THE NEW FRENCH MINISTRY.
THE formation of the new French Ministry is an event of which the French people have a right to be proud. Many criticisms have been levelled against the present regime in France, some of them no doubt well founded, and there have been many gloomy forebodings as to whether the Third Republic will not end. like its pre- decessors. For ourselves we believe these forebodings to be groundless, and for proof we would point to the sound- ness of public opinion in France at the late crisis and its power in a moment of national emergency to act swiftly and wisely. No doubt on ordinary matters public opinion in France, as elsewhere, often seems supine and indifferent; but look at what has happened in the last ten days. The moment that the French people realized the kind of action of which M. Caillaux had been guilty, and the way in which he had played fast and loose with the national interests, there was a rally of all the best influences in the land to put the wrong right and to secure a Govern- ment worthy of France. Sectional differences, often so strangely virulent in French politics, were forgotten, and men vied with each other in sacrificing personal interests in the service of the State. Politicians who have held the office of Prime Minister do not, as a rule, like serving under their rivals. Yet there are two ox-Premiers in the new Cabinet. Again, Ministers who are waiting for what they consider to be the exact psychological moment for coming back into office do not like being obliged to accept portfolios in which they may think that their par- ticular qualities will not shine. Nevertheless at the call of duty all such considerations were forgotten. For example, M. Briand, who had held. the office of Prime Minister with special distinction, has taken the post of Minister of Justice, and is willing to work side by side with many of the men who opposed and ultimately destroyed his Administration. M. Bourgeois, in spite of his long and distinguished political career, shows himself content to serve under one who is his junior as well as, in a sense, his rival. Whether this "Ministry of all the talents" will be long-lived, or whether it will break down under the weight of its own ability, as such Ministries are usually supposed to do, does not really matter. The essential thing is that public opinion in France has not only marked its disgust at action such as that of M. Caillaux, but has proved itself capable of dealing adequately with the situation. There need be no despair of a Republic in which the men show themselves so careful of the national honour and so willing and able to preserve it. And here we may perhaps be pardoned a word of personal explanation and apology. When the Senate began its inquiries, fearing the effects of a Ministerial scandal, we spoke of the unwisdom of probing these matters too deeply, and suggested the danger of pressing home questions like those raised in the Senate, lest the result should be similar to the ruin sometimes caused by recklessly rolling stones down a mountain side. The event has proved that we were wrong. To vary our metaphor, France has proved herself capable of bearing an operation and of freeing herself from a political scandal by the drastic surgery of a public exposure. Our most heartfelt apologies are due for doubting even for a moment the capacity of the French Republic to bear successfully the ordeal from which she has so triumphantly emerged. It is very difficult at present to understand all the ramifications of M. Caillaux's tortuous and secret diplo- macy and how it exactly fits in with the dispatch of the ' Panther' to Agadir. We admit that we are only guess- ing, but the course of events, so far as we can divine, was something of this kind. Caillaux, for reasons into which it may be right, and, indeed, we think it will be right, for Frenchmen to inquire very closely, but in regard to which Englishmen bad better maintain an attitude of reticence, desired to give Germany a considerable portion of the French Congo in exchange for a free hand in Morocco. M. Caillaux, however, appears to have doubted, as well he might, whether the French people would con- sent to parting with their possessions in the Congo unless there was some pressing need for the sacrifice. Therefore, though he was willing to negotiate iu secret with Germany, M. Caillaux hesitated to do what in the frank language of American politics is described as "delivering the goods." Whether the German Government acted on a hint from him or whether entirely on their own initiative we cannot attempt to decide ; but, at any rate, they came to the con- clusion that it would be advisable to put pressure upon the French Premier and so prevent him from standing shivering any longer upon the brink instead of taking the plunge. In any case what they did was to send the ' Panther' to Agadir, and so bring matters to a head, and bring them to a head not in regard to Morocco but to the Congo, for very soon after the Panther' had ap- peared on the coast of Morocco, and negotiations had begun, it was whispered in Paris, to the astonishment of a world which knew nothing about M. Caillaux's secret diplomacy, that Germany was asking for the whole French Congo as compensation. The suggestion seemed preposterous to those, including the French President and the bulk of the French Ministry, who knew nothing about the previous and cryptic negotiations. But it may be asked, even if we assume that M. Caillaux had come to the conclusion that the best in- terests of his country would be served by giving up the French Congo, how could he imagine that his object could be furthered by such a provocative act as the dispatch of the Panther' We expect—for here, again, we can only guess—that M. Caillaux in his calculations forgot, or rather disbelieved in, the strength of the entente with Britain. He did not consider the entente as worth any- thing. What we suppose he thought would happen was e that when Germany began to put on the screw by what was something very like direct menaces of war Britain would show her friend the cold shoulder. He expected that, instead of backing up France, as we did, and telling her that if the worst came to the worst a friend, not per- haps in shining armour, but in the grey of battleship armour plating and in the drab of khaki, would stand by her side, we should shrug our shoulders and say that the affair of Agadir had nothing to do with us, and that France must get out of her trouble as best she could and without our assistance. This was naturally the view of one who held the entente to be a sham, a delusion, and therefore a snare. If Britain had taken this line it would have been very difficult for France to do