-I; ' " 'OUR_ MEDITERRANEAN POSITION. . 1 1 E2 repeal of

the Union between Greatliritain and the Ionian ifehds is not a new idea. Ounesteesised tioireepotulant, Mr. Ed- ward Freeman,, reminds us that he himself ssiggeeted it in August 18i37, and he aeknowledges that he took the Idea front the guar, trrlk Itericar. Endonbtedly it hais-ewe cannot 'say, lurked in the niind of many an Ionian Daniel-G'Connell, but has exploded

from the mouth of mere than one Ibniati. crater With t elee.nie elo- quence. It seems to be a short cut: towards satisfying every'

parts, except that anomalous and..■301111)0Site om which pre-

sides over the destinies of Enrope, and is called mysteriously "-theyowers." They are likely eamighto object ste ; it, because it

ii'l4elifeetual Method of permitting rubre:Ilmu one state to ileVQ7 loPr its inherent energies, including our: own. At present the Iittiftins have the full licence. to develo,p" themselves into English stilijbcts. - This they decline; for the uthairable reaeen that they are quite incapable-of doing so ; . we are restrained by trea- ties, by Ionian discontents, and by every paltry circumstance el; the regionr-frent developing, the little Archipelago into a British prissiness the outpost of Our empire. The suggestion, thrown out by Sir John Young . appears to .meet tile grievances on. all sides., The greater number of the Ionians .undoubtedly Pent for release from the connection,!though' it :offends, their. ideas rether than

their practical interests. . Greece; We :imagine,. would in no way be displeased to receive so considerable au: accession of territory. Turkey could scarcely complain, since Ionia does:not belong to

her,-and if annexed to Greece would still remain under the sur-

veillance, as it does under the protection; of the Powers parties to the Quadripartite Treaty. In fact the transfer to Greece would give to Turkey, and to the interests of the status ,quo in Europe, guarantees probably exceeding those furnished by the much mauled treaties of 1814 and 1815. It would not, indeed, be just to remain entirely blind to the interests of those amongst the in- habitants who are faithful to us, and who might be positively ina

Yd, if we cast them off; but the plan suggested. by Sir John Young, of retaining Corfu, probably affords a loop-hole for pre- serving the interests of those faithful Ionians, who, while their compatriots were enjoying the idea of a Greek union, would enjoy

the realities of a British prosperity. Even those who are thick- and-thin advocates of the Greece of 1828, which is still to be realized, scarcely venture to raise an objection against the reten- tion of Corfu. Mr. Freeman countersigns the proposal of Sir John Young, as a very welcome compromise between a simple sur- render of the Ionian Islands, and a retention of the present system. It does not follow that Mr. Gladstone's mission is to be one of sim- ple routine or uninterrupted smoothness ; and it is only to be hoped that in the modern Corfu he will not injure his repute, as Ulysses wrecked his vessel on the coast of ancient Phmacia. Telegraphs, steamboats, and all modern appliances at any rate make us hope that Mr. Gladstone will not be ten years on his travels, and his own genius makes us tolerably sure that he will be able to con- front the complications of his task, serious as they are. So far as we are permitted to penetrate "the official veil" and all that sort of thing, Mr. Gladstone appears to be sent over to examine into the groundwork of Sir John Young's statements and_propositions, and to make his report. The fact, that Sir John had. to a certain extent prejudged the question, would scarcely embarrass a man of Mr. Gladstone's position. It is a statesman of the Cabinet Minister class, and of a high order in that class, reconsidering on the

spot the proposal of a man of the Colonial Governor class; a re- consideration in no degree disparaging to the discretion of Sir

John, but highly advantageous to the Government and public of this country. That Sir John had prejudged the question, as a simple matter of fact, is of no importance ; but rather a momen- tous difficulty is presented by the fact that Sir John's prejudgment is made public. The only circumstance which would mitigate the inconvenient effect of this publication would be the almost pre- judged determination of the existing British Government to back Sir John, and to carry out the probable report from Mr. Gladstone.

There seems, however, reason to apprehend another source of embarrassment. According to present appearances it must be suspected that the despatch was published by an act of treachery —on the part of whom ? Who gave it to the public ? Not, we are told, her Majestys Ministers; not, we presume, Sir John Young ; and we can hardly understand how the document could have strayed into the hands of any Member of the late Govern- ment. Nor is even that all. The existence of treachery amongst men who are so situated as to obtain possession of a confidential :diplomatic paper may naturally excite apprehension amongst the present Ministers and their friends. It at all events shows an lensernpulousness amongst their opponents, who still retain some illicit connexion with Downing Street ; and it appears to betoken the resort to weapons and to manoeuvres as dangerous as they are discreditable.

