REVELATIONS OF PAPAL POLICY.
THERE are two theories as to the policy of the Papacy.. Ac- cording to the popular Protestant view, the distinguishing characteristics of Papal policy are extreme astuteness, a remarkable tenacity of purpose, and an extraordinary talent for working out its own ends, in spite of—and, almost, in virtue of—the most powerful opposition. In fact, the wisdom of the serpent is assumed to be the one quality for which the Papacy is pre-eminent. There is much in bygone history to justify this popular faith, and the very fact of its prevalence is of great service to the Court of Rome. The native Italian view is a very different one. The serpent in Italian opinion may have retained its venom, but has lost its cun- ning. The policy of the Papacx is just what might be expected from a court of old men very bigoted, very ignorant of the world, and utterly deficient in bodily or mental vigour. In other words, it is feeble, unenlightened, and vacillating—obstinate in times of fancied security, and weak in danger. On such an hypothesis as this, and, indeed, on no other, the power of Antonelli is easily accounted for. In the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed is king, and in a court of cardinals .Antonelli is a statesman.
The adherents of this latter unromantic view of the Papacy (amongst which we number ourselves), have received of late an un- expected testimony in support of their opinions. During the crisis of the Italian revolution—the momentous period between the out- break of the war and the insurrection of Naples, the Commendatore di Martino—the highest, perhaps, in character of Neapolitan states- men—was the Minister of the Two Sicilies at the Court of Rome. Of all the European Powers Naples was the only one which, from its position and its policy, thoroughly and heartily identified itself with the Papal cause, and, therefore, the Neapolitan Minister was probably better acquainted with the real views and tactics of the Vatican than any other member of the diplomatic body at Rome. Indeed, in Di Martino's own words, the Papal Government promised "to keep him daily informed of all that occurred, in the hope that on these questions of common interest, the Vatican might act in perfect har- mony with the Court of Naples." During this period of 1859 to 1860, the Neapolitan Ambassador at Rome was in the habit of send- ing frequent reports to Signor Carafa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
• at Naples. These despatches were carried off to Gaeta on the flight of Francis II. from Naples, and after the capture of the fortress fell into the hands of the Sardinians. Within the last week a selec- tion from these despatches has been published in the Opittioxe, the official organ of the Ricasoli Ministry, and it is out of this collection that we wish to point out the vacillations and inconsistencies of the Papal policy during the eventful years of 1859 and 1860.
At the end of March, 1859, the question of war or peace between France and Austria still hung in the balance. There was but one possibility of staving it off, and that was by the assembling of a Con- gress to decide on the affairs of Italy—an idea which was then in great favour with the Imperial Cabinet. At such a time the obvious policy of the Vatican would seem to have been to favour the pro- posal, and thus, at any rate, to gain time. On the contrary, the Court of Rome refused positively to listen to the idea. "The Holy See," so Antonelli stated to Di Martino, "would never consent to submit the sacred principle of its authority to any tribunal whatever. War and all its open consequences were a thousand times preferable to this." In truth, with a strange short-sightedness, the Vatican appears then to have had no great dread of war. Probably the delu- sion entertained at Naples, that Austria would be the winner in the event of war, was held at Rome also. It is certain that Antonelli, the clearest-sighted of the Papal councillors, entertained a still stranger delusion—that "there was no apprehension of a possible in- surrection in the Papal States upon their evacuation by the foreign troops." "He relied," he said, "on the power of the Government and on the tree spirit of the people. But even if he was wrong, it was better to let others cut your throat than cut it yourself." In March, 1859, then, the deliberate resolve of the Papal See was to make no concessions, but to stand or fall with Austria. It was this resolve which in no small measure thwarted the idea of a Congress, and thus rendered war inevitable.
