LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
THE POSITION IN PEKING. [To Tan ED17011 OP Tin " SPTCTATOTI.1 SIR,—Now that the best part of a month has elapsed since the downfall of Yuan Shilakai, it is becoming possible to view that event perhaps more correctly than foreigners, both inside and outside China, were inclined to do at first. The dramatic story of how a meeting of the Grand Council was called for Janna•y 1st, how Yuan Shih-kai repaired to the Council Hall only to bo told that his presence was not required, how lie immediately fled from Peking with all his wives and household goods, and how he was only induced by a solemn guarantee of personal safety to return and make a more conventional exit in order to " save the face " of the Chinese Government, is possibly known to your readers from telegrams. What we are now venturing to hope is that the motives which actuated his dismissal were not the motives of "full speed backwards," but a human desire on the part of the late Emperor's friends to punish him for the part he played in the coup cretat of 1898. The kindest view to take of Yuan Shih- kars action in then siding with the Empress-Dowager Tz'e list was that he saw that the young Emperor, untried in government and emotional, was driving too fast under the influence of Kang Yu-wei and other reformers ; and that he preferred the idea of a strong ruler on the throne, believing that the inevitable trend of events towards reform must he too strong even for her reactionary instincts. But the view that the Chinese commonly appear to hold is that Yuan was untrue to his salt, and that his punishment was thoroughly deserved. The story that the Emperor Kuaug riBil left behind him an Edict, written on his death-bed, in which he spoke of "my ten years' misery caused by the one man Yuan Shilakai," and adjured the Empress Yehonala to have that man beheaded at the first opportunity, may or may not be true; but it chimes in with popular feeling. If we add to this the innumerable stories (not wholly, it would seem, without foundation) of Yuan Shih-kai's overbearing behaviour towards the Prince Regent and his fellow Grand Councillors, we can understand how conveniently the alleged "leg disease" might be used as an excuse for getting rid of him. No one attempts' to deny Yuan's great ability, though it ie said to have been somewhat discounted by love of pleasures of the table; and China can ill spare able men to-day. If, however, We may believe that be was dismissed principally because be was an ally of the Empress-Dowager, the inference is not that reform is dead, but merely that it is to be entrusted to other hands.
This view has been supported in many different ways, which may be summed up under two main heads,—the character of Prince Chun, the Regent, and the efforts of the capital to assert its will over the provinces.
Of the Prince Regent we are being taught to think as a somewhat austere man, studiously inclined, standing aloof from the corruptions and luxuries of his entourage, deter- mined in what he means to do and only uncertain as yet how he means to do it. Here, for example, is a fragment of
conversation between the Prince Regent and Censor Chao Chu-yuan as reported in the native Press. The Prince begins by declaring that the Throne is genuinely bent on introducing Constitutional government, " which shall be something different from the mere appointment of a few favourites to draw salaries on the plea of carrying it out"; and then lie goes on thus :—
" Financial readjustment is the basis of preparing and voting for a Budget, which will be the privilege of the Houses of Parlia- ment. The people having paid duties and taxes, it would only be right for them to be acquainted with the mode in which the authorities have expended the moneys. In recent years much peculation has prevailed in financial affairs in the different provinces, and not only do the people not dare to question the finances, but the Throne itself cannot scrutinise them. How could Constitutional government be instituted while such a state of affairs existed P" And the Prince concludes with a vow that " he will seek to remedy the troubles of the people so as to carry out
what the philosopher Mencius called the protection of the people."
Then we read how the Prince cuts down a bill for 36,000 taels for three sedan-chairs as a preposterous demand; how be enjoins rigid economy on the comptrollers of the Imperial household; lastly, how he makes a secret excursion outside the Palace, chartering a street ricksha like any ordinary citizen, to acquaint himself with the conditions of the people. These stories may or may not be true. The point is that they are spread throughout the Empire, and that they must have value in creating currents of sympathy from the people towards their ruler.
The struggle between capital and provinces is, of course, no new thing. It lay at the bottom of the Chekiang railway agitation eighteen mouths ago. It entered into the Japanese boycott (now gradually expiring) in South China, for the Cantonese certainly were, in part, inspired by a wish to embarrass the Central Government in revenge for what they considered to be its craven yielding to Japan over the seizure of the ` Tatsu Marti? It was traceable during the closing years of the late Empress-Dowager's reign in various spasmodic Edicts.
But in the past month we have had an Edict or a proposal on this subject almost daily. To name but a few. On December 31st we learn of a scheme to take the collection of the Salt-tax out of the hands of the provincials, and to centralise it in the Ministry of Finance ; on January 4th, that the Prince Regent has been appointing all high officials himself in order to eliminate favouritism ; on January 11th, that all provinces must submit their Budgets to Peking, and that no loans are to be raised without Peking's authority; two days ago, that the conduct of all Vioeroys and Governors is about to be rigorously investigated, and that means must he found of keeping some cheek on their actions. To these we may add a new scheme for the gradual dissolution of that old grievance, the Manchu Banner Corps, with a system for teaching the men trades so that they may support themselves instead of preying on their neighbours; and numerous instances of taxes remitted in consequence of bad harvests during the past year.
It is almost proverbially unwise in China to prophesy until after the event. We know by sad experience the difference between order and execution; and many, if not all, of the suggestions enumerated above have been heard of before. But they have never been put forward with so much force and frequency as now, and once again we may consider their possible effect on the whole Empire in arousing new hopeful- ness and definite expectations. It is true that we have yet to see the practical work. For example, the urgent need of the moment is the appointment of a foreign adviser to organise Chinese finances on a proper footing ; and it must be admitted that reform has not yet included any enlargement of the practice of taking outside advice, rather the other way. On two points, however, it seems permissible to base some little hopefulness for the future: first, that what was hardly more than a vague ideal a year ago is becoming more and more the practical consideration of every undertaking ; and secondly (to sum up the situation in the coldest terms), that in its anxiety to convince foreign Governments that the dismissal of Yuan Shih-kai does not mean reaction, the Chinese Govern- ment seems likely to commit itself too far along the path of reform for any drawing back.—I am, Sir, &e.,
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