21 FEBRUARY 1852, Page 15

BOOKS.

THE INVASIONS AND DEFENCES OF ENGLAND.

THE grave public interest on the state of our defences has given rise to a variety of publications on the subject ; the popular interest contrasting strongly with the gentlemanly, insouciant, " statesmanlike " ease of our rulers. Professor Creasy is before the public with the past history and present emergencies of the question of invasion." An anonymous author, of considerable ability, has handled the plans of Napoleon in 1803-1805, with a view to draw comforting conclusions.} Lastly, the Conqueror of Scinde is in the field with hints and directions to meet the emer- fiencY.$

The attraction of Professor Creasy's Invasions or Projected In= vasions of England from the Saxon Times, with Remarks on the present Emergencies, consists in its timely appearance. The early period either wants novelty or is unimportant. The two greatest events, the invasion of William the Norman and the attempt of the Spanish Armada, are familiar to us all in their lead- ing circumstances, while Mr. Creasy has already treated the same subjects in his " Decisive Battles." The various attempts during the Plantagenet period are too remote in point of time, too small in themselves, and too different from the conditions of the present, to have much interest. De Ruyter's successful attack upon Sheerness and Chatham was rather a bravado to affront than an endeavour to inflict serious injury, though mischief he undoubtedly. did. This affair also is well known—in fact, a standing dish of guidebooks : however, it points the moral of negligence, whether from corruption, as in the days of Charles the Second, or from an over-refined delicacy or feebleness of mind, which applies to our rulers of the present day. The battle of La Hogue, the different schemes of invasion in favour of the Stuarts, and one or two appre- hended attempts during the American War, exhibit the depend- ence of naval expeditions upon wind and weather, and show that an invasion of this country has generally been planned in con- nexion with a political pretence. The true interest of Mr. Creasy's book begins with the efforts of the Directory to invade Ireland, the gigantic and long-continued preparations of Napoleon at Boulogne,- and the considerations connected with our present posi- tion. The form of the danger, the characters of men, the modes of warfare, are the same. The chief differences are, the probable effects of steam, (though we think this will rather lessen the numerous uncertainties of navigation for a large expedition than altogether remove them,) and the yet unprepared state of this country, with the possibility of a coup. de-main without declaration of war. On this point Mr. Creasy falls in with a pretty general opinion, that our danger lies not in diplomatic disagreements, fol: lowed by recriminations, and wound up by the dismissal of am- bassadors, the appearance of memorials, and a formal manifesto ; but a decree, an embargo, an embarkation, and a rush. He shows, moreover, that we have already been guilty of something not very far from the proceeding ourselves. "I may state my belief, founded on the history of former wars, as well as on present facts, that a few weeks' notice of hostilities being about to com- mence, would enable us to make such preparations by land as well as by sea as to set invaders at defiance. But again the difficulty occurs, are we safe of having that notice ? Are we safe of having any notice at all ? May not the first intimation of hostilities that we receive be the news that there is a French army in Sussex, and in full march to traverse the fifty miles of good road that separates it from helpless London ? "Many people seem to think, that in making war, though it may bo but a word and a blow, the blow must always be preceded by the word. Ex- perience proves otherwise. A single instance may suffice. How did we act towards Denmark in 1807? We thought that our interest required us to seize the Danish fleet and naval stores. We sent no notice—we declared no war. Our fleet was off Copenhagen, and our troops were landing on the Danish coast, before the Danes had the least suspicion of our coming. They trusted to the peace between us. But, when the Danes refused to com- ply with our demands, we instantly bombarded their capital, and took what we wanted by main force. I am passing no opinion as to the policy then pursued by England. Many wise and excellent men believed that we were justified in acting as we did to Denmark, on the ground of necessity. But necessity, the tyrant's plea,' is one that may be used against us as well as for us. The harbouring of political refugees in our capital, or a hundred other pretexts, might be set up for an attack upon ourselves, in peace not more profound, and sanctioned by treaties not more solemn, than appeared to give security to Denmark."

