CHENNAULT OF CHINA
By EDWARD DALE
OVER eight years ago an American Air Force officer, Colonel Claire Chennault, was appointed Aeronautical Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He arrived soon after the out- break of the Sino-Japanese war, at a time when the Chinese air force was practically non-existent. His first- task was to organise an air-raid warning network. So successful was he in this that by 1939, when the Japanese started the heavy bombing of Chungking and other defenceless cities, it was possible to give the population several hours' warning, enabling them to take to the shelters or scatter in the countryside. Loss of life was thus extremely small. Towards the end of 1940 Chennault organised and commanded the famous American Volunteer Group, known generally as the A.V.G. This unit was composed of American pilots, both service and civilian, who volunteered to go to China and fight the Japanese. As the result of difficulties and delay in the supply of aircraft, the unit was still only partially ready to take the field when the Pacific war started. Early in 1942, at the request of the British High Com- mand, the A.V.G. went to Burma, to help the sorely pressed and tiny R.A.F. contingent there to beat off the strong Japanese air force. It was here, in overcoming immense handicaps, that General Chennault first showed his powers of leadership and genius for improvisation.
After the loss of Burma, Chennault withdrew the A.V.G. to China. The fall of Rangoon vastly increased the difficulty of supply to China ; everything had now to come in by air, and over one of the most hazardous flying routes in the world. But when, in 1943, the U.S.A.F. arrived in India in strength, it at last became possible to step up the transport aircraft available, and respectable quantities of stores began to flow into China. At the same time, the A.V.G. was abolished, and what was left of it was merged into a wing of the loth U.S.A.F., then stationed in India. Chennault continued in China in command of this wing. He was still very short of both aircraft and crews. Moreover, every drop of petrol and oil, every spare part, all his bombs and ammunition, had to be flown -in over the " hump " from India. Opposing him, from airfields to the north, east and south, was the Japanese air force, with anything from 400 to boo modern machines. In spite of the great dis- parity in strength, Chennault had only one policy—always to attack the enemy. He felt—rightly—that the only way in which he could preserve his small force in fighting condition, until such time as adequate reinforcements could be made available, was to keep morally on top of the opposing airmen. His audacity achieved his purpose. In fact, it did more. Not only was he able to protect his own bases, but he destroyed a large proportion of the enemy air-force, shooting down approximately ten machines for every one he lost himself.
When at last it was found possible to give him an adequate supply
of aircraft, it was decided that the time had come to break away from. control from India. A separate formation, known as the 14th U.S.A.F., was therefore created early in 1944, with Chennault, promoted to Major-GenerN, in command. Those who had fol- lowed with admiration his early struggles and had seen how he successfully overcame all obstacles, hoped that at last he would
come into his own. They foresaw the probability that he wo now be in a position to turn from the defensive to the offensit And, indeed, on a small scale, their hopes were realised. But his force grew in numbers, and as the missions against eneau shipping and other targets grew in distance, his petrol and oth requirements went up in proportion. Unfortunately, his dem for additional supplies were not met.
The amount of tonnage which was being flown over the " hump each month was rapidly rising. But the vital was naturally limite and there were many competitors for the available space. Th were at this time two schools of thought as to the correct sump use of this tonnage ; on the one hand, General Stilwell consider that the bulk of it should go towards the re-arming of large numbe of Chinese Infantry Divisions ; on the other hand, General Che nault considered that greater damage could be done to the enemy b increasing the weight of air-attack against Japanese shipping an lines of communication. The former was in command of all Amen can forces in China, India and Burma ; he was also chief adviser to the Generalissimo. In his first capacity he was Chennault' commander, and it was therefore natural that his opinion shou carry the day. The result was that, until General Stilwell lef China in November, 1944, the 14th U.S.A.F. was never given any- thing like enough supplies to enable it to make more than fraction use of its potential strength. In spite of this handicap, it achieve notable success.
During the past few months it has, for the first time, been ade- quately supplied ; its successful missions have been correspondingly greater. It is all the more disappointing, therefore, to learn from Washington of General Chennault's resignation. Reading between the lines of this report it is clear that there has been a reversal of the policy of giving effective support to the 14th U.S.A.F. Chennault himself is a man of outstanding character, of great charm and modesty and extremely tough. It was only his exceptional powers of leadership which enabled him to overcome so many obstacles and simultaneously to retain the loyalty and affection of all who served under him. This affection is also felt by his many Chinese and British friends ; they too will share the dismay which is assuredly felt by the 14th U.S.A.F. at his departure. It is to be hoped that the report that he may return to China as adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek is true.
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