20 FEBRUARY 1897, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE King of Greece has forced the hand of the Powers, and though he may not at once acquire Crete for his people, he has rescued the island for ever from the deso- lating oppression of the Turk. He appears to have been informed that the massacre in Canea, which was only stopped by the flight of all her well-to-do citizens, was begun by Turkish troops under orders from Constan- tinople, and to have known that even this instance of contempt for their Ambassadors would not stir the Great Powers to action. His people were wild with excitement ; he himself, though a quiet and judicious man, who has extricated himself creditably from repeated "crises," is probably by this time full of Greek feeling ; and he cares nothing about his throne, which two or three years ago he desired to abdicate. He yearns like a true Northerner for the clear, cold air of his own land. He decided, there- fore, on vigorous action ; despatched three cruisers of heavy tonnage to Canea, with orders to protect the flight of all Christians ; sent his second son, Prince George, with a squadron of torpedo-boata to prevent the landing of Turkish reinforcements ; and transported two thousand regulars to Crete under command of Colonel Vassos, his favourite aide-de-camp, with written instructions to "occupy" the island in the name of the Greek Monarchy. All these orders were carried out successfully. Toe citizens of Canea were escorted to Greek territory, Prince George drove back a Turkish transport full of Bashi- Bazouks which was steaming to Heraklion, and Colonel Vassos landed with his men unopposed within ten miles of Canea. He announced himself in a procla- mation as in occupation of the island on behalf of the Greek Monarchy, and the statement, though ridi- culed in the great capitals as bombast, is substantially true. The Turcophile papers say he has only two thousand men and some Maxim guns, but the state- ment conceals the facts. Colonel Vassos from the moment of his unopposed landing has been in command of two thousand Greek troops, a force of artillery excellent for fighting in the hills, and the whole body of Cretan insurgents, numbering twenty thousand men in all, fairly armed, accustomed to guerilla warfare against their hereditary oppressors, and recently flushed with many small successes. He has fifteen thousand men round his colours, and is, in fact, in full possession of the interior, where his difficulty will be not to defeat the Mahom- medans, but to prevent the Cretans, who look upon them as we look upon pirates, from taking too sanguinary a vengeance for the past.

Owing, however, in part to local circumstances, in part to the occupation by the Greek Government, which gives its agents full authority over the insurgents, and in part to the action of the Powers, this danger has for the most part been averted. The Mahommedan garrison of the fortress of Aghia, which was stormed on Tuesday by the Greek troops, has not been massacred; and the Powers are taking possession of the coast cities, where alone the Mussulmans are numerous enough to fight hard. These Powers, finding the magazine on the pointof exploding, have uttered many discordant cries, in the shape of protests, remonstrances, and even threats addressed to the Govern- ment of Athens; but the things they have actually done have been judicious and moderate. They have unanimously " disapproved" the action of the Hellenic Government, and unanimously informed the Sultan of their disapproval ; but they have requested his Majesty not to send reinforce- ments to Crete lest they should be sunk en route and so produce "complications." They have warned Prince George of Greece that if he sinks Turkish vessels, and if their own naval commanders happen to see him, the "consequences may be most serious ;" but they did not prevent, or try to prevent, the disembarcation of Colonel Vassos and his little army, nor do they threaten to fire on the reinforcements which the Government of Greece is sending to his aid. And, lastly, while stating their profound respect for the authority of the Sultan, they have superseded it altogether in the chief cities, occupying Canea in particular with a mixed force of Marines, under the command of the Italian Admiral, raising their own flags at every notable point instead of the Turkish flag, and intimating unmistakeably that the Admiral and nobody else is to be obeyed. With six hundred European Marines in the little town, with six hundred more held in reserve, with three hundred Montenegrin police, who had been withdrawn but have relanded, and with the power of reducing the town to ashes in twenty minutes by a broad- side or two from the combined fleets, the Admiral should be able to make Canea as safe under its European guardianship as London or Vienna. It will be neces- sary and easy "in the interest of Turkish dignity" to request the Turkish troops to retire to Salonica, and then the position will be this. The Powers will be in