THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO EFFICIENT AERIAL DEFENCE.
BY LIEUT.-COMMR. C. DENNIS BURNEY, C.M.G., R.N., M.P.
PARLIAMENT and the country at large have been so fully occupied in watching the experiment of handing over the reins of government to a Socialist Cabinet, and wondering -what new development in social legislation will be suggested, that little regard has been had to the efficiency of our fighting forces, Unfortunately, a political issue was made out of the establishment of the base at Singapore, with the result that that project is now suspended, and no new step has been taken towards co-ordinating our various fighting services. Different committees have reported upon some form of compromise between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, but no real attempt has been made to grapple with these post- War problems in so far as their solution affects vested interests, or calls for a far-reaching and comprehensive reorganization.
The problem of the defence of the Empire is necessarily closely associated with the development of our aerial forces, since every advance in the power and capacity of our aircraft alters the relative value of our older methods of fighting. Unless some very clear thinking is indulged in by the leaders of public opinion in this country, it appears probable that not only will our taxpayers be paying more than they need for defence, but that much money may be wasted solely because our higher organiza- tion is established on a fundamentally unsound basis.
Take, for instance, this very question of the establish- ment of a base at Singapore. During the political cam- paign against this project a large section of the Press, supported by a number of retired officers, sponsored the idea that—owing to the development of the aeroplane— the battleship was practically out of date, and that long before the docks had been built the battleships for which they were provided would be redundant. There is little doubt that it was this school of thought that converted the country to the idea of adopting Mr. MacDonald's policy of postponement. It will be interesting to examine how it is that such a school of thought should obtain the standing and prestige that it has, when the whole of that expert opinion that also has responsibility was so defmitely opposed to the abandonment of the proposed base.
We are faced to-day with a difficult evolutionary period, during which aerial machines, owing to their development, will be enabled to perform more and more of those duties which we are accustomed to see performed by the Navy ; consequently, the more that aerial machines develop the more will their functions partake of a naval character, and the more will the functions of an aerial vessel coincide with and overlap those of a naval vessel. The effect, therefore, of more powerful aerial machines must be to limit the functions and responsibilities of the floating vessels, and unless an organization is contrived that will allow of this -gradual substitution upon a -predetermined plan, and, without internal friction, it is certain that the efficiency and capacity of the fighting services must be correspondingly depreciated.
It is seldom realized that the aerial machine and the naval vessel are both part of a common carrier service— each fleet of ships and squadron of aircraft is made up of self-contained, self-propelled vessels which can attack an enemy, but cannot, without the assistance of an army, hold a position, the naval vessels being confined to the • sea, while the aerial machines are able to go over both land - and sea. In essence, however, they are identical. Take • a very simple case, and imagine that some inventor- has developed a force negative to gravity that would give the possibility of lifting a light cruiser into the air. Under the existing organization,- the administrative control of that flying light cruiser would be vested in the Admiralty when the vessel was floating on or flying over the water, but as soon as it flew over land it would automatically come under the control of the Air Ministry.
Such a condition would be Gilbertian, and if we were to consider an organization de novo it is obvious that no one would suggest two administrations to control the same vessel at different periods of the same voyage. Similarly it is absurd to have two authorities controlling two types of mechanically propelled vessels. Take another example —the aerial defence of London. Where does it begin ? Does it begin with the machines sent up far out at sea from our naval aircraft carriers, or does it- begin w1-. enemy machines cross the coast of England ? Surely the Admiralty and the Air Ministry must be combined into one service as soon as possible, so that these two carrier services may be co-ordinated and developed upon com- mon-sense lines. The function of a navy is not altered because it is driven by steam instead of by the wind, nor because it can go under the sea as a submarine or up into the air like a seaplane or airship. This artificial division of the floating navy and the flying navy is the real cause of both wasted expenditure and inefficiency.
