The best means by which the fullest advantage can be
extracted from personal conversation between the Big Three, while at the same time avoiding the imprecisions of the conversational method, is obviously the creation of subordinate committees of experts. It is much to be regretted that so little effect was given to the Yalta recommendation that the general principles there agreed to should be furthered and applied by periodic meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries. It is to be hoped that some such semi-permanent watch- ing or steering Committee will be left behind after Potsdam. It must be admitted, however, that recent experience does not justify us in regarding with any extreme optimism the efficacy of such a steering committee. It has been found that the Soviet representatives on expert committees hesitate to assume responsibility, even in matters of minor import, without referring for approval to Moscow. But it should at least be possible, once the main principles of policy are fixed, formulated and approved in Potsdam, to entrust to the Council of Europe a more active function than it has yet been able to exercise. The presence of a French representative upon the Euro- pean Council constitutes an additional advantage. It is not intended, we may presume, that any decisions even indirectly affecting French interests will be taken at Potsdam without the knowledge and consent of the French Government. Nor is it suggested that the absence of France from the meeting of the Powers primarily responsible for the defeat of Germany implies that France will not have an equal voice in the final settlement of Europe. Yet in effect her exclusion from these conversations does diminish what might be called the intimacy of her co-operation ;. and it is as such that it seems a regrettable mistake. * * * *
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