WAR WITH THE TRANSVAAL.
TT is with deep regret that we notice the efforts of a certain section of the English Press to embitter our relations with the Transvaal, and to make war a matter of certainty between us and the autonomous Republic which is subject to our suzerainty. We should like to ask one or two questions of those who are contemplating war with the Transvaal with a light heart, and to suggest to them what would be the results if a war were to take place at the present moment. Before we do so, however, we desire to make two things quite clear. In the first place, we have no sort of sympathy with President Kruger's attempt to set up a Venetian Republic in South Africa. We believe in the democratic experiment, and hold that the Government in a State like the Transvaal should be controlled by the majority, not by the minority, of its white inhabitants. On the merits, then, our sympathies are with the Out- landers. Again, we have no sort of notion of tolerating any breach of the London Convention. Our supremacy in South Africa, must be maintained to the full, both by strong action at Pretoria and also by strong action against any attempts by foreign States to infringe that supremacy. But though we hold, and hold firmly, to these principles, we consider that they should be maintained in a reasonable, statesmanlike, and far-seeing spirit, and not with a fussy, blundering Jingoism. If a brick-wall annoys us we must consider whether it is worth the trouble of removal, not dash our heads against it in a rage. Before, that is, we do anything to encourage the outbreak of war with the Transvaal, we must count the cost, and consider whether it is worth while. If we have war forced upon us, that is quite another matter. In that case there is nothing for it but to hit so hard and so promptly that there shall be no question as to who is to be the victor.
Those who have followed our argument so far will probably think that we are coming to the conclusion that a war with the Transvaal would be so formidable an operation that we ought not to attempt it unless we are absolutely obliged. That, however, is by no means our conclusion. We do not deprecate war with the Transvaal in the least because we think that it would be a military operation beyond our means. We hold, on the contrary, that the conquest of the Transvaal would be, as far as the military conditions are concerned, a comparatively easy matter. Twenty thousand men, with plenty of good horse artillery, would be quite sufficient. People forget that the conditions are entirely changed since those of the old war. Then the Transvaal was without com- munications and surrounded by deserts. Now it can be reached by at least two lines of railway that are in our hands. Again, seventeen years ago there were no cities and no centres of population which could be held, but only scattered farms. Now there are two cities, Johannesburg and Pretoria, and a large concentrated population which is hostile to the Boers. If, then, the conquest of the Transvaal can be considered separately, it would appear by no means a difficult task. But it cannot be considered separately. Remember that as things now stand—thanks to Mr. Rhodes—if we go to war with the Transvaal, we go to war with the whole of the Dutch in South Africa. At the present moment a war begun with the Boers would mean a war, or at any rate deep hostility, with the whole of the Dutch Afrikanders. The Free State would probably openly support the Boers, and the Dutchmen at the Cape would also do so, if not openly, then by every form of passive resistance to the Imperial Power. This fact means that besides wanting twenty thousand men for the Transvaal, we should want another twenty or thirty thousand to hold down the Colony and the Free State. That, of course, is not an impossibility, By calling out the Reserves we could, no doubt, manage to put forty thousand exceedingly efficient men into South Africa. Let us assume then—and in our opinion the assumption is a perfectly safe one—that a war has taken place, that the military part of the business was perfectly successful, that the Outlanders are emancipated, that the Transvaal has become a self-governing Colony or a democratic Republic under our suzerainty, that the Free State has been beaten and made to pay an in- demnity, and that the Dutch in the Colony have been forced into inaction by a powerful British garrison. What is to follow next ? Of one thing we may be perfectly certain. Nothing would induce the British Government to lock up forty thousand, or even twenty thousand, troops as a garrison in South Africa. Directly the fighting was over the troops would be withdrawn. Would South Africa then return to a normal condition of things? Most assuredly not. No doubt we should have a pro-English State in the Transvaal, but the rest of South Africa, would be in a condition of veiled civil war. The Dutch would feel themselves the victims of oppression, the Free State, for the first time in its history, would be bitterly hostile, and more than half the white people of Cape Colony would be proud to be called rebels. By good luck at the elections, or by help of the votes of the black men of means, we might just escape a rebel Ministry, but half the House of Assembly would be rebels. The result would be that the Imperial Authority would constantly be invoked in order to help the English against the Dutch Afrikanders. That was not a situation which we found very satisfactory in Canada sixty years ago. This would be the state of things if matters pursued a normal course and were not complicated by other influences. It is to be feared, however, that other and very terrible influences would be at work. The moment black men see white men fighting with each other they think that their time has come, and that they have only to strike hard to shake off the alien yoke. We saw how this happened in Matabeleland after the Raid. Is there not considerable danger that a real war in the Transvaal might excite the natives to the point of rebellion throughout South Africa ? A war undertaken against the Transvaal without the con- sent and sympathy of the Dutch Afrikanders in other parts of South Africa must then manufacture rebels on a large scale, and is only too likely to produce a servile war and turn South Africa into a shambles. We are not afraid of reasonable risks, nor are we among those who think that bloodshed ought always to be avoided and at all costs, but at the same time we cannot think it worth our while, even on just grounds, to fight President Kruger when the results of victory are likely to be those we have described.
' But,' it will be asked, ' are you content to let things go on as they are going on now ?" Yes,' is our reply, until the people of Cape Colony as a whole, or rather by a large majority, tell us that they are tired of the unrest and anxiety produced by President Kruger's plan of governing by the will of the minority, and desire that we should help them and the Outlanders to put a stop to it.' When that happens we may insist on justice to the Outlanders with a light heart, because we shall know that it will not mean turning the majority of our fellow-subjects at the Cape into rebels. After all, it is the people of the Cape and of South Africa generally, and not we, who are injured by the refusal of the Boers to accept the democratic prin- ciple, and to be loyal to the future of South Africa,—to do their part, that is, to build up a great dominion, free from all foreign influences, and absolutely self-governing. If they choose to acquiesce in that refusal, and do not wish that the nuisance of unrest in the Transvaal shall be abated, they have a right to have their will. It is the people of South Africa who will benefit by a federal union, and not-we; and therefore it is they, not we, who should bestir them- selves to prevent President Kruger from throwing obstacles in the way of union. We should, of course, be glad to help on the good cause, but the notion of compelling the Cape people to help themselves is not business. Our line should be exactly that taken up by Mr. Chamberlain over the Drifts question. We should tell the Cape Dutch,—' If you like to ask us to put pressure on the Transvaal to manage their affairs better, and will stand side by...side with us in the demand, we will act with you. If, on the other hand, you will take no responsibility, and are half inclined to resent our help, then we will take no forward step whatever.' Depend upon it, this is the true principle for the Imperial Government to act on,—to do nothing in South Africa which will not be endorsed by the majority of the whites of South Africa. Till they can make up their minds we can quite well afford to wait, for time is always in our favour. That is the lesson we have got to learn in regard to South Africa, and there is another which is almost equally important. It is to remember that, all told, there are not as many white people in South Africa altogether as there are in Glasgow. The truth is, we are inclined to examine all these problems under a microscope, and to talk as if something must be done instantly. All we need do at present is to see that President Kruger does not infringe the London Convention, cry "Hands off !" to all foreigners, and wait till the majority of the white people of South Africa make it quite clear what they desire shall be the future of their end of the continent.
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