The most complete part of Mr. Creasy's book concerns Hoche's all but accomplished invasion of Ireland, and the projects of Napo- leon. The statistics, if not minute or well detailed, are sufficient; and the account indicates the risk to which Ireland may be exposed from the application of steam, during a long war, when accidents may furnish opportunities for an invasion. It is curious and not uninstructive to observe how great masters look at a subject from a different point of view according as they have to criticize or to con- duct. In the beginning of the century Nelson, like Wellington apparently now considered the enemy would make a rush at London with 40,000 men. Napoleon, charged with the respon- sibility, had no such idea. When the Directory laroposed an at- tempt with an army of 60,000 men, he feigned to approve of it, but at heart he disliked it. "He was aware," says Thies,

• The Invasions or Projected Invasions of England, from the Saxon Times; with Remarks on the present Emergencies. By E. S. Creasy, M.A., Professor of History in the University of Loudon, Author of " The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World." Published by Bentley. + The French in England; or Both Sides of the Question on Both Sides of the Channel. Being the Story of the Emperor Napoleon's projected Invasion. Pub. lished by Bradbury and Evans.

t A Letter on the Defence of England, by Corps of Volunteers and Militia. Ail. dressed to the Members of Parliament. By Sir Charles James Napier, G.C.B., Lien- tenant-General, and Colonel of the Twenty-second Regiment of Foot. Published by )loxon. "that it would be impossible to conquer the country and to establish himself there; that he could at most ravage it, despoil it of part of its wealth, throw it back, annul it for half a cen- tury ; but that he must sacrifice the army he brought over, and return almost alone after a sort of barbarian incursion." When he himself undertook the scheme, 150,000 men was the force he deemed necessary ; of which number more than 100,000 were to be embarked at once, and in vessels expressly built for the purpose. It is probable, were he planning an invasion now, he would create a flotilla of steamers, so that each vessel should be independent of ex- trinsic aid. But the differences between the position of uncle and nephew suggest themselves at once. The uncle contemplated the invasion as a crowning glory, during a state of war, against a na- tion thoroughly prepared to receive him. The nephew would be driven into it as a desperate attempt to divert attention from him- self and to preserve his position. He would not share in the dan- ger, he would personally risk nothing from defeat ; his purpose would in part be answered if the army ravaged the country and injured London, though it might afterwards perish. Even if de- stroyed in the outset, there would be the " spirit " of the attempt, and probably—if he retained his place—the consolation in his heart of hearts, which the Turkish vizier frankly expressed to the French envoy, when he remonstrated against a project of the cele- brated Hassan, to relieve Lemnos besieged by the Russians, with a fanatic force formed from the scum of Constantinople. " What you say is very true ; it is a mad scheme of Hassan's ; but it will get rid of the four thousand rabble at all events, and that is better than any victory."

Mr. Creasy is not particularly new on the subject of our "pre- sent emergencies." In a volume of this character and pretension, the reader was entitled to expect fuller statistics bearing upon the question. The quotation from Mr. Macgregor respecting our navy is certainly ample ; but it is of little or no use for the main purpose : what is the available naval force now in our ports? The remarks and suggestions on the general subject are judicious, but differ little from what has already been thrown out by the press or in pamphlets, unless it be that Mr. Creasy proposes to attach two pieces of light artillery to every regiment of volunteers. He does not hold that the navy alone is a sufficient security ; though he considers our naval means ample, as everybody knows, if they were readily available. The following remarks bearing upon this subject are judicious.

