20 NOVEMBER 1897, Page 25

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WEST INDIAN DEMAND.

ON Tuesday last the Conference of Conservative dele- gates passed a resolution in favour of protecting the West Indian Colonies from the effects of the sugar- bounties. Though the resolution was moderately, and indeed vaguely, worded, its intention was perfectly clear. Those who proposed it and supported it obviously intended to urge upon the Government the necessity for imposing countervailing duties on bounty-fed sugar,—duties, that is, which shall take away the benefit conferred on the foreign producer of sugar by the bounty system. We most sincerely trust that the Government will not be in- fluenced by this resolution. We fully realise how strongly they must be tempted to endeavour to cure the terrible evils from which our West Indian islands are suffering, by the apparently easy and simple method of killing the bounties by a countervailing duty. At the same time, it is their plain duty, and also the only course consistent with the interests of the country, with their own interests, and with the interests of their party, to resist the temptation. It is our deliberate and most anxiously considered opinion that if they try to get rid of the bounties by imposing a countervailing duty they will not only do the West Indies no good, but will bring the Unionist party to ruin. In a matter of such moment there is no room for anything but plain speaking. Let us justify our double contention. Before doing so, however, we wish to state most clearly that we do not desire to take up any mere doctrinaire attitude in regard to the matter, or to dismiss the question as settled before it is raised, because it involves an infringement of the policy of Free- trade. Though we hold that the freer the trade the less the waste of wealth, and so the richer those who trade and use the results of trade, we admit that there are greater things than wealth in this world, and that cases are con- ceivable in which it might be right and necessary for a nation to decrease its wealth in order to attain some moral object. But the imposition of a countervailing duty on bounty-fed sugar is not one of these cases, for it coulj not accomplish its prime object, and it must bring in its 'train indirect evils of the most serious kind. That our West Indian islands are in a very serious economic condition no one who reads the Report of the Commission can, of course, doubt for a moment. It is also clear from the Report that they are suffering from the effects of the depression in the sugar industry. The West Indies are in the position in which many firms in England and elsewhere have found themselves from time to time. They are carrying on an industry without profit, possibly at a loss, and under conditions which, in spite of a very commendable exercise of energy on their part, forbid them to make a success of the industry. Can these conditions be changed in such a way as to make them favourable to the production of sugar on a large scale ? The only change in the conditions which it is certain would make the sugar industry flourish would be the virtual closing of the English markets to foreign sugar by the imposition of a prohil tive duty on non-West Indian sugar. This would, of course, mean discriminating against the sugar of India, of Queens- land, of Mauritius, of Fiji, and of other British possessions. But no one in his senses would dream of such a proposal. The only possible plan would be, then, not to discriminate directly in favour of the West Indies, but to do away with the advantage which the bounties give to foreign sugar by a countervailing duty, i.e., to let the West Indies start fair in the economic race. But even granted this could be done, it is more than doubtful whether the West Indian sugar industry would really be placed on its legs. " A rise of price," says the Report of the Commission— probably Sir Henry Norman must be taken to demur to this paragraph—" such as might reasonably be anticipated from the imposition of countervailing duties, would not, according to the representations made to us in evidence, place the West Indian sugar industry in a satisfactory position." The reason for this is clear ; the "West Indies are not the only, and also not the best, places in the world for growing cane-sugar. If they held a monopoly of sugar-cane growing, we might feel sure that they would benefit by an imposition of countervailing duties. But they hold no such monopoly. There are plenty of places better fitted for cane-growing. Hence the preference incidentally given to cane-sugar in the British market by the imposition of a countervailing duty on bounty-fed sugar would almost certainly fall not to the West Indies, but to other places. Cuba could grow cane- sugar for half the world, and if, directly the war is over, she were tempted to do so by a change in our policy, she could "cut in" and quite easily rend from our Colonies the morsel intended for them. The new and sharp competi- tion excited among the cane-producing countries by a change in our policy would not then improve the position of the West I❑dies, and would seem to them as disastrous as now seem the sugar-bounties. It is therefore almost certain, or at any rate as certain as anything can he which has not been actually tried, that the extinction of the bounties would not make sugar-growing pay in the West Indies, and that two years after the abolition of the bounties by treaty or countervailing duties we should be met with the cry that the islands must perish economically unless they received preferential treatment, unless, in fact, we returned in their case to the old "Colonial system."

