Thern Spanish Umbrella
BY DESMOND FENNELL ACOMMON way of misunderstanding the Spanish political situation is to suppose that it consists of Franco governing through a monolithic Fascist party—the Falange—and suppressing indiscriminately Communists and the friends of freedom. In fact, the Falange has been for many years past only one of the forces in the Spanish political arena; these forces are fighting out their political battles under the shelter of a regime that has been reduced to the function of an 'umbrella.'
This widespread misunderstanding is a sign of the isolation of Spain from the world. It is a concept that became fixed as long ago as the end of the Civil War when the Franco regime was regarded as a parallel and similar phenomenon to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Up to 1945 that was pretty true. A coalition of very disparate political and social groups had fought on the Nationalist side in the Civil War. The Falange managed to become the leading element in the coalition. It had high élan and tight organisation. As a Fascist-inspired movement it seemed to be riding on the political wave that was then sweeping Europe. At the end of the Civil War Franco relied on it to give his power a strong base, and government was in its hands. Such an important group as the traditionalists of Navarra—the Carlists—who are still in the popular mind the heroes of the war on the Nationalist side, found them- selves excluded, much to their chagrin. Similarly the Christian Democrats were squeezed out. Nevertheless, the concept of the National Movement, which was the name given to the Nationalist coalition, continued to be a moral force. The Movement had been held together by a few basic concepts such as Faith and Fatherland. Those who had taken part in it—the best of them—believed they had fought a crusade to save Spain. This moral force remained for some years the real basis of Franco's power and under its influence the Falange's hegemony was tolerated. permitted party within the State, but was no longer identical with State power. Franco gave tacit recognition to the tradition- alists and Christian Democrats by admitting their representa- tives to the Cabinet. But the National Movement continued to be a reality, which was artificially given a new span of life by the attempts of the outside world to bring pressure to bear on the regime. Many Spaniards were once again prepared to identify the cause of Franco with that of Spanish patriotism.
As the comradeship-in-arms of the Civil War was losing force by becoming more distant, this outside pressure relaxed and eventually disappeared. After 1950 the National Move- ment as a moral force of cohesion was disintegrating. At the same time the Falange was undergoing a process of attrition. It had always consisted of the fusion of a Fascist Right Wing with a Nationalist-Syndicalist Left wing. The Right wing had gained the ascendant and held it. The Left wing was disillu- sioned by the failure of the regime to make real progress towards solving the social problem. The ex-Falangist of openly Republican or Socialist leanings became a feature of the Spanish political scene. The Christian Democrats were now active again and they formed a tactical alliance with the Falangist Left. The referendum, making Spain once again a monarchy and bringing a restoration in sight, pleased neither wing of the Falange. To many it seemed Franco's final betrayal of the movement on which he had at first based his power.
The State power in Spain was now concentrated in Franco's hands. He was arbiter of the political groups and governed by holding them in balance or playing them off against each other. His Government and the regime had entered what a Spanish political writer some years ago termed the 'nihilistic phase.' Freed from association with any political doctrine, it was government pure and simple, the firm maintenance of the status quo.
The last stage in the disintegration of the regime was reached towards the end of last year. Hitherto the political groups had measured their relative power by the representation which they held in the Cabinet. Now, this yardstick was tacitly abandoned by all. The regime was recognised as effete and the tacit agreement was that it would have to be replaced by something entirely different. While the parties manceuvred for position, organised and carried on propaganda and agitation in various forms, the regime was maintained by mutual consent in its function of 'umbrella,' because none of the com- peting groups was yet strong enough to replace it by its own strength alone.
Although, in theory, Spain is a monarchy and Prince Juan Carlos is to succeed to the throne when he comes of age, the political future has never been more uncertain, more pregnant with unpredictable possibilities. One of the greatest faults of Franco's Government has been its failure to provide a constitu- tion or institutions that would offer some solution of continuity. Speculation, expectancy and political activity such as have not been known for years are going on in Spain today. The whole gamut of political tendencies is in movement from the conservative monarchists of aristocratic, upper-bourgeois or intellectual dye to the ex-Falangist Socialists and the small nuelei of Communists. In between are the Christian Democrats and the traditionalists believing in limited monarchy, though the former are' parliamentarians and the latter are anti- liberals; and there are the 'presidential republicans' of the Falange Left wing, thinking along lines of the United States constitution. ments among the Madrid students has been the assertive resurgence of liberalism. It is a cultural liberalism, the heritage of the Spanish intellectual Left of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is natural that the country's youth should turn to it when the twenty years of the anti-liberal regime have produced only cultural sterility. But there are no signs that the liberal tradition in its old form will reappear in politics. Political liberalism is too much discredited. Where it survives will be at most, indirectly, through the Christian Democrats.
In the workers' agitation there were two significant features. The first was the political indifferentism of the majority of the workers—they were agitating for better living conditions not as adherents of any political doctrine, but as an economic- professional force. The other was the evidence of the growing radicalisation of Catholic Action and of a large section of the parochial clergy. The Catholic workers' confraternities, ostensibly purely religious bodies, are to a certain extent providing that free association and representation of workers which the monopoly of the official trade unions makes other- wise impossible. These workers' confraternities were the force behind the strikes in Pamplona and were very active during the strikes elsewhere. It is known that Bishop Herrera, the chief organiser of the Christian Democratic interest, hopes to develop them into the working-class base of the Christian Democratic movement. Whether they will be willing to move out of the purely economic into the political sphere is questionable.
All political groups and social classes hope for a continuance of strong government and all—except the hopelessly reaction- ary—want to see the social problem seriously tackled. The signs would indicate that the political future of Spain will lie in either of two directions or in their interplay. The first, a reformist conservatism, with or without monarchy. The second, radical socialism.
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