PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

Sin—In my last letter I put the question, whether, even could we reduce our electoral body to a state of ideal perfection, we should necessarily there- by give increased efficiency to the body whom they elect. The subject of the inefficiency of Parliament is one on which you have yourself often en- larged. It is a patent fact that matters of the highest national import do not obtain at the hands of our Legislature that impartial and attentive ex- amination to which they are entitled. Can any mere change in the electo- ral system obviate this ? Of course, a change which issued in returning a preponderance of Red Republicans or Socialists might produce a Parliament very efficient in its own way—one more than combining the characteristics of the "unlearned," the "mad," and the " merciless " Parliaments of former times. On the other hand, we may hope that any redress of real in- justice in the electoral system may not be without its reward in producing, after its own measure, some degree of real improvement in Parliamentary action.

But it seems to me that the real cause lies much deeper; and that the source of Parliamentary inefficiency is to be sought for in the scheme of government now recognized, and that it is a necessary result of that scheme. Our present form of Ministerial government, like everything else in this country, has grown up ; which is, pro tanto, an argument that it is one adapted to the requirements of this age and country, and which certainly proves that it is not to be got rid off by an attempt to wipe it out at once, but, like all our past changes, by redressing as far as may be its practical evils. Now, though it is a system containing much good, the existence of such practical evils can hardly be denied, and I hold that Parliamentary in- efficiency is the foremost among them. The old constitution of England is a government by a King and a Parlia- ment; the executive power being vested in the King solely, the legislative being shared between him and the Parliament. Such is still the theory ; in practice both functions are pretty nearly transferred to a body called the . . stry or the Government. The use of the latter term expresses the na- ture of the change. Under the old system, nothing short of the King and the two Houses together could have deserved the name ; now the word is familiarly applied to a small body which actually has no legal existence at all, a cabal or a Cabinet. This body takes upon itself to propose all execu- tive measures to the Sovereign, all legislative measures to the Parliament ; the utmost that is allowed to either being a veto on the measures so pro- posed. When such veto is put in practice, the "Government" resigns office, and a new one comes in to try its luck.

This form has some very great advantages ; it combines two of the greatest merits of Monarchical and Republican government respectively. Like the former, it supplies a personal representative of the state, as an object round which the loyalty and veneration of the people may centre, in the way which, among Teutonic, and still more among Celtic races, they fail to do round an Assembly or other political attraction. The Sovereign is rendered a

sort of majestic puppet, in whose name everything is done, and which re- mains untouched, as a principle of continuity, whatever changes may affect everything below. It supplies, in greater perfection than any Republican form, an orderly and constitutional means of removing the real ruler, without bringing the ostensible one into any undesirable collision with his subjects. I say, in greater perfection ; because an Archon, Consul, or President, holds office for a stated time, during which he cannot be removed by any consti- tutional means, unless (where the constitution so provides) some definite act (as is the ease with our own hereditary kingship also) involves the forfeiture of authority. To remove Louis Napoleon at this moment* would require as much of extraordinary revolution as it took to remove Louis Philippe. But Lord John can be sent to the right about any day by a vote of the House of Commons without the regular course of law and order sustaining the slightest shock.

Thus far the system is admirable, and is indeed the greatest fruit of po- litical wisdom on record. Rome and Athens abolished their sovereigns en- tirely, and Athens well nigh centered the executive authority in the same ab- solute and irresponsible body as the legislative. Sparta and Venice retained a nominal sovereignty in King and Doge, but kept continually adding such restrictions on its exercise that the prince became at last the veriest slave in his dominions. We retain all the splendid associations of royalty in un- diminished majesty, combined with a truer freedom than Athens or Flo- rence ever attained. We have a Sovereign whom we see only as the fountain of good, but who, we learn from our cradle, is incapable of wrong. We have realized the ideal which floated before the minds of those Egyptian sages who attributed all the good done in the land to the king personally, and all the evil to his bad counsellors.

But to this, thus far beautiful system, the great evil of Parliamentary in- efficiency seems inseparably linked. It at once introduces the system of par- ties. The "Government" being, so to speak, negatively chosen by the ma- jority of the House of Commons, the Parliamentary battle reduces itself to a strife between the supporters and opponents of the existing Government, to keep them in or to turn them out. This being the grand object of the campaign, questions not directly bearing on it hardly meet with any atten- tion; a Government also will unfairly stake its existence on some particular vote, so as to drive men to vote for or against the Government, and not honestly and soberly upon the merits of the proposition. To the grand ques- tion, shall Ministers stay in or go out ? everything else must yield.