anything else in her isolation but part with the Congo in exchange for a free hand in Morocco. When this had been accomplished and France was sore with what she would have rightly regarded as our desertion of her, M. Caillaux might have carried out what is understood to have been the second and most important part of his policy, namely, an understanding or, indeed, entente with Germany, under which France would have lent Germany money with which to build fleets and develop armies, and generally would have become the helper and server of Germany's ambitions. The scheme was an ingenious one, and its author apparently appeals to the Daily News as a statesman highly moral and pacific in his aims. Unfortunately, however, for M. Caillaux, it was vitiated by the fact of British good faith. It very soon became apparent that the entente was not a fraud but a practical reality. The entente was tested, and it stood the test in a way which surprised both Germany and M. Caillaux. Our Government were no doubt quite as ignorant of the secret diplomacy as were the majority of the French Ministers and the whole of the French people ; but, ignorant or not, they played a perfectly straight game. They told the French Government that, though they had-no desire to dissuade France from making any under- standing with Germany which they thought right, and, again, had no wish to prevent France and Germany being on the best of terms with each other, they were perfectly pre- pared to stand by France if the worst came to the worst, and were ready to prevent her being taken in isolation and in detail and bullied out of her rights by her powerful neighbour. We said, in diplomatic terms, to France : " We do not for a moment wish to urge you to fight for things which you do not think worth fighting for. The last thing in the world we desire is to egg you on to quarrel with anybody, and so produce what we should regard as a ter- rible disaster—a European war. At the same time remember that if you tell us that impossible and humiliating demands are being made upon you by Ger- many, demands to which you cannot yield without a sacrifice of essential interests, we mean to stand loyally by you and to share with you the consequences of your refusal, whatever they may be. We are not going to desert you because the pressure is severe. The greater your danger the more sure you may be of our assistance." That was the wise course for us to take in any case, but it appears to have been wiser even than our Government knew. It not only prevented war, but it prevented the humiliation of France at the hands of her great neighbour —a humiliation so great and so exasperating that it is hardly possible to believe that even if war had been avoided at the moment it could have been postponed for long—unless, of course, the rage and humiliation of France could have been so deftly manipulated that the nation's anger would have turned, not upon Ger- many, but upon us, thus laying the foundations for a Continental league against Britain. As a matter of fact the Government's policy was not only successful in preventing war, and in preventing the humiliation of France, but it also showed to all who will take the trouble to learn, and are not led astray by the whispers of an interested diplomacy, that we in no sense debarred France from making concessions to Germany which she thought she could make without any sacrifice of her essential interests. After all is said and done, France did give Germany very considerable compensation in the Congo. But no one dare allege that we ever tried to prevent this or grumbled at its being done. We took the line of saying that whatever concessions France liked to make of her own free will, and not under pressure enforced by isolation, we should view not only with equanimity but pleasure, as we had no desire to make ill blood between France and Germany. So much for our share in the business. We cannot help thinking that the French people will be wise if they take precautions for the future against secret diplomacy of the kind used by M. Caillaux. If we may venture to say so, France does not make quite enough use of the position of the President of the Republic. No doubt there are many advantages in his being what he has become, a constitu- tional monarch ; but this need not prevent his exercising more influence than he now does upon great affairs, and certainly upon foreign affairs. The President, it seems to us, should insist on knowing whatever is done in the name of France. No one would suggest, of course, that he should be allowed to conduct French foreign policy. That must be in the hands of the Ministry, who are responsible to the Chamber, from whom alone can be obtained the supplies requisite to carry out any policy, foreign or internal. The President, how- ever, ought to know what is going on at the Foreign Office, whether he agrees with it or not, just as, for example, Queen Victoria did. The Queen always insisted that no despatch of importance in regard to foreign affairs should be sent out in the name of Britain without her being fully cognizant of its terms. If it became the custom for the President of the French Republic to be made aware of every important step taken in foreign affairs, though he need not become, as it were, a second Foreign Minister or take responsibility for the conduct of international relations, or again feel obliged to forbid acts of which he disapproved, he would be in a position to stop action such as that taken by M. Caillaux. If it were known throughout the world that his cognizance was necessary to make negotiations valid, foreign statesmen would, as a matter of course, ask whether the President had given his assent to particular proposals ; and if they had not assurances on this paint., they would not feel it worth while to proceed with them. What we may presume the President would do in a case like that of M. Caillaux is something of this kind. He would, when he heard of unofficial negotiations, ask the Prime Minister whether he had acquainted his colleagues with his proposals, and if he were told that the Cabinet as a whole had not been made acquainted with them ho would insist that matters so doubtful and dangerous should have the sanction of the Cabinet as a whole. In all probability, however, matters would never come to that. If the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister knew that concealment of their plans from the President of the Republic would be regarded as a breach of constitutional etiquette, in regard to which no mercy would be shown by public opinion, the risk of backstairs diplomacy would soon disappear from the region of international relations.
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