THE MORALITY OF " EXPERTISING."
SOME correspondents of a contemporary raised last week a question which we hoped they would continue to argue, for it is really one of the most perplexing questions of casuistry in modern life, and one, too, which is perpetually coming up. Most of the serious moral difficulties of that kind are of the rarest occurrence, but this one meets us every day. Is it fair so to use knowledge as to deprive the ignorant of their property, the value of which they have not under- stood ? Most men, in practice, say it is fair. Thousands of amateurs as well as dealers are every day searching the by- ways of the world for treasures, which they know to be treasures, but which they hope the owners will deem to be of little worth. The majority of mankind think age a drawback to any article, while a minority value it above all other attri- butes. When the experts find anything, they give no hint of its value, but offer a small price, or produce the small price asked, and walk off with their prizes, exulting in their skill, and entirely contented in their consciences. They are most of them decent people ; they would not, even if hungry, steal pence out of a blind man's tray ; yet they will deprive the mentally blind of half or three-fourths, or even nine-tenths, of the value of their possessions. They are even proud of the fact. They do not often lacerate the seller by telling him what in his ignorance he has parted with, though we have once at least known that done, the buyer coolly remarking as he left the shop that the bronze he had purchased for six pounds was worth at least sixty ; but in all other company they are proud of their achievements. 'I got that chest in a cottage,' says one, from an old woman for ten shillings, and I suppose it is worth even at auction at least as many pounds." I bought a little picture in Cairo,' says another, for a hundred francs, and sold it in London, to a dealer too, for three hundred pounds." I got the whole con- tents of an old palazzo,' says a third, for fifteen hundred pounds, and three vases among the stuff repaid my whole expenses.' They even recount their feats in books, and no more dream of defending themselves than Mtecenas does of defending himself for buying at the price asked the pictures of the artist struggling towards fame. In one particular form of bargaining with the blind they not only boast of their suc- cesses, but are openly admired for them. There are excellent men in every society and every capital who have an accurate, sometimes a profound, knowledge of the pecuniary value of books, and if they see a scarce one offered for a few shillings or pence, will buy it with glee, carry it home exulting, and receive praise from their friends because they have done what deprived a blind man of part of the property that belonged to him. The seller is precisely in the position of the blind man ; that is, he does not see, cannot see, what it is that is being taken away from him. Can that be right by any reasonable code of ethics, and especially by the Christian code, the very basis of which is that you should do unto others what you desire them to do unto you ? If you may take away John Smith's book for sixpence when it is worth six pounds, why may you not take away John Smith's silver spoons ?
We have stated the case for that side pretty strongly, and we are not surprised that to many good men it seems abso- lutely unanswerable; but Christianity and common-sense are rarely incompatible, and there is an answer, though it docs not quite cover the whole ground. The usual one, that you must not buy to great advantage from a private person, but may buy in market overt, and especially may buy of a dealer in the article, is in our judgment no answer at all. There is an immense difference in the gentlemanliness Of the two acts, there being a tacit contract in society that except when a horse is in question men are to bargain with the cards on the table, and not to use secret knowledge ; but where is the difference in honesty ? The complaint is that the buyer is by the strength of superior knowledge taking away the property of the seller, and whether the latter is a tradesman or private person does not, if that is true, signify one jot. You might as well say that to burgle Mr. Garrard's shop was not robbery, but to burgle a private house was. Except as regards sales at auction, the defence is not worth a straw, and it is only sufficient there because you are giving in an auction the highest price there is to give. We suspect that even there, if we have stated the whole case fairly, the true counsel of perfection would be to tell the owner of his mistake and the bidders' mistake, and to pay him the difference. The truth is, we have not stated the whole case, but only that of the seller. There is the buyer also to be considered and his rights. The moralist who con- demns bargain-seeking as dishonesty is asking the buyer to give away his knowledge to some one he does not know and does not care about, and why should he do that ? He is generous if he does, but he is not bound to be generous when he does not want to be, or to give away gratis a power which it may have cost him years to acquire, and which is at all events his, just as much as the other man's spoons. Intellectual property may be intangible, but it is property just as much as plate. The buyer of the object of desire has only to pass on and the object recedes at once to the value it possesses in the mind of the ignorant owner. The buyer by his knowledge, in fact, makes the value as much as if he possessed the Rosicrucian's secret and could turn lead into gold. It is surely an extreme version even of Christian teach- ing to say that he is bound to be philanthropic, and teach the ignorant man the value of his possession before he passes on. That would really involve this consequence, that no man possessing a sovereign had a right to walk on if another man wanted it, a doctrine which would dissolve civilisation at a blow, and make the beggar the master of mankind. The moralist who insists that John Smith shall give full value for an editio prineeps which the dealer thinks an ordinary copy is asking not for justice, but for generosity, the moral virtue of which is taken out of it by its being made, so to speak, com- pulsory. The buyer is, in fact, to subscribe heavily, whether he likes, it or not, for the benefit of the seller. We think we can make this clear by stating a crucial instance. The buyer for the British Museum hears of a book, very rare and still wanting on his shelves, and is asked on inquiry E..1 for it. It is worth, say, 250. Is the buyer, who is, of course, a trustee for the taxpayer, to pay the £5, or to make the tax- payer contribute 245 for the seller's benefit ? The latter answer is impossible, and yet if the question is one of simple honesty, as we see is alleged, that is what he ought to do. We do not see, we confess, where an answer to this answer is to be found, except in the principle that no man has a right to make a market of any special faculty he may possess, but is bound to use it, asking only a living wage, for the benefit of all, which is not, as we judge, Christianity, but Socialism.
Is there then no practical rule which can be applied in such cases ? We should say that the simplest was never to per- suade. If the seller is a dealer, pay his price and go away ; if he is a private person, either pay his price, if be has fixed one, or, if he has not, offer one, and but one, and go away, success- ful or unsuccessful. Do not deny if challenged that the object desired is worth much more though you will not give it, and do not under any circumstances buy below value where the motive of sale is clearly imperative poverty. The seller then is not really a free agent, and though you are ndt bound to be generous, you are bound not to justify Traddles's great argument, that no man knows how mean a man can be if he gives his whole mind to it. It comes, in short, in plain English to this, that you are at liberty to refuse to give away your knowledge, which is your property, when buying, but you are not at liberty to tell, or to act, lies.
Previous page