possession of the ports, Colonel Vassos will be in possession of the interior, and the Sultan will be in possession of the fullest right to agree to any dis- positions which the Powers may make for the future government of the island. What that disposition will be is, of course, uncertain. The wisest course in the interests at once of the Cretans and of the European peace would be to hand it over to Greece, which can easily garrison Canea and raise a native police force to maintain order in the interior ; but if the Powers prefer the intermediate plan always hitherto pursued with Turkey, and wish to make of the island a principality under Prince George, with a nominal tribute to the Sultan, there is no valid objection to that compromise. The simple fixed condition is that Crete shall be free of the Turk, and to this we understand all the Powers to have already acceded. They will not say so probably in any formal way until the Ambassadors have " conferred ; " but for fifty years past no Christian province once free of the Mongol has ever been banded back to him, and in the case of Crete his dominance is too formidable to the cause of peace. King George of Greece, as we said before, has rescued Crete, and, so far as we can see, is no more blameworthy than Cavour when he liberated the Papal States or accepted the result of the Garibaldian Revolution. Indeed, he is less blame- worthy, for there was always a chance that the Romagna or Naples might be decently governed by Princes who were at all events Christian Europeans ; whereas Crete was governed by Asiatic Mussulmans inferior in every respect to their subjects, and unable from their conditions of race, education, and creed ever to rise to a higher conception of their duty. Crete has shaken out the Turk as Wallachia and Moldavia did, as Servia did, as Greece did, as Bulgaria did, and as Macedonia yet will do, as a creature at whose hands death was preferable to a life which must be lived under him without freedom, without honour, and without prosperity.

The grand question now is whether Macedonia will follow the example of Crete. If it does it will be most difficult to avoid the general war of which the Powers are so apprehensive. The Turks can reach Macedonia from the north, and from the south can pour regulars over the mountains from Roumelia, and can invite the. Albanians to descend from the north for a grand massacre both in Macedonia and Thessaly. That means invasion both from Greece and Bulgaria, a possible mobilisation. by Austria, which cannot tranquilly see Macedonia de- populated, and a probable explosion in Constantinople, where the Greeks could defend themselves only by civil war. Such a rising would be followed by the general break- up, the advance of Russia to Constantinople, and probably by the war all over Europe which has been so long prophesied and so successfully postponed. This time, if the rising occurs, it can, as we believe, be averted only by one of two alternative schemes. The Powers, startled by the danger arising from their lethargy and their jealousies, may order the Sultan not to send troops, under penalty of a joint occupation of his capital, may occupy Salonica as they occupy Canea, and may announce that they will hold a Conference with the intention of raising Macedonia into a principality. The insurgents would then sink back into tranquillity, the Albanians would hesitate, and the question of questions, which is the occupation of Constantinople, would be once more postponed, at all events for a season. Or—and this is far more probable—the Romattoffs and Hapsburgs might arrive at a compromise, divide the Balkan Peninsula between them, and with the acquiescence, reluctant or willing, of Great Britain, finally expel the Turk from Europe. The difficulties of such an arrangement are exceedingly great, if only because the Turk is essentially a fighting man, and may at the last moment insist upon defending himself by arms; but they would not be insuperable if only the European Powers could resolve to trust one another frankly for a single month. They have done so about Crete, and all will probably go well with that island ; but whether they will do so when the visible prize is Constantinople, which they believe to be the "Empire city of the world," remains to be discovered. We should greatly fear that if Macedonia rises, the right to the great heritage must be settled by force of arms, and how to pacify the Macedonians without a pledge that they shall be free we confess we do not perceive. They have borne so much and have been deceived so often that they may well believe their only chance lies in firing the magazine. We abhor the idea of this war, which will throw back Europe for thirty years, and which might have been averted if only the Powers had insisted on deposing Abd-ul-Hamid ; but we are not so sure that were we Macedonians this would be our point of view, whether we should not rather say, "Let Europe suffer for its crimes in allowing us to be enslaved, but let us be free."