`1st thiereninst benne clear emirseigrodgleadlithesdkoniplica- thins; , and ailikikJef nits'iS have been origimillyi the patipsidnimaioue oc'fbr inenigisieilibfaliGfbire the etimittyItheyattilW*iehee jolts real dPillegfliiiillidineidut the fititts'andild'pteraning,k-se the resolve stattliffiriveril. • thistrestep.eissionamieing. AmOngst the 'Whelb retied-of, BritiSiljatistessmetieMai. Gladdens in perhaps the one 'who is most properly selected; for this minim. The faults of his character scarcely come-into play-here, while here expressed 'ar to Mr. GTailstone's leadertiltiy• the accidental eirCumstanaies of his career; anavtiltlz.alipeis peculiarly qualit ies, peculiarly fit Ides for the task, whatevier. 'doubts we may trying time, it must be admitted that habelongiefar dame to British statesmanship in the broadest sense than thliarty:usid - he is un- doubtialls- above mere part -eonsiderations. ' Hia indipendeneeee the party at present in polder has obeen attested hy;his declining to take office under it iu 1852 ; at the-sane time, that his accept- aucs of the present post,' without fee or ard to :induce him, without political pledge to restrain his Patlianientery neon hereafter, is proof that he is not, inclispeeed to act with, the pee- sent Ministers for the advautaae of the dottntrYs.!,' Menke stance, that important 'railway companies have!nstille him referee in their disputes, shows the esteem in which he is.held, as a well-- informed;- impartial, and lofty. arbitrator. His .letters to the Earl of Aberdeen will stand *ea reeoi'sled. evideneato the Ionians that lie can a gencreus view of natientslitis. not his own, and of lainein rights, iriespedtively of Offioial technicalities. Hellenic sympathies have been well evinced,: and. are! calculated to predispose in his favour the community amidstiwhich he will appear as an inquirer, invested ,wilth all• the attribides that can. surround an English ,Tettleinan-of the highest standing. Such. a man is the very person froinwhoni we could- wish a clear and authoritative. report ; and Mr. Gladstbne'a pen trill:not impair the exposition of his judgment by any obscurities or foibles of manner.

We may assume that with 'all his Hellenic sympathies and

cosmopolite views, his judgment will be English in its fairness and in its feeling: That he will 'carry out our view, 'or Sir John Young's view, or the view Of enyether persons,we cannot assume; but we are very much disposed -tes .assuntie that he-will not carry out the view of our excellent 'correspondent who gives his suffrage to the appointramat. Mr; Freeman "cannot understand what our Atlantic island wants with a Mediterranean position," and he is evidently favourable to a simple gift of the Ionian Islands to Greece ; England retreating from ell intervention in the eastern Mediterranean, as he world apparently have her retreat.from all intervention whatsoever. He avows himielf a "non-inter- ventionist." • What does the word mean ? We may have some guess at Mr. Freeman's interpretation of it, from his hint that we need no Mediterranean position. According to ordinary philology we should, in our correspondent's view, restrict ourselves from " making or meddling " in any foreign affairs. This is not an uncommon nostrum with those who have discovered, justly enough, that our " making and meddling" has often been neither for our own honour nor for the honour of those whom we have protected too often to betray ; but to fall back from bad inter- ference to a total abstinence from interference, if it were prac- ticable, would entail consequences against which its advocates scarcely assure us ; would entail consequences to other nations, as well as to our own, of the most disastrous kind. Before we could even begin the novel process, we must recant and cancel half of those treaties which form the statute-branch in the public law of Europe. Nor could any such step on our part be taken without precipitating a convulsion on the Continent. At the present moment England is one amongst the five most powerful supporters of the European system. If we were to withdraw from the support of that edifice, if we were to proclaim that we no longer intended to sustain any of those political institutions which we are at present sustaining, negatively if not actively, the simple fact of our withdrawal would bring down at once some part of the political structure, would arouse the hopes of anarchy and the reaction of despotism, would plunge at least half the Con- tinent in war, and would, to bring the matter home to us, suspend the greater part of our trade for an indefinite term. The mere absence of England would be licence for the most violent and sanguinary aspirations of despotism and its enemies. There is but one blackly consoling possibility attendant on such a prospect We have before betrayed national and popular interests in Europe by a sudden withdrawal of our support, as we withdrew it from Sicily in 1812, simply to study our own convenience : were we now more generally to withdraw from our present mode of in- tervention, we should avenge the injuries which we then inflicted on popular interests by the shake that we should give to eveg throne on the Continent. The terrors of such a prospect viola alone forbid any responsible statesman of this country from even hinting at such a course.

But we may consider the consequences of abandoning our Me-

diterranean position in a more limited view. The whole course of events in eastern Europe is tending to a considerable relaxa- tion of the exclusive system in trade, with a consequent develop- ment of British commerce, towards which' the interests that we have heretofore protected by our intervention have aided Our pacific fleets therefore will not only penetrate in greater Blowy' to the more distant shores of the Mediterranean and:of the Black

the Black Sea, but will most probably be conveying largely increased values. We cannot absolutely trust the self-interest of Turkey, of Russia, or even Austria, for the observance of peace whether to

Meditertinienane;VionallAntAtieed absolutely trust any Feeeethe ofattrepei agsansteenpninni.,aceepiple as pirates ; it is we Lien; with oheele !the -iiieetefe lin ,*editerranean ; and it is we innst bee Prepae4 it11:46ken4 .onrselves against even the Riff iistest...Ahlemeelutfoneeeemeemons, tee„.there are persons ti) pica- lichny, diiipbsefla whoveemtnan.eli ,the ropeurces of , empires ; and theist emptittionetalre!seriouely.riniebed when a great commerce epieee the ,maxiiee anenrenee o the national power. to protect it. we's we tOpublieliwthe cleact,K1410i of, non-intervention, and limit evolves

ant contingent. • .

These are the reasons why, whatever may be done with Ionia we must' not surrender: that important station in our general Mediterranean -position, For the time we are inclined to think that the facts provisionally corroborate Sir John Young's sugges- tion, and we fully 'anticipate that, however it may be modified by Mr.Gladstonels report, something of the kind will ultimately be adopted. At all .events, this conclusion is safe,—that in the Mediterranean any British Government for the time being must take care that we hold our own, although it cannot be bound to predetermine the ultimate disposal of our own.