21 APRIL 1928, Page 4

The American Peace Proposal T HOSE who hold it to be

a cardinal part of British foreign policy to co-operate with the United States will go through an anxious time till they are satisfied that the discussions of Mr. Kellogg's latest proposal are proceeding on the right lines. No more important project has been put forward since the War. The cause of peace— incidentally also that of Anglo-American relations: is at the parting of the ways. If the British -Government choose the right way and show a firm determination from the beginning not to magnify obstacles or to be awed by rdmours of lions, ambushes and pitfalls, they will confer the greatest boon upon the world and upon the nation that it is possible for any Government to confer.

In order to understand exactly what is at issue and what the difficulties are—for the difficulties must be admitted since they cannot be disguised—it is necessary to look back a little. Last June M. Briand proposed that France and America should enter into a pact which would ban war for ever as " an instrument of policy." It seemed a promising opening, but at first America took very little notice of it. Later, however, Mr. Kellogg answered M. Briand's " feeler " by suggesting that if it were really possible to enter into such a beneficent pact it would be a pity to shut out other nations. Why should not the pact be multilateral ? Why, indeed, should not every civilized nation be brought in ?

Then ensued long discussions in the course of which M. Briand developed numerous doubts. How would an unreserved renunciation of war fit in with the obligations of the members of the League ? Had not the League committed itself to make war in the last resort in order to suppress a deliberate disturbance of the peace ? True, such action would be a police war, not a spontaneous or deliberate war for the purpose of securing a selfish end ; but it would be war nevertheless, and Mr. Kellogg might be taken to mean that he wanted to rule out all war. Finally, M. Briand drew up a list of reservations. ltIe proposed that in the event of any Power violating the pact all the other signatories should be released from their pledges, that no Power should be deprived of the " right of legitimate defence," and that the pact should not affect existing obligations. There were other reser- . vations, but these were the chief, and they virtually comprehended the others.

The disadvantage of watering down a general renuncia- tion is that one or other of the qualifications can be pressed by some manipulation into the service of any Power that is really intent upon making war. A suffi- ciently diluted renunciation would have much the same value as the old Arbitration Treaties which by excluding matters of honour and vital interest virtually excluded everything. M. Briand, though we have been convinced throughout of his sincerity, and of his intense desire to do his duty to the League as well as to his own country, was showing the way to a pact which might be interpreted as meaning, " We will never go to war except when we do go to war."

In the end, Mr. Kellogg . cut the discussions short by producing a draft Treaty which he sent last week to the British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments, as well as to the French. The Treaty contains three articles. The first declares. that the signatory Powers (''condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of policy in their relations with one another." The second article declares that the settlement of disputes of whatever nature "shall never be sought except by pacific means." The third declares that the Treaty shall wine into force after ratification by alll the Powers named above. Mr. Kellogg proposed in a letter that all other Powers shall be invited to add their names to those of the original signatories. He also pointed out with great cogency that the first two articles of the draft Treaty are practically identical 'kith the original proposals of . M. Briand himself. Another very important statement -was that the United States Government do not believe that such a general renuncia- tion of war as is proposed would clash- with any of the obligations to the League.

The first comment of those who are temperamentally timid about any policy which is startling is that it is trying for too much. What can come, it is asked, of such a vague though generous proposal as.Mr. Kellogg has made ? Can it be anything better than a pious opinion ? If our Government should begin making that kind of comment they will, in our judgment, make a fatal mistake. Cer- tainly the characteristic American method is not ours ; but to reject a promising experiment because its form makes us open our eyes wide would be simply to refuse dealings with America on the ground that Our Styles are different.

The Americans as a people begin with an ideal, with round phrases; or with a general aspiration, and come to details later. We British seldom commit ourselves to anything till we have seen out way fairly clearly to conqUer the details. There is, however, an historical reason for the distinction. The Americans have a written Constitu- tion, into which are crowded a great many admirable principles. No political idea has the highest importance in the American mind unless it is sanctioned by the Con stitution. This sanction might be called the first Step in recognition and dignity. We publish elsewhere this week an article on Prohibition in America which happens to give an illustration of what we mean. The principle of Prohibition was accepted by means of an amendment to the Constitution, but all the working out of the details had subsequently to be embodied in the Statute which is known as the Volstead Act. We do not mean that all this represents an invariable method of procedure; but it does provide a fairly exact analogy of the way in which Americans think about politics. The general principle comes first ; the practical application comes later.

At present we are 'offered only the general principle, and under the conditions which we have described it seems to us that we ought to welcome the draft Treaty with open arms. We feel as convinced as we can be of any- thing that the American Government will admit when we come to details later that certain kinds of war must be regarded as inevitable. The American Government understand as fully as we do that the League is pledged, if necessary, to discourage by force wilful ruptures of the peace. They themselves are engaged at this moment in what the late Lord T-TalsbUry would have called- " a sort of a war " in Nicaragua. There may and probably will be minor difficulties in reconciling Mr. Kellogg'S general renunciation with the policy of the League, but those difficalties seem as nothing when we recognize that the only alternative is the topsy-turvy admission that the League (which was created solelyto keep the peace) rejects a Peace Treaty in order that it may maintain the right to make war!

Mr. Kellogg does not by any means deprecate discussion. On the contrary, he invites it. The most that he says of his draft Treaty is that it "satisfies the needs of the world " in a general way." Academic writers on the art of war Used to describe war as an act or instrument of policy.

That was quite a good description, worthy of inclusion in a dictionary, but it belonged to the period before the Great War. The common attitude was to regard War as a respectable means of enforcing one's policy at a pinch. The common attitude to-day is obvtbUsly to regard war as a very disreputable means of settling a dispute until every one of the many means of settlement provided by the League and by International Law has been tried.

It should also be remembered that, though there may be objections to.vagueness as such, there are equally strong and perhaps stronger objections to precise definitions. It 'was because Sir Austen Chamberlain held these latter 'objections that he opposed any definition of an " aggres- sor." History shows that it is usually possible for a nation which is malignantly bent upon mischief to work ;up to a situation in which the letter of the law—when the law is very explicitly worded—will seem to be on its side and will put that nation nominally in the right, though according to the common sense of the whole world it is in the wrong. Sir Austen Chamberlain, therefore, should be the last man to object to Mr. Kellogg's generality merely on the ground that it is a generality. M. Briand would be ready, utterly to renounce war as " an instrument of personal, ifidependent and spontaneous policy." That,. sounds well, but after all, it is only another definition with the dangers inherent in definitions. We repeat our conviction that the United States does not, and cannot dream of, wanting to prohibit such police wars as are judged necessary by reputable opinion for the suppression of open evil-doing. Senator Borah in a recent speech indicated the necessity of such exceptions, and he has not been contradicted, nor is he likely to be.

The Kellogg proposal provides an unprecedented oppor- tunity for making the world safer. There is no prospect at present of the United States joining the League, but here is the way to an almost equivalent result. If the British Government help the scheme to fruition their name will be blessed in history, but if they fail either through lack of enthusiasm-, or through managing badly, though their intentions may be_good, the whole cause of peace will be set back.