Partly from the tendency to resolve everything into a struggle of this kind, partly from other causes, arises a feeling that Ministers should have the initiative in the House. The routine of office is almost sure to generate, in all but the greatest minds, a certain pertness and insolence ; again, com- bined indolence and party-spirit tend strongly to throw everything into the hands of official men. Certain it is that things are rapidly tending to realize the picture I drew above, of Parliament having only a veto on Ministerial proposals. It may soon be reduced to a " placet " or " non-plaeet," on the recommendations of the Treasury Hebdomadal Board,—with, however, this advantage over the Oxford parallel, that repeated non-placets " may have same little effect even on a Russell ; while the academical oligarchy has never been known to contemplate resignation even in the most adverse cir- cumstances. Let a "private Member" attempt to "bring in a bill" on some subject which perhaps he has thoroughly mastered, but on which the Cleon or Ilyperbolus "at the head of her Majesty's Government" is pro- foundly ignorant; the whole torrent of official impertinence is at once pour- ed out upon him : "Government" does not approve of the measure at all, or at all events cannot tolerate it that session ; at best, the honourable Mem- ber had better withdraw his bill; if so, "Government" will take the mat- ter into its own consideration in the recess, and then produce its own mea- sure,—some puny starveling of official routine, some excuse for doing nothing, to which doing nothing is preferable. All this repeatedly takes place on matters affecting the most vital interests of the empire ; and the House, so tenacious of privilege, sits and sees its real privileges trampled under the feet of the Jack in office ; the body which bearded Stuarts and Plantagenets is cowed into silence at the mandate of a Russell or a Palmerston.

"Shall the Tile fox-earth awe the race that stormed the lion's den?

Shall we, who would not brook one lord, crouch to the sicked Ten?"

Now till it he really recognized that Parliament has some other function than to keep in or to turn out Ministers—till it can be brought really to give its own attention to a question without letting Ministers think for it, and without any reference to party ends—it does seem of comparatimely little consequence whether the House of Commons be appointed by the lords of Gotten and Old Sarum, or by the free and independent electors of St. Al- ban's. We may even doubt whether the manifest benefits of our present system are not too dearly purchased ; whether the days of "le Roy s'avi- sera " on the one hand, and impeachments and stopped supplies on the other, were not a preferable state of things. At all events, everybody was in ear- nest; neither King nor Minister, representative nor elector, could afford to go

to sleep. It may even be, that present scheme may be merely a state of transition to one in which the three theoretical elements of our constitution may be neither dormant nor antagonistic.

That Parliamentary inefficiency is connected with the Ministerial system, is, I think, shown by the fact, that in the House of Lords, which has less to do with pulling down and setting up Administrations, questions are treated with somewhat more dignity and impartiality, and something more like dis- cussion on the merits of the case, than they often meet in the Commons.

I would not be understood as denying that Ministers are proper .persons to originate measures ; I only protest against their exclusive arrogation of the power. An honest and prudent Minister must know the defects in his own department, and be able to propose remedies, better than any one else ; though even here he must have strong wings indeed if he can soar above the tether of his red tape. But why other people should not be listened to just as much on subjects with which they are conversant, I cannot at all divine.

One suggestion more, historical rather than practical, and my speculations are at an end. Is it not to be regretted that at the time of the Reform Bill the opportunity was lost of making elections indirect; electing the repre- sentatives, as in some foreign constitutions, by electors themselves elected by the people at large ? It certainly does seem that many a man is quite in- competent to decide between the merits of two political candidates, who is fully able to say which of his neighbours is, by general good sense and honesty, best qualified to decide for him. A suffrage of this kind might be made as nearly universal as is consistent with its retaining the nature of a pri- vilege. Bribery could hardly be carried on so systematically as at present. The intermediate elector' set more individually before the public eye, would be more likely to shrink from receiving a bribe, and would often be at once less able and less willing to bribe his own constituents. It was a pity that Parliamentary Reform and Corporation Reform were not effected together. In such a case, the elections vested in the old oligarchies might have been transferred to the present freely-chosen bodies. But this could hardly be done in any existing borough, as it would have the appearance of withdraw- ing a privilege ; and could it, or anything like it, be introduced in new boroughs, it would have the disadvantage of producing a non-uniformity of franchise in different places.

With many thanks for the insertion of my former letter,

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, E. A. F.

• The letter has been in type some weeks.