20 APRIL 1944, Page 10

MARGINAL COMMENT

By HAROLD NICOLSON

ONE is reluctant in time of war to criticise the policy of one's own Government. This reluctance arises from several motives, none of which is necessarily disreputable. There is in the first place a disinclination to carp at an administration which since 1940 has displayed such fortitude and foresight. One is reluctant also to give to the enemy any grounds for suggesting that the support of the present administration is anything but uniform and vigorous. And, above all, one is deterred, if one has any experience at all of the management of great affairs, from questioning actions which may be necessitated by facts of which one has no knowledge or imposed by circumstances the exact value and proportions of which one is unable to assess. How easy and how foolish it is for the irresponsible to gird at the responsible, to make suggestions which are obvious though ignorant suggestions, or in criticising the inci- dentally undesirable.to forget or to ignore some general principle of action which overrides by its compelling necessity all momentary or minor disadvantages! Yet there arise occasions when an accumu- lation of minor actions suggest that a change, and perhaps an error, of general policy is being committed. A step in one direction may seem imprudent, but we remain silent, not knowing whether this step may not be a movement of hesitation or a feint ; but when several steps are taken in the same direction, then a note of warning can justifiably be sounded. The present trend of policy towards the neutral countries (and it is a new and remarkable trend) would seem to be mistaken both in principle, in method and in timing.

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Each one of our present actions and menaces, if taken by itself, may appear to be justified ; the accumulation of these actions, how- ever, suggests a trend of policy which is not consonant either with the traditions, the experience, the wisdom or the principles of sound British foreign policy. I have, for instance, no sympathy whatsoever for the Spain of General Franco, and our pharisaism during the Spanish civil war must always remain as a scar upon our conscience. The Spanish Government in allowing their legionaries to fight against Russia, in allowing La Linea and Tarifa to be used as enemy observation posts, themselves violated the principles of neutrality to which they now appeal, and the occupation of the Tangier zone was an international outrage which we can neither forgive nor forget. But it is not a reputable policy to toady to a man when one is weak and then to start nagging at him when strength returns: such a change of attitude is consonant neither with the dignity nor the repute of the United Nations. The policy of Turkey again may not have proved as helpful as we expected or have justified the hopes of those who regarded the Anglo-Turkish alliance as an important diplomatic achievement. We may be justified in feeling some disappointment that Turkey should have damped off at a crucial moment of the war ; but it is unreasonable for this dis- appointment to express itself in pin-pricks and snarls. Turkey has much to lose and little to gain ; her neutrality in the past years was benevolent and useful ; it is not very sedate of us to show ill- temper at this stage. The war before long may shift to areas, and attain proportions, which may render Turkey of supplementary importance only. It would seem wiser, and less productive of future tension and misunderstanding, to allow Turkey to fade out of the picture quietly and without a fuss.

* * * * Our attitude towards Eire, again, does not appear to be very dignified, expedient or far-seeing. There was a time, during the dark periods of the Battle of the Atlantic, when the possession of the Eire harbours would have saved us much energy and many lives. We displayed during this period a wise forbearance. The cynic might argue that our rectitude was governed by a lively concern for public opinion in the United States, and that our policy was restrained by the consideration that any violation of Eire's neutrality would alienate a wide and powerful section of the American electorate. This may have been a governing consideration, but it was not determinant. The respect which we showed to Eire's

neutrality, and at great disadvantage to ourselves, was a generous respect. Had we maintained that attitude until the day of victory we might- have done much to eliminate the -poison which has infected Anglo-Irish relations for three hundred years and more. At a time when Eire's neutrality was, in fact, some menace to our safety we behaved with laudable forbearance ; and now, when victory is assured, we start exerting pressure on Eire, not on the ground of vital strategy, but on the ground of the presence in Dublin of a German Minister and a Japanese Consul. The demand for the expulsion of these enemy officials is not analagous to the action taken by His Majesty's Government in curtailing diplomatic privileges in Great Britain. The latter action is a unilateral action taken by our Government in British territory ; it imposes no un- neutral action upon any foreign government, and is justified, as will be accepted by all reasonable people, by the fact that Great Britain is now " within the zone of the armies." The demand for the expulsion of enemy officials in Dublin, however, would, if accepted. have obliged the Eire Government themselves to take action of an un-neutral nature. 1 am not saying that the demand should not have been made: I am saying only that it should have been made with less publicity and greater tact.

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Our simultaneous, or concurrent, change of attitude towards Sweden also suggests that some definite trend of policy is involved. It is true that at the time when Germany seemed to have conquered the world, Sweden was obliged by her weakness and isolation to render to Germany some most unneutral services. With the decline of German dominance, and the accretion of her own defensive strength, Sweden has done her best to regain her neutrality. It may be highly inconvenient to us that she should, in return for coal, supply our enemies with iron ore and ball-bearings. It was equally inconvenient to our enemies, when the United States were neutral, that they should so lavishly have supplied us with the weapons of war. When we were still weak we tacitly admitted that Sweden as a neutral and independent State had the right to trade with all belligerents. Now that we are strong we have suddenly discovered that these lawful occasions constitute an outrage. The Swedes are an intensely proud people who will defend their independence with dogged resolution ; their neutrality is for them a symbol of this independence ; if we start coercing them, their preient admiration of us may turn to contempt. The advantages which we may gain by being tough with the Swedes may, I admit, be great advantages ; but the price which we shall pay for them will be the loss of the deep respect that we have earned. And shall we soon start bullying Switzerland also? Switzerland—to whom neutrality is a religion which has illumined so much misery, which has shone like a beacon in a clouded world? It would be more than a mistake for us to coerce Switzerland: it would be a moral disaster.

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Such actions, if isolated the one from the other, may possibly be defended on the grounds of expediency ; but taken in the aggregate they raise a question of deep principle. This new trend of policy, the policy of bullying the weak, is not in accordance with our traditions or our conscience. It is not, and never can be, a British policy. Russia, with her immense physical power, can afford to be "realistic "; the United States, conscious of the integrity of their purpose, can afford to believe that the end justifies the means ; but the power of Great Britain is based not so muds upon force as upon influence, and our influence derives from the fact that for the last hundred and fifty years we have sought to defend the weak against the strong. If we lose that influence we lose our position in the post-war world_ We entered the last war in defence of the neutrality of a small country ; it would be tragic, indeed, were we to end this war, in which hitherto we have set so fine an example, by trampling (in the wake of other, heavier, feet) upon those very rights which it is our duty, our mission and our need to defend.