" We must, however, bear in mind that all the advantage which the intro- duction of steam seems to give us, depends on our having a superior navy,_ ready to act decisively at the very commencement of a war. It is of no use to have the means of collecting and equipping a superior navy if in the meanwhile the enemy beats us. The French naval officer, Captain de la Gravibre, to whom I have so often alluded, says truly on this point, that 'there is but one way to avoid the danger of being half conquered before the first battle,—that way is, to be both active and provident; to keep line- of-battle ships ready to be manned at the first signal, and to threaten the enemy's coast before he can blockade ours.' Assuredly, if war ever comes again, the struggle for naval superiority will be short, sharp, and decisive. The party who gets the first advantage will have such facilities for beating in detail the rest of the enemy's forces, as they come from various quarters to the rescue—he will have such opportunities for destroying the docks and arsenals, and of intercepting and capturing the commercial marine of his adversary—that only very gross folly on his part, and very extraordinary heroism on the opposite side, can reverse the ascendancy which he will have acquired. Besides, in discussing naval affairs with reference to projects of invasion, we must remember that a very short supremacy at sea may enable a foe to deal us infinite and permanent calamities on land. Napoleon only wished for twenty-four hours' command of the ChanneL

• * "So far, then, as our naval defences are concerned, there seems reason to believe, that if England had time for preparation, they would afford us an ampler measure of security than ever was the case in former wars; but that our condition is not so safe as we could wish it to be in the event of sudden and unforeseen hostilities. But in any point of view, there remains the ul- terior question, how we could resist an enemy if once landed ? For the best and largest fleets cannot be infallible guarantees ; and there is also one con- tingency which must not be forgotten, and against which we should sum- mon our fleets too late for defence, though not, perhaps, too late for revenge —I mean the possibility of a hostile force being suddenly thrown across the Channel on our shores, without any warning or declaration of war."

These questions are full of risk if not of peril, and we wish they were satisfactorily resolved. It is now a good two months since the nature and probable future of the late revolution were thoroughly understood, the state of our risks pointed out by the press, and a response elicited on the part of the public sufficient to show that they appreciated the danger and were desirous that it should be met. Within the time that has elapsed since allthis was obvious, we might have had a force at home sufficient to render any coup almost too hazardous to attempt. The Tagus fleet might long ago have been recalled to the Channel, draughts from the Mediterranean and even the West Indies might have reached home, and some of our steamers prepared. What has really been done ? Three captains have been appointed as commodores of steam squadrons, and the Tagus fleet is said to have been ordered home ; but the available force at present in our harbours we do not know. Why there should be any secrecy in the matter if we are sufficiently strong, it is difficult to divine. The public feeling upon the matter is palpable ; the Queen's Speech has suggested increased Estimates ; and noble and right honourable " statesmen " may feel assured that it is weakness not strength that will provoke attack.

Up to the close of last year, the Ministry would not have been more responsible for any mischief that might have occurred than Parliament and the country at large, except as all men are exclu- sively blameable who undertake anoffice and shrink from its duties. The fierce attacks of the Manchester school, the exertions of the Financial Reform Association, the agitation of the Peace party,

the apathy of Parliament and of the public, induced Lord Toln Russell to strike off five thousand men from the army, in the face of the Duke of Wellington's celebrated letter. Since that time the Caffre war has taken away some thousands of our best troops. Still, any attempt to increase the forces would have encountered so much opposition that Ministers alone could hardly have been blamed had evil followed. They have no longer that excuse. Public opinion has acquiesced in the necessity of preparations for security ; the Tory " statesmen " who quarrel with the press for calling a spade a spade, admit that it is right to increase the Estimates ; the Man- chester school have been moderate ; • the very Peace party have held their peace. Whatever affront or injury or dishonour may by possibility ensue will be chargeable upon the Ministry. They, and they only, will be the guilty persons—and " upon their heads be it."