By the month of July the error of this policy had been made mani- fest by the event of war. Austria was utterly defeated and prostrate, while the Romagna had revolted at once and for ever from the domi- nion of Rome. On the very day after the armistice had been signed between France and Austria, the Due de Gramont communicated to the Vatican that France had never guaranteed the Romagna, and could not undertake to suppress the insurrection in the revolted pro- vinces, but that she would maintain order in the other Papal pro- vinces until a European Congress could decide on the whole Italian question. As this Congreis "would have to pronounce on the com- patibility of the Pontifical Government with the real and just wants of its subjects and with the demands of civilization," the Vatican was urged to "take due measures beforehand." The hint, broad as it was, was not taken. Even then, the notion of granting any conces- siotis whatever could not be entertained. The first idea of the Vati- can was to make an appeal to Catholic Europe on behalf of the Papacy, but this fell through "owing to the repugnance of the Pope to resort to spiritual weapons in a question that was purely tem- poral." The second scheme, which -seems to have been favoured by Antonelli, was to put the Emperor in a dilemma by calling on him to hold the Marches while the Papal army reconquered the Romagna, and "thus compromise him with the Catholic party or divide him from Piedmont." When even this ingenious scheme broke down, through the refusal of the Emperor of the French to admit the force of the logical dilemma, the Vatican awoke to a dim consciousness that some concessions were necessary, and a month later the Papal Court declared its readiness to make temporal reforms, but only on the principles established at the conferences of Gaeta, that is, on principles established when political reaction was at its height. That the Italy of 1859, after the battle of Solferino, was not the Italy of 1819, after Novara, was a fact the Papal mind could not yet grapple with. "It was only at the last extremity" that the Cardinal Minis- ter could make up his mind to any concessions at all, and even then he hoped to forestal any real change by "harinksa reforms."
The declaration of the Duchies and of the Romagna, that they con- sidered themselves united to Sardinia, appears to have hastened on the work of reform, and by the beginning of October the Papal Reform Bill had actually been revised and sanctioned by a committee of Cardinals. The Cardinal, Di Martino states, "seeing that an in fluential share in the Government was preserved to them by the measure, are now interested in not opposing the reforms." From this statement and from the fact that Cardinals Patrizi, Ferretti, an-1 Di/Pietro were on the committee, we may judge that the reforms were not very extensive. Such as they were, they only needed the Pope's sanction, and were to be issued at once with a "molu proprio." On the very eve, however, of publication, Baron Bach, the Austrian Ambassador, represented to the Pope that he ought to derive all the profit possible from so great a sacrifice, and as a reward for his reforms to assure at least the integrity of the States of the Church. This advice chimed in with the Pope's own views, and he thereupon announced to the French Government "that the reforms were ready, but that he could not publish them until the Legations were restored to the sway of the Church, and the integrity of his States was solemnly recognized and guaranteed." The blindness of such conduct was palpable even to the Neapolitan Minister, who thus concludes the announceme4 of the circumstances: "On such an emergency no one can fail to see how his Holiness ought to forget that he is the sovereign of three millions of doubtful subjects, and only remember that he is the head of a hundred and fifty mil. lions of Catholics."
The scheme of conciliating public opinion by nominal reforms was thus laid aside, and the Vatican again turned its thoughts to active measures. In the middle of October a measure was agreed upon with extreme secrecy between Rome and Naples, by which Near, litan troops were to enter the Papal territory, apparently with a view
of marching on the Romagna. Some expected movement in Tuscany was to be the signal for t Neapolitan army passing the frontier, and the whole scheme was to be kept a profound secret. "When the passage of the troops was accomplished, and then only, the true object of the movement and the unexpected causes which had led to it, were to be explained to France." The anticipated Tuscan insurrection did not come off, and probably the secret oozed out. Until the end of 18.59 this strange coup &Etat seems to have been meditated on by the Vatican.