Let us, however, assume for the purposes of argument that if the bounties could be countervailed, the price of cane-sugar would rise and the West Indies get the benefit. We must next ask, Could we successfully countervail the bounties short of a policy of excluding bounty-fed sugar as we exclude plague-rags and tuberculous beef We hold it to be certain that we could not. Foreign Govern- ments will not, we believe, give up the bounties through negotiation, even if the negotiation is supported by the threat of countervailing duties. It may be true that they would dearly like to stop the drain on their Exchequers, but they dare not offend the peasant beet root growers, all voters, who receive the bounties. There never was a bounty which filtered into so many channels. But if we try to extinguish the bounties by equivalent countervailing duties, it is practically certain that the Foreign Governments will reply by further raising their bounties. Theoretically two can play at that game no doubt ; but we ask our readers whether it is likely that the British public, always rather half- hearted in the matter, would agree to such methods as

these. Besides, the counter- countervailing bounties could at a pinch be given in a cryptic, indirect way which it would be almost impossible to again counteract. Again, how are we to prevent the bounty-fed sugar being shipped from some obliging smaller country which would give up its own bounties in order to get the

transport trade ? Are our Custom House officials to taste all the sugar that comes, and declare that, though such- and-such sugar has a Belgian or Dutch label, and is certified to have been packed in Antwerp or Amsterdam, it is really French or German sugar ? Such a policy as that—and no other policy would be in the end effective— would be a. revival of Napoleon's policy as set forth in the Milan and Berlin decrees. If, then, foreign countries were determined to go on with their bounties, they could certainly make our countervailing duties of no avail. But as we have suggested above, they dare not give up the bounty system. The sugar-refining industry and the beet-growing industry are too powerful to be resisted. No Minister abroad dare face such a combination of peasant, manufacturer, and merchant fighting for their lives. Look at the efforts made by the West-Indian sugar- growers, and imagine all those men and their labourers and employ& not merely able to use indirect appeals to sentiment and charitable feeling, but armed with votes, and supported by a public sentiment which regards it as the prime duty of Government to help, foster, and protect a threatened industry. Depend upon it, in a war against bounties we, who do not think that the way to make people rich is to raise the prices of what they use, would tire long before the German and the Frenchman, who obey the dictates of an opposite policy. We have contended that the abolition of the bounties will not be obtainable, and even if it were obtained, that it would not save the sugar industry in the West Indies. It remains to point out that if all these arguments are wrong, and if the countervailing policy were by a miracle to succeed, we should do a great and serious injury not only to the British consumer, but to our trade and commerce as a whole. To do any good the countervailing duties must raise the price of sugar. That is admitted. What would be the result ? Not only that the poor man would be taxed more than he is at present, but also that several of our most flourishing industries would be very seriously injured. Let any one who wants to understand the sugar question go into a, village shop and note what is being sold most. He will be surprised at the enormous amount of jam, of sweet biscuits, of sweets, and of aerated waters, such as ginger- ale and lemonade, that pass over the counter. The trade in these commodities in the shops of the poor is enormous. Jam and biscuits were once the luxuries of the well-to-do. Now they are a regular part of the food of the poor. In the last ten years these industries have developed beyond all belief. But the corner-stone on which they all rest is cheap sugar,—sugar that is so cheap that it can be used like barley-meal. Raising the price of sugar means, therefore, not merely making the housewife put a little less in her tea or in her puddings, but crippling these great industries. That is a side of the question which must never be forgotten. Physically even the results of cheap sugar are most valuable. The doctors declare that the modern child is often strong and well grown even in a very poor house because it can so easily get sugar, the food which gives the body necessary heat.

There is yet one more reason why we, and every one who cares for the Unionist cause, should implore the Government not to touch the question of the sugar- bounties, or enter upon the dangerous and thankless task of imposing countervailing duties. If they do so, they will not only divide their own supporters, but will in an instant reform and reconstitute the Opposition. All that the Home-rule party wants are a cry and a, policy. If the Government is mad enough to give Sir William Harcourt the cry of " Free- trade in danger," they will have dealt themselves and their own party a staggering blow. With such a cry the Opposition would at once rally to it all the Liberals of sense and position who are shy of the fads and follies now advocated on Opposition platforms, but who would seize eagerly on a good excuse for renewing their active political life. " Free-trade and cheap sugar " would give them exactly the excuse they need. But the Government, which is composed of quick-minded and prudent states- men, can see all this as well as we can. Therefore we feel sure that however much they may be tempted by their desire—per se a very laudable one—to help the West Indies, neither the Report of the Commission nor the resolution of the Conservative delegates will induce them to take so suicidal a step as the attempt to impose countervailing duties on sugar. The more they consider the plan, the less chance is there of its adoption. Nor need a negative decision mean a refusal of help to the West Indies. There are other and far better ways of improving their position. The true method is to treat the West Indies as we have treated the congested districts of Ireland. Let us appoint a Commission for the purpose, and give it, say, £40,000 a year for ten years, and the right to raise a loan of £300,000, to be spent in the work of improvement. That will do the West Indies far more good than a policy of countervailing duties, and it will save the Government and the country from plunging into the fiscal Slough of Despond towards which the Puck of Protection, under his various aliases, is always attempting to lead us.