The French in England contains an account of the projected invasion of Napoleon, written with fulness, clearness, and spirit, up to the time when all hopes of success were destroyed by the brush of Sir Robert Calder with the French fleet,- and the rapid return of Nelson from the West Indies. The conclusion the writer comes to is that if Napoleon were baffled by the difficulties and dangers of the project, no one else is likely to suceded ; and therefore we are safe. -Upon the data of the writer the opinion is just ; but he omits three elements from consideration : L the power of steam; 2. the difference between the positions of uncle and ne- phew ; 3. the chance of a desperate attempt at surprise. We do not overrate the effect of steam in any future war : we do not think it will move with such absolute certainty as many suppose, and that speed will be diminished in proportion to load. But there is no doubt that steamers will be able to move when a calm or a head-wind confines sailing-vessels to port ; that they can face weather which row-boats or over-crowded flat-bottomed boats could not; and that consequently the whole of the French coast is available as a start- ing-point, instead of being limited, as the Emperor Napoleon was, to the neighbourhood of Boulogne. A passage, therefore, can gene- rally be effected, if not in a few hours, at least in a day. or two, unless a sufficient naval force is ready to assail it. The dif- ference between the uncle and the nephew has already been touched upon : the uncle was a prosperous man, who very prudently shrunk from risking life and prosperity in an enterprise so full of hazard; the nephew may be forced to attempt it as a desperate throw for the preservation of both. The third point, however, the chance of a sur- prise, is the most important. In 1803, we were regularly at war ; by 1805, whenNapoleon had completed his preparations, we had 100,000 seamen, and half a million of Volunteers, besides regular troops, under arms on shore. What parity is there in the two cases ? It is doubtful whether we could now immediately collect 40,000 soldiers, including the Pensioners, to check an army of similar numbers marching on London : we fear it is more than doubtful whether we have a sufficient naval force at hand to prevent such an army from being thrown suddenly on our shores. What parity is there in the Ministries ? Even Addington, when war was imminent, made some preparations ; though without the aid of steam a sud- den descent was at that time impracticable. Lord John Russell and his colleagues have done nothing to any purpose in two months ' • though they might have secured an efficient fleet in the Channel without additional expense, by merely withdrawing ships from places where they are useless, or at least might be dispensed with.

Sir Charles Napier's Letter on the Defence of England by Corps of Volunteers and Militia is the most authoritative and at the same time practical document that has appeared. It is nominally addressed to Members of Parliament, but really to the gentlemen of England. It discusses no questions about the why or wherefore of invasion—it only assumes that there may be one ; it does not touch upon the question of when, where, and how to oppose the enemy by the regular army—that must be left "to the Duke." It only considers the dress, the arms, the instruction, and the tactics fit for volunteers ; and it does this with the racy energy and spirit of the late Commander-in-chief of the Indian Army.

For soldiers' dress the Lieutenant-General clings to the scarlet and its associations, for reasons assigned. The Volunteers may be clad as they like ; their own "shooting-jackets and leathern gaiters" will be the best. The old warrior also adheres to the musket and bayonet for the soldier,—and for still better reasons than retaining the scarlet. The Volunteers, again, may use what weapon they are most familiar with, " always .provided that it carries a musket-ball; for there must not be two sizes of ball for the small-arms of the army. This is imperative."

The discipline or instruction necessary for the corps or clubs is too important a matter not to let the veteran announce his own. rules.

" With regard to your Volunteer corps, I think each should consist of from one to four companies, each company consisting of one hundred men, with a captain and two lieutenants ; and I advise you to let each man carry two small cartridge-boxes made to slide on a girdle round the waist, so that one may be carried before and one behind, each holding thirty rounds of ammu- nition : thus the weight would be divided, and, consequently, more easily carried.

"Get some old soldier for your adjutant, to teach you, not a long course of drill, but just seven things, viz.

"1. To face right and left by word of command.

"2. To march in line and in column. "3. To extend and dose files as light infantry, with 'supports:

"4. To change front in extended and in close order.

"5. To relieve the skirmishers.

"6. To form solid squares and 'rallying squares.'

"7. To form an advanced guard.

