TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
PERHAPS after the light thrown upon Indian subjects,generally by the very copious discussions which we have had, in Parlia- ment and in the press, it will not be difficult for the public at large to form some judgment on the general merits of the question between the Government and the East India Company : the pro- bable working of the new plan for the administration of India de- mands closer examination. Lord Palmerston's bill naturally divides itself into three parts—first, what we may call the dis- franchising clauses ; secondly, the constructive clauses relating to the home Government ; and thirdly, those clauses that somewhat alter the arrangement of the Councils in India. This last portion is a consequence of the change in England, and for the time we will set it aside, concentrating our attention upon the alteration proposed in the home Government. The disfranchising clauses abolish the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors ; and we must judge the operation of this part by the advantages it will supply, or the obstructions which it will remove. It is to this portion of the bill most especially and positively that the East India Company and its friends elfier re- sistance, and to them we ought to look for the strongest case on that side. We are told, in the first place, that the abolition of the Court of Directors will remove "a check" upon the Executive Government ; and this argument is always advanced in a tone which implies that " a cheek" is something good in itself, a positive advantage. There is in discussion, as well as in official administration, a routine of its own, a red-tape technicality, and it is considered "constitutional" or "popular" to insist upon " cheeks." Now it is evident that in the administration of a dis- tant dependency like India we are far less in need of " a cheek " —" a stop or hinderince," to use one of the dictionary definitions of the word—than of positive assistance : and only that_ part of the pleading on behalf of the Company which represents the aid given merits attention. It consists in telling us how favourable to the progress of India has been the government by the Company : but the representation involves a confusion of things in themselves distinct. The blue-book industriously circulated by the Company before the introduction of Lord Palmerston's bill informs the reader, that during the last thirty years there has been a steady improvement in India. But to whom is that im- provement due, if not to the influence of men like Malcolm, Dalhousie, Colvin, and others, who have acted directly un- der the Crown ? It is true that the new regulations have been carried out with verygreatability, with a zeal and power severely tested by the difficulties to be overcome : but in what lay those difficulties ? Chiefly in the routine kept up under the adminis- tration of the East India Company. The real progress of India has been accomplished by individual sagacity, zeal, and energy, as opposed to organized officialism. There is no evidence what- ever that the Directors as such have materially affected the case one way or other—as little as the Postmaster-General affects the transactions influenced by the correspondence that passes through his hands. The- welfare of India has been materially developed by eminent public servants whether of the Company or of the Crown ; but men of the same stamp, in some cases the very indi- viduals themselves, will be retained at their work whether the Directors continue or not. It would probably be, as Lord Gran- ville declared, a misfortune for India and England to lose the servioes of a Idelvill or a Mill ; but these services would not be changed in their nature although the superior officers of these eminent persons should be called. Directors or Councillors, Chair- man of the Board or President. It is unnecessary to say any- thing on behalf of the Court of Proprietors, whether as " a check" or an aid. There is no evidence that the Court has either pre- vented the execution of any objectionable measure in India or promoted the execution of any good measure. It is at present, save as a very anomalous and awkwardly-contrived constituency, a nullity. On a calm review of the facts, therefore, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the case against the disfranchising clauses of the Government bill is not made out.
