20 MAY 1854, Page 11

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE ROAD TO RUSSIA.

he 1849, Russia was regarded, not only by Austria but by Eng- land, as the preserver of Europe against subversive movements. Five years later,—the change having taken place almost within the last twelvemonth,—Russia stands unmasked as the great sub- verter ; and it is now known that throughout these latter years of apparent conservation she was carrying on a system of fraud and covert violence, designed to crush her feeble neighbours, to place her allies in the wrong, to undermine her rivals in power, and to establish in Europe the ascendency of an inferior race. Even while England sympathized little with the professed principles of autocratic rule, she so far trusted to the professions of the " gen- tleman " in the North and to the supposed conservatism that clings to an Emperor, that she lent unwitting assistance to his ma- noeuvres; and in one case, that of Schleswig-Holstein, her co- operation helped to create part of the most active difficulty with which she has to contend. But at last we are awake to the danger. Then, we rested contentedly under the supposed safeguard of Russia : now, it is not merely to rescue the Danubian Princi- palities that the English nation is urging its Government on to active warfare--it is to restrain, to bring down Russia ; and no- thing short of that result will be accepted by the English people as worthy of the cause in which they have resorted to long-disused arms.

The enemy has one strength which is indisputable—the inert power of immense territorial hulk : and it is a question, now actively mooted, how to get at him by penetrating the barriers that surround his capital. Many modes are suggested. One pro- poses a French expedition by land, to try, with better auspices, the experiment of Napoleon. A marine expedition is advised to test the impregnability of Cronstadt ;—and we see a writer calcu- latiog how a West wind and a flooding of the Neva might har- binger a British fleet, carry destruction before it, and facilitate the entrance of a Napier, even amidst the fortifications behind which the Emperor turns white with anxiety. Others again, who speak with a more local knowledge of the navigation on those difficult shores, doubt the practicability of manceuvering with great ships amongst shallows, inlets, and fortifications, aggravated as the natural difficulties are by artificial contrivances. Hence the call for gun-boats. Another notion is, to take advantage of the winter, and send a great combined army across the ice. Another, to raise Finland against the Power that seized it from Sweden, and turn against the Czar his ancient spoils. Some shadow of justification for this notion might be adduced in the circumstance that it finds favour in Sweden itself, and that the paper of the largest circula- tion in that country, the Aftonblad, upholds the plan. Doubts have already been expressed, • whether the Fins, who have enjoyed some special immunities from the worst effects of Russian rule, would be so readily available for the purposes of foreign state policy : but much more serious questions hang over this part of the subject. Not that we allude to the lukewarmness of official Sweden, though that too cannot be overlooked. But it appears to be explained. Since 1848, the King has appeared inclined more than he was previously to lean upon Russian support as a coun- terpoise to democratic hazards ; and, as in our own country, long peace has brought inertness over the people. At the first immediate prospect of hostilities in the Baltic, therefore, the Swedish Times perhaps expressed the general feeling when it pronounced for neu- trality and nothing else. " Neutrality," said the Aftonblad," will be the only and best policy for Sweden "; the Swedes "ought to be thankful for not being thrown into a war with which they had nothing to do." And the Four Estates, in Diet assembled, ex- pressed their thanks to the Crown for having established neutral- ity. The subsidies to maintain the neutrality probably showed the arousing of feeling against the Czar and his aggressive pro- ceedings: a Gothenburg paper took the lead in utterirg senti- ments counter to the neutrality dogma ; the leading journal of Stockholm conformed to the popular movement ; and a general activity of armament proves that the Government is not insensi- ble to the possibility that out of neutrality action may have to spring. Indeed, we are assured on Swedish authority which we have reason to respect, that few persons of judgment hold it pos- sible to observe neutrality for many months longer ; while none can expect to find Sweden arrayed on the side of her old despoiler, then indeed also her future despoiler. But there are very serious difficulties in the way of Swedish action—difficulties which need consideration and time for their removal, and some knowledge of what other states will do. In the first place, Sweden is bound up, by treaty, with Denmark, in a sort of solidarity for the maintenance of neutrality. Now there could not be a more unfortunate partner than Denmark. The people of that country we believe to be sound at heart; but it has suffered the Court to complicate it in intrigues against Schleswig- holstein; and this mistake has been a Nemesis to the Danes, against whom the Court has turned the Schleswig-Holstein sue- cession. In the succession of the Duchy of Holstein, the house of Holstein-Gotorp, if we remember rightly, stands third. The Rus- sian Autocrat has disclaimed the succession ; but a disclaimer may be revoked. The Danes assisted their Government in annex- ing Schleswig-Holstein to the Danish sovereignty by a closer con- solidation than the succession of the Danish Prince to the German

