20 JUNE 1992, Page 6

POLITICS

To have one opposition is a misfortune, but to have two looks like carelessness

SIMON HEFFER

Within hours of the Prime Minister's return from South America last weekend word began to spread of the terrors in store for backbenchers who had been 'disloyal' enough to sign the Commons early day motion calling for a 'fresh start' on the Maastricht Treaty. Having looked rudder- less for a week, the Tory party was now, we were told, about to experience the smack of firm seamanship. And, indeed, once MPs were back at Westminster on Monday one of the worst forms of coercion known to Conservatives was being ruthlessly imple- mented: the invitation of 30 'new boys' to a lunch at 10 Downing Street.

This occasion was conducted according to the traditional Foreign Office precept that the best form of political assault is to belittle the intellectual grasp of your oppo- nents. Another traditional precept — that such denigration is always most assiduously used by those whose own judgment does not always bear close scrutiny — was also employed. Mr Major told errant back- benchers among his luncheon guests that they had been 'naive'. Since attack is the best form of defence, we can forgive him this outburst. However, since he had that morning agreed with his closest advisers that the Maastricht Bill would not return to the Commons until the autumn at the earli- est, he seemed to accept the message his backbenchers have sent him, even if he was not prepared to say so in public.

The Maastricht Treaty, having been !ejected by one country already, is in law dead. Despite this obvious problem, the mood this week has been to wait upon what happens in Ireland and France before the Government moves in any definite direc- tion. There is still no willingness to admit defeat. Perhaps because of this emotions in both camps are running high, and the argu- ments have an increasing flavour of ad hominem rather than ad rationem. To be fair to Mr Major, his brave face is not entirely unjustified. He remains proud that the Treaty he signed was not nearly so bad as the one he might have had to sign. He knows that, despite his pre-Maastricht rhetoric, there was never any option for him but to collaborate in the end, but he did his best.

He sets great store by not being seen to play an active role in stopping the Treaty from being ratified. He may hope others will do our dirty work for us. His motives for this may be judged according to whether one feels he is driven by states- manship, pragmatism, vanity or fear of causing offence. No wonder that, with the Foreign Office at his elbow, he should regard as 'naive' those who fail to appreci- ate diplomatic necessities.

What each side does next is problemati- cal, though more so for the Government than for its internal opponents. For the Government, the future is gravely compli- cated by the Labour Party's sudden desire to start behaving like an opposition, there- by giving Mr Major a second set of critics. Mr Kinnock's announcement that he no longer wishes to be considered for the Pres- idency of the Confederation of European Socialist Parties signalled that Labour will vote against the Government when and if the Bill comes back to the Commons for its committee stage. So, too, might the Liber- als, who increasingly feel the Danish result has made a referendum a sine qua non of the Bill's continuation here.

More alarming even than this for the Government was Mr Kinnock's hint that Labour might see the need for a referen- dum. Mr Major has said categorically that there will not be one. He now knows that if he brings back the Bill at its committee stage there is a strong possibility a referen- dum amendment would be tabled and passed. The decision on Britain's future in Europe would thus be removed from the hands of those who think they know best, and placed in the hands of the people. Mr Richard Ryder, the Chief Whip, is a man of some ability, but one must doubt whether it stretches to controlling 40 million voters.

Thus the question would, in the first instance, come down to whether there were enough rebels to defeat the Government on a referendum, or any other amendment. The 22 who voted against on second read- ing might be enough. It is certain that quite a few of the 90 or so who have signed the offending early day motion would be intim- idated back into the Aye lobby. But, unfor- tunately for the Government, it is equally certain that quite a few of them would not.

However, not all the rebels support ref- erenda. Those who dislike Maastricht but who also dislike plebiscites will argue that there is no need for a vote because, legally, the Danes have killed the Treaty. They will try to persuade Mr Major to avoid the potential humiliation of a referendum by agreeing with that legal point, thereby negating the need for a plebiscite.

He may, though, ignore his finer instincts, listen to the Foreign Office, and call the rebels' bluff. This might just harden their view. If they are made to see that the best chance of stopping an attempt to ratify involves agreeing to a referendum, in the end many rebels will go along with it. By the time of such a hypothetical vote a cho-

rus of Baroness Thatcher and Lords Ridley, Tebbit and Parkinson would be singing the same tune in the House of Lords, and probably nightly on News at Ten.

If Mr Major sees a Commons referen- dum vote coming, he should take no risks.

He should exploit his friendship with Chan- cellor Kohl, persuade him there is no way round the Danish 'no', and suggest a less ambitious way forward needs to be found.

If Denmark were to recant and accept the Treaty, Mr Major would still have troubles.

Feeling against Maastricht is immensely strong in his party. Many ministers — and not just those who have been attending well-publicised private meetings to discuss this question — take a similar view. Too many Tory critics have gone too far in the last fortnight to make a retreat back into Trappist obedience credible or possible.

Nor are these the only problems. The economy is once more emerging as an issue, and one which, because of the ERM, is linked umbilically to Maastricht. Much is made of the inflation-conquering power of ERM, and it has certainly had that effect.

However, the Foreign Office wanted us to join to prove our commitment to, and to get ourselves into shape for, a single cur- rency. The time for reflection the Danish vote has given the Germans in particular makes that single currency look ever less likely, despite Herr Kohl's strangely anachronistic talk of moving faster, not more slowly, towards European Union.

Malcontents are beginning to ask again what all the suffering is for, and when the recovery is going to start. Mr Lamont, who is no proselytiser for the ERM and whose realistic attitude to the implications of the Danish vote has been an object lesson in intelligent politics, will come under increas- ing pressure to look with equal realism at problems closer to home. If Mr Major is to silence the protests of his troops on all these matters, he will have to make room for many more coercive lunches yet.