The Minister for India may be regarded as being either created or promoted by the bill. We have already a President of the In- dia Board, but in the vague estimation of the public he is re- garded only as third in that scale of Cabinet Ministers at the head of which stands the Premier. He is now to be in the se- cond class, immediately under the Premier and on a level with the Secretaries of State ; and with increased power he will neces- sarily be placed under a much greater weight of responsibility,
towards the Cabihet to which he belongs, towards the Parliament, and towards public opinion generally. Mr. Roebuck applauds
. the bill because it thus increases the responsibility of the Presi- dent, but he would still further increase this responsibility by putting a negative upon the Government proposal for a Council to assist the President. Let us see how this suggestion applies, and how the responsibility of the principal officer is affected by the present system, or by the bill. There is no doubt that al- ready the President of the India Board is the person who is in- dividually most responsible for Indian government and legisla- tion. He can control. the Court of Directors and the Secret Com- mittee ; he can take the initiative ; he could override the obstruc- tion of those bodies if it were offered ; and though he could not overrule the decision of the Cabinet to which he belongs, he could at all events resist any measure which he thought injurious, by an appeal to public opinion through his own resignation. All this is within the power of the President already ; and if we were to call any man to account for misconduct in India—if any Minister were to be impeached on an Indian charge—it would at the pre- sent moment be Mr. Vernon Smith. Following out Mr. Roebuck's idea, we should get the very beau ideal of an efficient politico-moral responsibility by disencumbering the Minister of all adventitious aids, leaving everything to him alone. This would be an excel- lent plan if it were possible always to find "the right man "—a man who should combine intimate knowledge of Indian affairs with intimate knowledge of English politics : great experience and sagacity with bold confidence in himself; a disregard of ob- jection with a deference for the sound judgment of others ; a tem- per to conciliate opponents, to moderate friends, with a tempera- ment to bear unremitting exertion, anxiety, and trouble. But where is there such a man at the present moment ? Indeed, where can we ever find him by simply looking for him ? Would an advertisement in the Times bring him out ? We are de- scribing a beau ideal ; whereas working arrangements must con- template such an average man as any given Premier can find to make up one department in his Cabinet. The Council, therefore, will probably assist the Minister. Will it diminish or increase his responsibility ? Undoubtedly, the way in which India has been governed hitherto has tended to throw the chief authority into the hands of the President, the larger ostensible responsibility upon the Court of Directors. They are supposed to be " controlled" by the President, but really to do the greater part of public management in India ; and hence they have operated less as " a check " than as a screen. How far will the proposed Council operate in the same direction ? This de- pends upon the composition of the body. According to the de- scription which Lord Palmerston has given of his own plan, we may suppose the Council to consist of respectable gentlemen who will be brought more directly under the mastery of the Presi- dent; since they will not possess in the public sight an authority apparently divided from his, they will not to the same extent divide his responsibility. In truth, we might suppose them to constitute a " Board," not very unlike that of the Admiralty or the Treasury ; and it would only raise a smile if any one ima- gined for a moment that the responsibility of a First Lord is diminished, or even shared, by the Junior Lords. Were the Council suitably composed, it might enforce a very powerful responsibility upon the President at the head of it, even without delegating to it executive powers that would obstruct or encumber him in the exercise of his duties. It is evident that the authors of the bill have felt great difficulty in arranging the composition of a Council independent in itself and yet effectual for the purpose in view. At present the nomination resides with the Proprietors of East India Stock, and, by a recent innovation, with the Crown. If the Crown nominates as members of the Council gentlemen of the class usually contented with a thousand a year, the Board is likely to consist of nothing higher than a few Junior Lords—junior, that is, in rank, though probably not in years. Some have imagined a Council nominated by Parliament but a great number of objections would present themselves to such a course, and it is difficult to contrive any election of Coun- cillors by a vote in India. Others have contemplated a mainte- nance of the present vote in the holders of East India stock,—a very clumsy contrivance for the composition of any great Council. Who, for example, would tolerate a plan for nominating the Trea- sury Board by a vote of holders of Three per cent Consols ? There are cases in which the nomination can lie with the Crown, and yet be so thoroughly controlled by public opinion that the appoint- ment would be absolutely above reproach. The most con- spicuous though not a sole instance lies in the appointment of the Judges. How are they selected ? They arc chosen from the men who have worked their way to the highest place in their own pro- fession; and the appointment is guided and controlled by the force of a public opinion which has all the life and information of the profession at large. The same principle might unquestionably be applied to the composition of the Council for the affairs of India. What we want in such a Board is members practically acquainted with the civil administration of India, its military administration, its finance, its law, and its commerce, and at the same time per- sons who have risen to so high a position that they can view these subjects with the breadth of statesmanship ; such men, in short, as are presented by the very highest members of the legal pro- fession when the Crown is seeking for Judges. Certainly the Civil Service, the Army, the finance, law, and commerce of India, could present candidates who would have their moral claims to the selection of the Crown ; and in adopting this principle for the selection, the Crown would derive all the advantage to be taken from paying due deference to public opinion. Such a Council would less divide the responsibility of the President than concentrate responsibility upon him. The members are to have the power of recording their opinion in minutes ; the concurrence of four of them is to be required in all financial matters. Should a Council possessing these powers be composed of men who have acquired practical knowledge of the great branches of administra- tion in India, with a repute in India and in England for their knowledge, character, and ability, that Minister would be able or reckless indeed who could overrule or even disregard the pre- sentments of such a Council.