"These seven things are all that you require ; do not let any one persuade you to learn more. " Let your practice at a target be constant. Also habituate your corps to take long marches of from fifteen to twenty miles, with your :arms and am- munition on ; and also in running, or what is called 'double quick time.' These must be arrived at by gradually increasing from small distances. No single man, much less a body of men, can make these exertions without training. Also subscribe for premiums to those who are the best shots. Do not be exclusive in forming your corps; your gamekeepers as your com- rades, and any of your labourers that ll enrol themselves : a gentleman will find no braver or better comrades than among his own immediate neigh- bours and tenants. Should you require to throw up a breastwork, they will be more handy with the spades and pickaxes than yourselves."

—The last a most important suggestion : for traits of that " re- spectable exciusivigm " which is more prevalent in England than in any other country, and stronger amongst the middle classes than an' other, are perhaps to be traced in some rules and regulations of mtended Rifle Clubs.

The directions for the Volunteer tactics are more general, and contain more " spicy " matter.

"Let us suppose an enemy lands ; which we must all hope may never take place, though I believe our young soldiers pray night and day that it may. I know the young soldiers of 1803 did, and I see no slackness on that head in these of 1852. Indeed, for that matter, I do not think Messrs. Cobden and Bright will be voted 'honorary members' even of the Senior United Service Club. The old soldiers hope that an invasion may never take plaee, because they would regret that a square mile of England should suffer the ravages of an enemy : but, if it should so befall us, that club has men of great experienbe, in whom the spirit is willing and the flesh not weak,—as England would see if the Duke mounted his horse, with his ancient 'Paladins' gathering thickly around him. Well, suppose an invading army landed : it would be opposed, in whatever way the Duke deemed proper, with the regular troops, ready and eager, in order of battle—where, when, and how, it is not for me to discuss : but we can suppose the regular army assembled to encounter the enemy, he being armed with minis rifles,' spike rifles,' and 'revolving rifles,' and the Devil knows what terrible weapons ; and our soldiers armed, as of old, with the long tried muskets and bayonets; the Duke at their head, the enemy in front, and firing with as yet untried minid rifles at two miles' distance, and we, I suppose, quietly lying down behind any little rise of the ground, or wall, or bank, their long balls whizzing harmless over our heads ; while our now called useless artillery would, 1- think, find out a way to make the mina riflemen unsteady and uncomfortable as they came on.

"Well, there we lie till they come closer ; and when close enough, and a good deal of their ammunition expended, then the Duke would begin busi- ness. Now you, gentlemen, not being drilled to this sort of work, would be in the way ; you would come into it after a while, but at first you would be in the way. 'Then, where should we be?' you will ask. Why, far away, clear of the regular troops, and getting round on the enemy's flanks and rear, to be sure ; your men in swarms, creeping as close to him as ever you eau; hiding in ditches, behind banks, rising grounds, woods, 8ze., so that his artillery could not do you as much harm as ours could do his ramie' men ; because you need not advancer his must, while you were pitching your shot into his columns : you have =Me rifles, you know, as well as he has ; and those among you who have only muskets would just get closer to him, that's all; and, as Punch has so well expressed it in his Sharpshooters' Chorus,

Up trees, behind hedges, 'mid rushes and sedges, From thickets, and brakes, from church-tower and house-top, Let each hand be ready, determined, and steady,

Unerring of aim, at Invaders* to pop.' " The enemy must all the while, as I have said, keep moving on towards the Duke, who waits for him very patiently, in one of those terrible positions of his, against which his enemies have a hundred times broken their heads. The enemy must move on—he is an invader ; he cannot sit down and do nothing; he M like the man in The New Tale of a Tub.

Mustn't stop to eat I mustn't stop to weep ! Mustn't stop to drink ! mustn't stop to sleep !