By the commencement of 1860, the Court of Rome had learnt to put its faith in the Meeting of Congress. It had been proved at last to be not inconsistent with the dignity of the Holy See to appear before an earthly tribunal, and.great hopes were entertained at Rome of the verdict the Congress would 'mine to ultimately. Austria was strongly in favour of the idea, and, if Di. Martino is .rightly in- formed, not Without reason. According, to his statement„,theeontents of an English despatch had come to his k:nowledge, in which it was announced that the plan of Austria was to wait at the Congress till the principle of non-intervention was agreed to, and then strongly urge the establishment a Central Italian kingdom, under PrinCe Napoleon, " as a foreigk element ref foreign weakness,. introduced into the heart of Italy, and thus to weaken Piedmont and the idea of nationality." This sort of underhand scheme was too consonant to the tactics of the Papal See not to meet with its sympathy.„ if not with its support ; and as long as the Vaticair, whether rightly or wrongly, believed that, the French Goverment would oppose the policy of Sardinia, the Congress met with favour in ,Rome. It was announced officially that Antonelli was to be the representative of the Papal See; the one Papal steam-yacht, the Immaculate Concep- tion, was under orders to convey him to France, and there was much gossip, as we remember, at the time at Rome, about the delight ex- pressed by the Cardinal at the prospect of a journey to Paris, Un- fortunately,. when everything seemed settled, the pamphlet of .Le
• Pape et Zr Congris made its appearance, and when Count Walewski informed the Papal nuncio, at Paris, that the pamphlet expressed the opinions of the Emperor Napoleon, it was felt that no good could accrue to the Papal See from a Congress where such ideas were likely to be supported by the influence of France. The notion of the Court of Rome sending &representative to Congress was dropped definitively, but with characteristic indecision the announcement of the refusal to send a representative, was purposely notified to the French government in the form of a question, "After all this, can Rome send an envoy th Congress ?"
When it became evident that the Congress would never meet, the French Government again pressed upon the Papal See the necessity of giving up the Romagna in order to save her remaining provinces. The Pope himself was influenced by these representations, but no positive 'decision could be come to except the general one, that it was the duty of the Holy See "to maintain its rights at whatever cost, and without exception to wait patiently, and to oppose extreme remedies to extreme evils." The words were brave words, but within three months' time, the most extreme remedy which the Papacy could devise was to issue an excommunication, in which all personal mention of names was avoided, for fear of driving things to extremities.
Then, when the spiritual coup d'Etal fell drearily and hopelessly dead, the Vatican hirned its mind again to the arm of flesh, engaged Lamoriciere, and resolved to form an army of its bwn for the recovery of the lost provinces. The Merode ultramontane party contrived to impress the Pope with such a conviction of the certainty of their success, that a proposal of the French Govern- ment in the month of May to withdraw the army of occupation was accepted eagerly, and, contrary to Antonelli's advice, the Pope - expressed his wish that the evacuation should commence at once. An extraordinary delusion prevailed at Rome, that other Catholic Powers would be 'willing to tale the place of France in Rome, or, if willing, would be permitted to do so. Naples, however, had its own hands too full at that period to interfere in behalf of the Papacy. Spain Spain was applied to without success, and even Austria refused to labour further in a thankless cause. In fact, the Vatican had so managed matters, that in a couple of months it would have been left to the sole protection of the Papal army, had it not been that the Garibaldian invasion altered the views of the French Emperor, and induced him to retain his army in Rome. What reliance could be placed on the Papal army, was shown at Castel Fichado, and if the Vatican in this instance escaped the consequences of its own wilful- ness, it was by accident, not by any wisdom or foresight of its own. The series of despatches we have quoted from closes with the date of Garibaldi's landing in Calabria, and the last glimpse we have of Antonelli's statecraft, is an expression of his hope and opinion that Garibaldi will overrun the whole of Italy, and then come to blows with Austria at Venice, in which case he looked on the overthrow of the national cause as certain. Happily, the Cardinal counted without Cavour. The Sardinian Government has done wisely in publishing these papers. There have been many statements made, more injurious to the moral repute of the Holy See; but there have been few, if any, so fatal to the repute of political and practical astuteness on which Rome has traded so long.
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