AMERICA AND THE PEACE TREATY. T HE German Peace Treaty is
still being used as the shuttlecock of American party politics. The meeting of the new Congress has not changed this unfor- tunate situation. Mr. Lodge, who leads the opposition to the Covenant, and the President, who demands the acceptance of the whole Treaty as it stands, profess them- selves equally unable to move a step towards a compromise. Mr. Lodge announced last Saturday that, if the President would express his readiness to modify the terms of the Covenant, the Opposition would be prepared to negotiate with 'him. The President replied next day that he had " no compromise nor concession of any kind in mind," and that he meant to leave to the Republicans the un- divided responsibility for the fate of the Treaty and the present condition of the world." The antagonists are well matched, and both are firmly entrenched in the famous clause of the Constitution which divides the Treaty-making powers between President and Senate. The President knows that America wants peace to be concluded, that only a handful of Senators are hostile to the Covenant in principle, and that very few indeed object to the Peace Treaty itself apart from the Covenant. On the other hand, Mr. Lodge knows that most of the Senators would like to modify the terms of the Covenant, and he believes that the American people are not prepared to accept the responsibilities in Europe, Asia, and Africa which the acceptance of the Covenant would entail upon them. If the President will not accept the reservations dictated by Mr. Lodge, to limit America's duties in the League of Nations, and if Mr. Lodge insists on some or all of these reservations, the Treaty will apparently be delayed for months to come. But both parties to this . dispute have to remember that the Presidential election campaign will begin next summer, and that if the Treaty is not disposed of before then it must become the leading issue before the electors. Whether either party is anxious to fight the election on the Treaty issue we do not know. We are inclined to think that foreign policy would not be sufficiently attractive as a subject of electoral controversy to a people who are mainly interested in their domestic affairs, and that the party leaders will avoid it if they can. If this be true, the inference is that the fate of the Treaty will be settled in one way or another by the spring. The situation is further complicated by the President's serious illness, which prevents him from taking an active part in politics, and yet does not require him to devolve his duties upon the Vice-President. Mr. Wilson's break- down through overwork has come at the worst possible time for us all. Our natural sympathy with him in his affliction is sharpened by a sense of the embarrassment which it causes to the Allies as well as to America.
Whatever America may decide, our duty is clear. We, in common with France, Italy, and Japan, must carry on the work of the Peace just as if America were actively co-operating with us. The German Treaty will come into force as soon as Germany has signed the new Protocol about the Scapa outrage and ratified the Treaty. The four leading Allies will then have to supervise the execution of the Peace terms and to set up the League of Nations. There will be some technical difficulties at the outset. The provision in the Covenant that " the first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States " will have to be interpreted as if the Treaty had been ratified by America, just in the same way as the International Labour Convention ordained by the Treaty has been held at Washington without regard to the Senate's delays. Similar difficulties in connexion with the various Peace Commissions can be overcome by the concerted action of the Allies, with the assistance of the President. Indeed, the Allies have already had to point out to Germany that ishe would gain nothing by protesting that the Treaty would not work without America's immediate co-operation. In any case it must be made clear that the hesitation of America does not imperil the League of Nations. We should say, on the contrary, that the establishment of the League has become even more necessary than it seemed to be a year ago. America might be able to afford another war, but Europe cannot. Europe's only chance of recover- ing from the appalling losses that she has sustained lies in the formation of a League which may prevent the recur- rence of war within our time. The old system has gone ; a new system of small States has been founded on the ruins of Central and Eastern Europe. The orderly development of this new system can only be secured through inter- national combination. For the alternative—the Western Allies maintaining great armaments to repress by force any attempt to upset the peace settlement—is frankly impossible. Great Britain cannot afford it, and France and Italy are far poorer than we are. We must put our faith, therefore, in the League, which may be able to do by com- bined effort, and especially by moral and economic pressure, what no one Power can or will undertake. We all agree in principle that war is a horrible thing, and that its horror tends to increase. We all accept Professor Murray's contention, very skilfully argued in an article in the League for December, that law is a great improvement on war, in international as well as in national affairs. The League of Nations now offers a means of attaining the reign of law among nations and abolishing the resort to violence in every quarrel. We should be very foolish not to grasp the opportunity and strive with all our might to make the League a success. Of course, in view of the American complications, it might have been better if the Allied statesmen had contented themselves with a simple agree- ment to enforce respect for the sanctity of contract, and to require that any State which desired to break a Treaty should give a year's notice of its intention to do so. As our readers know, we should have preferred that moderate and practical scheme. But now that the Allies have de- cided to form a League of Nations, it is the plain duty of every right-thinking man in the Allied countries to do his utmost to make the League a reality. We must forget past differences and make the very best of the scheme which is now about to be put into operation at Geneva.
If the Allies go on with their work steadily and quietly, they need not have any anxiety about America. They will have America's sympathy from the outset. We are sure that, apart from the political disputes over the Treaty at Washington, the vast majority of Americans are still heart and soul with the Allies in the cause which America helped so nobly to save. The American people came into the war of their own accord, after mature con- sideration, and they have not changed their opinion about the war. They rejoiced over the victory of civiliza- tion and democracy, and they would no more seek to undo it than we should. If a similar crisis ever occurred, America would act in the same way and for the same reasons. We may take it for granted, then, that whatever happens to the Peace Treaty, America will not leave us and our Allies to complete the task of reconstruction as best we can. The domestic controversy in Washington is not our affair, but it really affects the manner in which America may co-operate with us rather than the fact of her co-operation. How America will help Europe is America's business, not ours. We cannot, and would not, dictate to her as to the precise method. in which she may assist in the League of Nations. If she decides to join the League on special conditions, limiting her responsibility more narrowly than ours is limited, we must accept her conditions thankfully. Provided only that America determines to modify her former attitude of absolute non-intervention in the Old World, we shall be satisfied with anything that she cares to propose. The League, with America's moral support, will become at once the most potent political organization for good that the world has ever known. We have no fear lest America, having once entered the League, should seek to withdraw from it. That is not the American way.
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