No cry ! no laugh ! no rest ! no grub 1' &c. &c. He must keep continually marching and fighting. If he halts to drive you off, you retire, seldom meeting him in close fight, but always firing at him ; he cannot catch you ! he goes back—then again you follow him up as he ad- vances against the regular army, you keeping an incessant firing into his back ; hundreds will fall under your galling and unerring aim—his hospital increases—he must leave guards: you are in vast numbers, a few thousands of you close,-and then you may occasionally rush, in overwhelming numbers, upon these guards, make them prisoners, and be off again out of reach. His convoys, too, are coming up; you gather upon and destroy them, carrying off his food and ammunition. His columns will send out detachments to plunder ; they are weak and wearied, for you, dividing yourselves in watches, as the sailors say, keep up your sharp-shooting night and day ; some resting and feeding while others fight, for you must take advantage of your vast num- bers. The enemy gets no rest. If he despises you and moves on, merely sending a few skirmishers to keep you off, you gather in closer and thicker, and your fire becomes more terrible ; his skirmishers give way, his column is forced to halt, and send a large force against you,—you are off! Again,- other portions of you take charge of our own convoys ; and finally, should the Duke think it expedient to fight in an intrenched position, you would, at his command, pour into intrenchments where no manceuvermg is required—nothing but courage ; and there you would be as good as any regular soldiers, for you would have only to shoot down the enemy as he came on, or knock the brains out of any that got over your intrenchments! Then, again, if his men straggled on his march, you would shoot them or make them all prisoners, and every hour you would become more expert and more daring. In short, you would leave the regular sol- diers nothing to do but the one stern job of fighting the battle; and a very tough one it would be, without doubt. But England and her young Queen would be in the soldiers' hearts, the ever victorious Duke at their head ; and the second edition of Waterloo would, if possible, be greater than the first !"

The following is a useful hint.

"I now come to the fourth subject on which you should support the ef- forts of Government; and that is to register all your means, such as spades, pickaxes, felling axes, barrows, carts, horses, in every town and village ; so i that, should an invasion happen, and the Duke orders such and such posi- tions to be intrenched, the engineer officer might find every magistrate at his post, with a written report of how many tools of each kind he could imp- ply, how many workmen, and in how many minutes or hours they could be collected ; though, in such details, to count by hours would not do when it is possible to effect matters in minutes ; therefore should such matters be prepared. Those positions should also be secretly made known to magis- trates as early as the Duke thinks it proper so far to divulge them, that the proprietors of neighbouring woods may mark the trees they could spare • "Punch must pardon my substituting the word ' invaders' for the rascals.' If there was a Kafir Punch, our Punch would not admit that the African Punch was jun if he called our soldiers ' rascals '—eh ?" to be cut down for abatis, instead of their timber being hewn in haste and at random, making unnecessary waste without an,y immediate advantage to the public, and even great loss ; for confusion is always extravagant in war, i as n all things else; in war it produces loss of life and loss of time; the eco- nomy of both, during a campaign, being among the most important means of securing victory.

" With such preparations in their memorandum-books, magistrates would throng round the Engineer officer, like so many staff-officers ; and each, re- ceiving his orders, would in the shortest possible time collect men and tools in masses, and, on the points designated, abatis would be formed, and para- pets be thrown up like magic."

We have oftener than once expressed our doubts as to the won- ders that steam will work in future wars, either by sea or land; and Sir Charles Napier confirms the scepticism as regards railroads. "One subject more and I have done, for my pamphlet is already too long. It is on railroads ; to which the public appears to me to attach an undue importance. I do not much like to say anything about this, because the subject of railroads bears on the grand general plans of defence which the ;Duke has no doubt formed in his own mind, and will execute, if you gentlemen, give him the means of execution ; and on these, any suggestions from an humble individual like myself would be presump- tuous and impertinent in the extreme. But I am free to say, that I cannot see any great military advantage in the railways. The trains may, perhaps, be used with advantage in bringing troops together rapidly at first— say the first two or three days. They may also possibly be useful in bring- ing provisions together. But beyond the first days I see no advantage. The movements of contending armies could not be regulated by railways one mo- ment. I imagine they would embarrass a commander, for they would force him to make movements to cover them or to take them up."