• See Fraser's Magazine for May.

Duchies. After being thus helped by his Scandinavian against his German subjects, King Christian turns round upon his good people, and proposes, as he is now doing, to assimilate the Danish succession to the Salic succession of Schleswig-Holstein, in which the house of Holstein-Gotorp stands so high. By the arrangement which settled the Schleswig-Holstein difficulty, the Danish Go- vernment is virtually bound to include certain representatives of the Duchies; a virtual solidarity is given to the Danish Cabinet by understandings with Prussia, Russia, and Austria, that Cabinet including in it personal allies of Russia; and whatsoever Austria may do, we have already substantially proved that Prussia is wil- ling to work in with the objects of Russia. Nor is she less likely to do so on Danish than on German grounds. These are real diffi- culties; and we have no right to wonder if the most Anti-Russian of Swedish statesmen would be glad, before committing them- selves to any decided course of action, to have some understanding with England as to the future fate of the Scandinavian states generally, including those parts of the North in which some sense of freedom and civilization resided before the Tartar dynasty was established on the Neva.

Independently, however, of these considerations, weighty as they are, one still more serious must precede any action on the presumed cooperation of the Fins. A military writer of the Af- tonblad is strong in favour of a plan to land a force on the coast of that province, in order to march for St. Petersburg, turning Cronstadt from the North-west. It is suspected that the writer may be instructed from a high quarter, and there may be strategic reasons to warrant the project. But might there not be a formid- able counter-move ? The Czar has already threatened to remove the whole Finnish population to the interior steppes of Russia ; and if he feared that the Fins would again be disposed to become Swedes, he is the man to execute such a threat.

That Sweden might be active instead of neutral, is probable, if time and scope were allowed for her to shape her action. The idea has already obtained some attention, that the Western Rus- sian frontier ought to be removed further East, and that power excluded from the Baltic, in order that Europe and the smaller states may be more safe against "Muscovite aggression,"—send- ing back Russia to be imprisoned in her own steppes : and if that result were held out, some states that now waver might recognize the true course of policy. At present, however, the Swedes ask time. It is an idea prevalent in that country, that Sir Charles Napier's big ships will prove useless for the shallows of the North- ern Baltic ; and that while be may perform a useful duty in shut- ting up the Russian fleet during the summer, the real attack must be made later. In the winter, say the Swedes, after a new har- vest shall have been gathered in, and perhaps after English troops have been landed at Aland, French contingents have come up, and the course is clear for some other continental Scandinavians, it will be the time to mature a campaign of attack. The view is not ours, but sent to us from Stockholm : the grounds on which it rests however, merit more than a passing consideration. Al- though we cannot at once accept the necessity for so long delay, there is no doubt that any time necessary to obtain the active con- currence of the Baltic states would be far from wasted. Perhaps Sweden may come to a right conclusion sooner than she is at pre- sent prepared to expect ; and the Danish people may do as much sooner than their King calculates. The Swedish view, however, confirms conclusions to which we had already arrived on distinct grounds,—first, that the character of Russia is now so well under- stood as to have awakened a common feeling and a common desire to unite against her for something more than the restoration of the Principalities to Turkey ; secondly, that the union will be most speedily and completely brought about, when those Powers which are taking the lead distinctly proclaim that the ultimate purpose of the contest, which has been forced upon Europe, is the effectual curtailment and restraint of Russia, perhaps by taking away her Baltic provinces, if not remodelling and contracting her entire frontier.