Take as an instance the following chain of cause and effect. It is generally admitted that, owing to the increased capacity of the aeroplane for carrying torpedoes - and large bombs, the control of the narrow seas will pass into the hands of the aerial forces. This development will be only a continuation of that process of driving the capital ship further from a protected harbour or coast, a process that was begun by the introduction of the mine and the submarine, but with the difference that the mine and the submarine are controlled by the same organization that controls the surface ship, namely, the Admiralty. Therefore, owing to the Admiralty having the responsi- bility for naval work, but not having the authority to develop and substitute aerial forces for sea forces, no regard is paid to the entire reorientation of • material that must necessarily ensue from such a substitution. • So far as can be seen at present, it will be several decades before aeroplanes have that great radius of action necessary , for operation over the great ocean routes, so we may say that the tendency must be for the defence of the British Isles to become more and more aerial, but for the defence of the outer Empire to remain almost completely naval. The acceptance of this doctrine carries with it the necessity for a reorientation of our naval bases and dockyards. We require more dockyards abroad and in the Dominions, and fewer at home. But this reorganization is not likely to take place so long as the Admiralty and the Air Ministry remain in competition instead of co-operating.
The result can be seen to-day if we examine the dock- yard position in this country. I suggested in the House of Commons the other day that Chatham Dockyard should be made an extension of the Port of. London, and connected via Gravesend by a new railway under the Thames at Tilbury. Chatham, is useless for the larger capital vessels, and the work of the smaller and auxiliary craft could be carried out largely by aircraft. The saving to the country would be about £1,500,000 per annum, a portion of which could be spent upon the provision of bases overseas. Nothing, however, appears to be in contemplation in this respect, because no Department is to-day responsible for initiating ideas and schemes to replace floating vessels by air vessels for naval purposes.
Two difficulties immediately present themselves, and will have to be surmounted before a reorganization such as is suggested can be carried out. In .the first place, such an upheaval would not bring any political advantage to any party, in fact the reverse would- probably be the case. There is accordingly no political pressure that can be exerted upon any Government. Secondly, there are two strong vested interests that would be up in arms against such a logical development. The Air Ministry to-day supports a large number of officials, together with its own Staff College, medical corps, clothing department, contracts department, and the like, all of which could be cut down enormously by a complete combination with the Navy. These officials will naturally fight hard for autonomy. On the other hand, the • dockyards that should be closed, will exert political pressure through their representatives in the House of Commons, as exemplified in the speech of the Member for Chatham upon this very suggestion. Without any consideration or investigation, he characterized as " specious nonsense " the suggestion to make Chatham Dockyard commercially self-supporting instead of being a drain upon the Admiralty vote.
I have not here dealt with the problem of a "Ministry of Defence," as that idea is yet hardly within the sphere of practical politics. The combination of the Navy and the Air Force necessarily carries with it provision - by the Army of its own aircraft for the tactical use of the Army. Every other great nation adopts this sensible and logical procedure. It is, however, important to recognize the fact that the functions of an independent air striking force are in no way different in character from the func- tions of a navy. Surely it is time for drastic action to be taken to put our house in order. Clouds hang upon the international horizon even now, and when we realize the loss of life and treasure in the last war through inefficient preparation and organization, it does seem that the Government is in duty bound to exert itself in the direc- tion of securing both adequate and economical defence for the Empire as well as in carrying out its policy of social reform.
So long as there are two great Departments of State, such as the Admiralty and the Air Ministry, each fighting for its own aggrandizement, so long will the efficiency of our defences suffer, and the cost-of our forces be unwar- rantably increased by a servile fear of these vested inter- ests. If, on the other hand, these two Departments can be combined into one, under one political head, there will be no check to the adoption of that form of vessel that can most cheaply and efficiently perform the required function. The House of Commons can surely be trusted to deal with the political pressure that may be exercised on behalf of the useless dockyards, and to realize that plant and - methods that are out of date must be ruthlessly scrapped, otherwise the result will be the same as with a business firm that refuses to move with the times. New methods and new plant call for a reorganization of the directorate and administration, and it will be well if the attention of the public is focused upon this very necessary -reforth.
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