(To THE Enema or THE SPECTATOR."] Sire—Politicians, like solicitors, are
always enamoured of the policy of compromise. Every compromise, however, has to be judged upon its own inherent merits, whether it be good or whether it be evil. The compromise suggested by the Spectator for the settlement of the vexed problem of the Liquor Traffic is inherently evil, as with your permission I will proceed to explain. The Spectator recommends the State Purchase of the Liquor Traffic, "coupled with the scheme of Local Option, which may very fairly and properly be described as Piecemeal Prohibition. Such is the compromise which can, we believe, be obtained." One does not need to be a teetotaler to appreciate its futility. There are objections to it from every point of view, but they may be all summed up in the single sentence: " You cannot purchase what you propose to prohibit; and still less can you prohibit what you have already purchased out of public funds." That would be financial folly in extremis, and the Premier is little likely to batter his head against the stone wall of conscience and of common-sense. We teetotalers oppose State Purchase of the Liquor Traffic because we conscientiously object as good citizens to having part or lot in the depravation of the people.
The ...Spectator writes: Such Conscientious Objectors " forget that if it is a crime to sanction the sale of liquor by the State, they are already up to their necks in that crime. We know how they will reply. That will say that accepting the taxation of beer and spirits does not constitute the crime in question. We do not agree." It is a pity that the Spectator should so deliber- ately sin against light. Whether the Spectator agrees or not, the reply placed in the mouth of the teetotaler is sound in substance and in form. Taxation of the Liquor Traffic does not condone it; and the higher the taxation the greater the consequent restric- tion of the traffic—which is the aim and object of all Temperance Reform. The Spectator continues: "But let that pass for the moment. Our temporary admission in regard to taxation does not avail them [the objectors] at all. . They are already hit morally just as hard as Purchase would hit them, owing to the fact that, as component parts of the State, they sell licences for the sale of liquor—i.e., sell licences to commit what they regard ste a crime." Wherever did the Spectator obtain this extraordinary piece of information? What liquor licences are
sold by the State? Where the premisses are so entirely unsound, there can be no wonder that the conclusion is inevitably at fault.
—I am, Sir, &c., ARNOLD F. Ham Hammerfield, Penshurst, Kent.
[We cannot quite make out whether Mr. Arnold Hills writes in irony or in ignorance. In any case, we are delighted to give him the answer he asks for. The State does not allow any person to sell liquor unless it has issued a licence to him to do so, and that licence can only be obtained, whether it is for a day or three or four days or for a year—no licence is issued for more than a year—without what is in most eases a very heavy payment. If that is not selling licences, the language seems to have lost its meaning. Surely Mr. Hills does not think that selling is confined to sales at auction! But that is not all. In this country we not only sell licences to sell liquor. A man has to buy a licence from the State to manufacture liquor, whether it be beer or spirits. We say once more that it is absurd to argue that State Purchase would make men, who believe that to sell liquor is a crime, guilty of a crime of which they were previously innocent, for the very good reason that they have already committed the offence. To sell licences to sell is just as bad as to sell. We cannot continuo to reiterate this statement, and therefore must decline further correspondence on the point. Neither Mr. Hills nor anybody else will ever convert us to the belief that the pay- ment made to the State for a licence is not a purchase of the licence.—Eo. Spectator.]
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