Two Philosophic Demociats
In Defence of Democracy. By J. S. Fulton and C. R. Morris. (Methuen. 5s.)
IN the last year or two many knights errant have been has- tening to the rescue of democracy, but there was room for a champion of the old-fashioned sort, wielding the rapier of philosophy rather than the firearms of practical politics. Oxford has now sent the distressed lady two such champions in Mr. Fulton and Mr. Morris. Their joint book, In Defence of Democracy, is the most purely theoretical of all the volumes recently published on the same text. It is practical enough in the sense that it tries to keep firmly in touch with human nature as it is—not as one would like to imagine it to be ; but it keeps no less firmly to the plane of general reasoning, and hardly ever condescends to the particular.
Thus, when answering Professor Laski's thesis that the Election of 1931 finally ranged the competing forces of Socialism and Capitalism against each other in a battle to the death, they do not ask whether the thesis is true as a matter of history, but only whether it need be true as a matter of prediction. Again, they argue in the same way that there is no necessary connexion between dictatorship and efficiency or between democracy and inefficiency ; but they refrain from ques- tioning the actual record of dictatorships, nor do they draw any distinction between the performance of Italian Fascism and of German Nazism. Indeed, they draw no distinction between the various forms of government which answer to their general definition of democracy ; for instance, they do not analyse the diverse relations which exist in different democracies between executive and legislature.
This severely philosophic treatment has, of course, many disadvantages. In particular, it tends sometimes to miss the real point of contemporary events. The real refutation of Professor Laski's argument lies in the fact that there has probably been a deeper division of opinion between himself and Sir Walter Citrine since 1931 on the subject of economic policy than between Sir Walter and Mr. Runciman. Again, the significant characteristics of Nazism are its almost ludicrous barrenness in the field of social legislation and administration, and its extraordinary success in evoking voluntary effort in social service. It has thus succeeded where English demo- cracy had admittedly succeeded far better, and has created administrative chaos where the English civil service has at least maintained coherence. The point is that the Nazi's case is not really based on any contention as to forms of govern- ment : his case is rather that forms of government are less important than spiritual stimulation ; and our authors' logic swings rather wide of that point.
But perhaps a more serious disadvantage is that the philoso- pher must be so very careful of his own definitions, lest, having refuted others, he himself should slip into fallacy. He cannot make the sort of courteous admission to his opponents which is happily so common in English political debates ; he is, as it were, on his-oath and there must be no weak link in his evi- dence. Our authors are shrewd critics of revolutionary philosophies ; that is, they give the devil fair play and allow him to trip himself up. They detect, for instance, what so many controversialists miss c, the " millennial " assumption on which the whole Communist case is founded, an assumption derived, not from, reason, but from a priori faith. But they do not always watch their own steps. For instance, in reply to the Marxist :case, they concede that in a democracy " all real power over the individual, whichis within the competence of human hands at all, should reside-in the political sovereign." If this is a considered statement, its inevitable conclusion is that the only possible form of democratic government is com- plete state socialism, for all private employment Means "real power " exercised over one man by another, and in every Market the richer man, whether buyer ,or Seller, will exercise "real power " over his neighbour by getting th\e better of the bargain. Substitute for the words -" reside in " the words "be exercised Within limits pre.seribed by," and you get the accepted principle of all Modern government, and, indeed, of all civilized government since the decay of feudalism. Must Modern democracy go beyond this ; and, if so, where can it stop, short of state socialism ? There are signs at the end of the book that our authors have made up their mind to travel very far along this road, and that there is nothing in the principle of democracy, as they understand it, which would prevent them from'going the whole way. They may be right ; but, if so, their conclusion raises the old doubt whether democracy is a principle at all—whether a reasoned deferice of democracy is anything more than an attempt to rationalize
an attitude. -
This impression is rather strengthened by the fact that like all recent defenders of democracy and all devotees of-dictator- ship, Mr. Fulton and Mr. Morris end by resting almost all their hope on an improved education. They repeat the old objec- tions to private schools, as tending to discourage a democratic state of mind, and they appear to be hardly aware that they are thus raising an issue of political principle : whether a State. monopoly of teaching is compatible with freedom. In one respect, indeed, they are refreshingly original. They realize, as so few people realize, that the adult tutorial class is not a pis aller but a distinct form of education, and in many
Ways the most powerful and the most hopeful of all its forms. Adult education is, in truth, the great cultural discovery of the present • age, and this country has never shown its Peculiar instinct for democracy more • Clearly than in the distinctive methods by which it has sought to develop this new territory.
But it is also true that it is the most easily perverted of all forms of education. Here, as elsewhere, the inculcation of an attitude of mind is no substitute for belief in coherent principles
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