave as that which disturbs me- I strive in Vailè to make out how M. Bonaparte's usurpation can fail to produce a French invasion of the shores of England. It is not by a great jump that I have reached this conclusion, but step by step, treading warily, with caution and reluctance. Napoleon the Second is inevitable. His despotic throne will rest on his uncle's system, modified to suit the present circumstances of Europe. To preserve his power, even to save his life, he must imitate his uncle as closely as possible. At first, his sole support at home will be the army. When this splendid army shall have restored the French Empire in France, it must undertake be extend French dominion abroad. Its terrible exploit at home mast fill it with an ardent desire of foreign conquest. It will be mad to wipe out the stain of the foreign occupations of France in 1814 and 1815, and to revenge Waterloo. The Emperor, besides his interest in flattering and gratifying the army, will have a deep interest in war, as the surest means, perhaps the only means, of exterminating Republican and Socialist ideas : tor within a week after de- claration of war, or commencement of war without declaration, more espe- cially against England, every Socialist and Republican in France, as well as every other Frenchman, not to mention the women and children, would think of nothing political but that "one victory" which Lord Ellesmere told us is the passionate desire of every Gaul. The half-dozen assassins who always dogged the steps of Louis Philippe, were manageable by the police ; but there are now ten thousand would-be regicides in France, whom a war would instantly convert into soldiers and worshipers of the Emperor. Ac- cording to the first Napoleon's system, "the war maintained the war" : in the present state of French finance, nothing but war and plunder can ever feed the army which is now France. Napoleon the Second is perfectly un- scrupulous and sufficiently daring: he will not hesitate to do whatever may seem good for his own interest without regard to any other consideration. But this new military France will not attack any of the Northern Powers : by them it will be upheld and cherished, from a natural sympathy with it as the queller of democracy and destroyer of constitutional freedom ; whilst, on the other hand, England invites ii aggression by her prodigious wealth, by the contrast of her free institutions, by the recollections of Waterloo and St. Helena, and, above all, by her military weakness. We are no longer a mar- tial people, excepting the few of us who are trained to war ; and even our soldiers are unfit for war as compared with the first-rate soldiers de- scribed by Sir Francis Head (at any rate a close observer) who have been made soldiers in Africa. It seems to be admitted that a French army of 50,000 men, once landed in England, would march straight to London, and possess the metropolis, which contains moveable property worth a hun- dred millions. What is to prevent them from landing ? We really know nothing about it. We may believe that British steam would beat French steam whenever they met on the water : but they would not meet in the night-time ; we could not insure their meeting at any time; there are fifty places between Harwich and Portsmouth where steamers might land troops with case in mary states of the weather; and the invaders would pick their own time and place for landing, of which we should be in total ignorance until the mischief was done. I say that the thing is possible, perhaps not difficult. The temptation, therefore, is immense for a desperado such as this second Napoleon, impelled by the strongest personal motives, by a fierce army, and by the most presumptuous of nations, which hits an unrivalled genius for sudden attack, and to which the glory of a week's conquest of England, of the occupation of London for twenty-four hours, to say nothing of "beauty and booty," would be ample compensation for the shame of their political slavery. And mark, too, that the Parti Pretre of Europe has been really won by this Napoleon ; and that Milesian Ireland would furnish him with capital ground for a feint whereby to divert our attention from lauding- places nearer to London. Just now there are indications that the first ag- gression of the new imperial and military France will be upon Belgium, Austria being allowed at the same time to suppress liberty in Piedmont England is almost bound in honour to defend Piedmont from attack, and is absolutely bound by treaty to maintain the independence of Belgium. But we need not look out for causes of quarrel. Louis Napoleon will belie him- self if lie give us notice of war, lie is skilful at concealing a purpose by dissimulation ; and the main condition of success in an attempt to invade England is, that we should be surmised in a state of fancied security. In this state, most assuredly, we are at present. I hear merchants, bankers, lawyers, and politicians, rejoicing at the triumph of military violence in France. Their honor of violence from below blinds them to the conse- quences of violence from above. They cannot see beyond the present ; and of the present they see nothing but the downfall of Socialist Democracy. Is that all ? Can the Algerine soldiery of France stop there ? These problems are not investigated : the present satisfaction is great enough to be all-suf- ficing. The City, the Inns of Court, the Clubs, and Downing Street, appear to me to be mad : they tell me that I am mad. Well, patience! events are crowding upon us ; and I pray, but a ithout hope, that they may continue to
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