GERMANY AND BRITAIN.
THE country is justifiably annoyed at the correspondence between the Foreign Office and Prince Bismarck about Angra, Pequena. It is perfectly clear that, owing, as we believe, to Lord Derby's inability to make up his mind in serious contingencies, Lord Granville left inquiries which the German Chancellor thought important unanswered for nine months, that he then advanced claims which had no founda- tion, that he then receded from them, and that England was left quite needlessly in the position of a Power suffering from a diplomatic defeat. There was, we believe, no defeat, but a misunderstanding, ultimately cleared up, which ought never to have occurred. While, however, the annoyance of the country is reasonable, it should not forget that it has mainly itself to blame. It is just as undecided as the Ministry is. We never remember an occasion in the history of our foreign policy on which it was so difficult to form an idea of effective English opinion as on this outbreak of the German desire to acquire Colonies. Almost every serious speech, from Mr. Gladstone's ad- dress in Scotland down to the last utterance of a new candidate for election, contains a disclaimer of any jealousy of Germany. Scarcely any serious journalist writes an article in any other sense ; and, as far as we can gather, no one of importance even regrets in private the new German departure. Nevertheless, the moment Germany begins to carry out her plans there is a chorus of alarm, and the Government is accused of culpable weakness for not anticipating her. If Prince Bismarck occupies Angra Pequena, the Colonial Office is accused of sacrificing the Cape. If it is reported that he wishes for part of Zululand, Mr. Glad- stone is eagerly adjured to annex at once. If he appoints a Consul-General in Zanzibar, correspondents suggest that the Sultan of that island should be instantly "protected." When the Prince called a Conference on West Africa, all England was bidden in solemn tones to await some plot for English humiliation ; and now tve are told, in accents of extreme apprehension, that he is about to seize the northern half of New Guinea, which is either Dutch or English, and to annex New Ireland. It is time to ask which policy the people intend to adopt,—whether they are willing to recognise the Germans as friendly allies in the work of occupying unused spaces of the world, and drilling its savage races into decent order ; or whether they intend to re- gard each advance with suspicion, as the aggressive move of a powerful and ambitious rival ?
We are decidedly for the first of these two policies. We are by no means so certain as are some of our contemporaries that Germany, with her confirmed and almost unavoidable militarism, is the best leader for European civilisation, and are convinced that she will find in the loss of her self-government, and in the growth of Socialism, arising from the overstrain on her resources, a heavy counterpoise to the advantages Prince Bis- marck has secured for her. But we are satisfied that a policy of resistance to German expansion beyond the seas has no basis, either in sound policy or morality. It is futile, to begin with. No race so poor, so rapid in its increase, and so full of adaptability to new circumstances as the German, will consent to remain cooped-up on a large but over-populated strip of loam and sand, while there are new and rich territories to occupy or to conquer. It will overflow in some direction, and had much better overflow in Africa, in South America, or even Western Asia, than in South-Eastern Europe. In the latter region it can only commence a struggle with the Slays, which may lead to wars lasting for a century, to the pure waste and detriment of the resources of mankind ; while in the former two it may, by possibility at all events, produce much good. As settlers, the Germans are admirable. We have no better citizens in Australia or England ; while in America they display. besides industry, intellectual activity, and a readiness to obey the law, unusual political capacity and sense. Of German ability to govern the darker races, we have as yet little experience ; but there is every reason to believe they will do that work well. They possess the needful masterfulness, they never delight in injustice for its own sake, they know how to organise, and they never commit the most fatal of errors, letting their agents run loose to do what they themselves would be unable to approve. The Russians do that constantly, trusting their Governors-General with most dangerous powers ; and the French do it occasionally, especially when at war, in the most inexcusable way. We do not believe that last story of General Negrier, but it is evidently thought not incredible in France. We may be perfectly certain that no German Pro-consul will get out of Prince Bismarck's hand, and that no German General will execute opponents in batches against the will or orders of his Sovereign. The Germans will make fair rulers ; and they cannot convert any savage State into a Colony without enriching the world at large, and ourselves first of all. Suppose they do make of Angra Pequena a mere "gate," and find Namaqualand and Damaraland culturable, or capable of yielding minerals, how is that to our loss ? It would be to our gain, and so would be their possession of the whole basin of the Congo in its widest and longest acceptation, even if it stretched right across Africa, and included the main- land of Zanzibar. A German India flung across the Dark Continent would be a pure good to us, as well as to mankind. It is nonsense to say that Britain would thereby be limited in her natural expansion, or would lose—for this is the real thought of many objectors—a profitable future rever- sion. Britain cannot, without a conscription, undertake to maintain the Roman peace in all uncivilised lands, and has no moral right whatever to block up the way of all other races than her own. She could not do the whole work, even if time should bring her a cordial and permanent alliance with the United States, and would, even then, have no right to attempt it. It is not only that the Slav, and the Teuton, and the Latin have a claim to their share of the world's wealth, but that they are bound to take up their share of the world's work ; and those who prevent them when they are acting for the general benefit, are pro Matto debasing them. To judge from some of the papers, there are Englishmen who think that every uninhabited spot, except Kerguelen Island, is theirs of right, and that any white race which approaches a Colony of theirs is necessarily an enemy, and this even if the dividing sea is fifty times the breadth of the English Channel. They forget entirely that to attack Sydney is to attack London, and that the latter enterprise would be much more profitable to France.
But, it is argued, Germany may occupy or annex some territory which marches with some of our own. That is, of course, quite possible ; and what then ? Every State in Europe has a boundary except ourselves, and finds it possible to keep it ; and we have a boundary which marches for fifteen hundred miles with that of the most powerful State in the world, and hardly remember the circumstance. Why should Germany be worse as a neighbour than the United States ? It is the neighbourhood of uncivilised States, not of civilised ones, which is dangerous to Great Powers. Sup- pose Germany stretched right across South Africa from Angra Pequena to Delagoa Bay, how, if Free-trade were conceded, should we be the worse ? Germany would " draw " the Africanders just as much and just as little as the United States draws the Canadians, while a White State of great potential strength would be placed as a powerful barrier between ourselves and the influx of fresh barbarians from the North. Germany would have the border work to do, while we pursued in peace the task of consolidating and thoroughly opening-up our own possessions. This is an extreme case ; yet there is nothing frightful in such a position, any more than there would be in a divided Papua, but for the in- trusion, in the latter instance, of another element into the matter. Australia is convinced that any division of the island would hereafter be to her an injury, compelling her to keep up a fleet and an army, and perhaps a difficult foreign policy, and therefore presses upon England the advantage of avoiding those contingencies. As Australia is one of the best of our allies, and entitled to a voice in Imperial affairs, her representations in such a matter ought, if possible, to be followed ; but that is a special case. The general principle should be to acknowledge that Germany is a safe neigh- bour across the ocean, and seek to enlist her powerful aid in thoroughly pacifying the enormous expanses of territory over which, more especially in Africa, we are now extending the indefinable authority we call "Protec- tion." If we are unprepared to do this, and determined to carry out our task in lonely pride, let us adopt the other policy, —increase our armaments, give up praising ourselves for absence of jealousy, and treat German expansion as German aggression. Only let us remember, if we enter upon this dog- in-the-manger course, we must draw nearer to America, for it is all Europe we are about to enter into contention with. Europe has little solidarity, except upon one point ; but that one is that the British pretension to loneliness on the seas is the first obstacle to the Colonial expansion of every State. We have no ally anywhere beyond seas, or, if we have one, it is the English-speaking Republic with which some among us want to quarrel on account of a projected scheme for cutting a canal which would probably give us a new trade.
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