One of the greatest difficulties in the arrangement of the new plan has lain with the distribution of patronage. At present it is divided between the President of the Board of Control and the East India House, a great part of it, however, being regulated by a certain routine. Those who believe in the efficacy of public competition for putting "the right man iu the right place," have faith in it also as a sufficient check against abuse or cor- ruption ; though it is probable that when the novelty is worn off, and when gentlemen in search of place, and those having it to bestow, have accommodated themselves to their new circum- stances, it will be found that competition, though effectual to keep out absolute boobyism, will not altogether prevent favourit- ism. Here again some practical persons arc for retaining the Court of Directors and Proprietary, simply as a machinery for the distribution of patronage, in order to prevent the accumulation of privilege in the neighbourhood of Whitehall, with a consequent increase to the influence of the Executive and the extending of corruption. They thus formally propose to keep up the plan of " burning a house to roast a pig. Certainly the practical men of this country will never think of maintaining a great separate ad- ministrative establishment in order to prevent an incidental pro- clivity to corruption in another and duplicate establishment. On the contrary, we must check the abuses as well as we may by new and direct counteraetives. The best counteractive of all would lie in complete publicity of the proceedings of the Indian department ; the next in the ability of the Councillors and of the principal sub- ordinate administrators, whose judgment could not be disregarded. In all these complaints about patronage, however, the pensive public is very apt to cast upon officials the blame which it should take upon itself. It is untrue that there is any approach to the corruption which has been witnessed in former times. Queen's Ministers do not now take bribes, East India Directors do not now receive money-payments for the places they distribute. Perhaps the higher you rise in society, the more difficult it is to approach anything like a corrupt use of official op- portunity. A certain sort of favour is inevitable. A gen- tleman who has places to distribute will naturally give the first preference to persons whom he knows ; less perhaps through favour than from the fact that he does know them and their claims more vividly than he can know the qualities and the claims of strangers. No doubt, there arc always very plausible reasons for "taking care of Dowb." The evil lies not in this natural pre- ference of friends and connexions whose ability or trustworthiness is known, but in the circumstance that high position, influence, and therefore place, fall principally to gentlemen in certain circles. But how is it that it happens so ? Mainly through the servility of society, which, by its subserviency, leaves high position and place for those who are noble, who are " distinguished " already, who are successful, who are very rich—those who by habits of life principally consort together in society and in the Senate. Many of our public institutions contribute to keep up this spirit of an "Upper Ten." The property qualification in Parliament assists. The systeas of purchase in the Army helps it, by multiplying the wealthy holders of commissions in high places. The maintenance of exclusively hereditary peerage lends its help. But all these are political abuses to which the country at large is passively in- different. Like the empiric in medicine, the public seeks to pre- vent the abuses of corruption without attempting to disturb the causes of favouritism. No country which is politically apathetic can ever expect to be politically healthy, or free from administra- tive abuses. There is some part of the abuses of Government both in India and in England which cannot be cured by any Parlia- mentary bill. The practical question before us is, how far the proposed measure will tend to improve the administration of India by increasing the efficiency and responsibility of the Executive ; and we have endeavoured to answer this question judicially, by examining the chief provisions of the measure.
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