A thoroughly bad bargain
Labour governments seem to get the For- eign Secretaries they deserve. The Attlee government, in its period of success, was served by the best Foreign Secretary the party has yet produced, and Mr Mor- rison's period of office aptly coincided with the twilight years of that administra- tion. Mr Wilson's government came to office with no discernible foreign policy, and then spent several months finding a Foreign Secretary who could get himself elected. The honeymoon period Leading up to the 1966 election coincided with Mr Stewart's first, and nondescript, tenure of the Foreign Office. Then came Mr George Brown whose character suitably epitom- ised the unexpected transformation of the staid British into a race of hectic, mini- skirted music-hall artistes. And now, as the Wilson government gradually disinte- grates before our eyes, Mr Stewart's second stint resembles a ruined landscape littered with ruined follies.
Not all of these follies have been Mr Stewart's responsibility alone. He has been woefully ill-advised by his perman- ent officials on Rhodesia and Biafra, and although he rushed into the Soames affair with every appearance of enthusiasm, the trap was laid for him by the diplomats. The responsibility for the mock heroics on Anguilla was shared with the Prime Minister, and although the Foreign Secre- tary brought Tuesday's censure debate on arms sales to Libya and Israel upon his own head by his inept refusal to answer questions in person on Monday, the orig- inal policy decisions stemmed from the Arabist nostalgia of the Foreign Office, and its failure to realise that the closure of the Suez Canal is no longer a matter of significance to anyone save the Egyptians.
Now it seems that Mr Stewart is pre- paring to crown his record with the ex- change of Mr Gerald Brooke for the Krogers. Here again the responsibility is shared by the Prime Minister, to whom the security services report direct. It must be a long time since the national interest has been more flagrantly threatened by an outbreak of sentimentalism prompted by hopes of short-term electoral gain.
Admittedly the security services bear a large share of the blame for the dilemma in which the Government has been placed.
The Americans gave the lead when they agreed to exchange Mr Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, for a convicted Russian pro- fessional spy, Colonel Rudolf Abel. Britain then followed suit by swapping Mr Greville Wynne for another top-rank- ing professional, Mr Gordon Lonsdale.
In each case there were extenuating cir- cumstances attached to what was never- theless, in intelligence terms, a mighty poor bargain. Powers was the innocent victim of the risks taken by his superiors, while Wynne was a businessman specially recruited by the secret service because he happened to have become the friend of a very valuable potential defector.
After these experiences, however, it is hardly surprising that the Russians should have come to the conclusion that western governments can always be blackmailed into releasing spies who get caught by callous threats against western citizens who have fallen into their hands. All the more reason, therefore, to resist the black- mail on this occasion.
The Foreign Office has repeatedly and correctly maintained that the Krogers and Gerald Brooke are poles apart. The Krogers are professional spies whose re- covery would be of value to the Russian intelligence system both for prestige reas- ons and, very possibly, for more technical reasons. Gerald Brooke is a foolish young man who behaved in a manner which would not have merited attention from any government with an ounce of con- fidence in the loyalty of its own citizens.
If this exchange is arranged, then either our own secret service will in future have to think twice about arresting Russian spies and allowing the Courts to sentence them to long terms of imprisonment, or —more realistically—any British citizen will have to think twice about visiting the Soviet Union and other parts of eastern Europe so long as there is a single Russian agent locked up in a British gaol.
Mr Wilson and Mr Stewart have evi- dently decided that there is some kudos to be gained with the British electorate by rescuing Mr Gerald Brooke from a re-trial and another fifteen years' incar- ceration in one of Russia's evil prison camps. It is to be hoped that in this case, as in other matters, they have underestim- ated the common sense and self-respect of their fellow-citizens. Of course there is widespread public sympathy for Mr Brooke, and loathing for the bestiality of Russian conduct towards an innocent pawn in the espionage war. But there has been no sign that the public want the Government to give in to Russian black- mail. The threat of a re-trial of Mr Brooke might well turn out to be bluff, and it should certainly be called. The Foreign Office has been right to play down this affair and thereby to diminish the loss df face which the Russians would suffer 'if they were to allow Mr Brooke to come home at the end of his present sentence.
It seems a little hard to believe that even the gang of scared, secretive and sleazy old men who pass muster for the govern- ment of the second most powerful country in the world would really be prepared to incur the odium of re-trying an innocent man simply because they could not obtain the release of a couple of their own spies.
But suppose the Russian threats turn out not to be bluff after all. What then? Instead of surrendering the Krogers the British government should here and now warn the Russians confidentially, through diplomatic channels, of the action it would feel bound to take should Brooke be subjected to a second trial for 'espion- age'. It should tell the Kremlin that the staff of its London Embassy, apart from the ambassador and secretarial assist- ance, would be sent home. This would deprive the Russian intelligence system in this country of its diplomatic anchor —and retaliation against the British Embassy in Moscow would hardly make much difference. The British government should further give notice that it would use what influence it still has to secure the exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation in international sporting and cultural events so long as Gerald Brooke continues to be held in custody (and it could surely count on the support of other western countries which would not wish their own citizens to be put at risk in future). And as the present Gov- ernment expresses great confidence in the United Nations it should also prepare to raise the matter in the Security Council and invite condemnation of the Soviet Union for its inhuman behaviour.
• These warnings might still not achieve their purpose, in which case they would have to be put into effect. Mr Gerald Brooke would still suffer, and his life might even be forfeit. But it is not callous to argue that this would be a lesser evil than that of exposing every future inno- cent British tourist to a similar risk. if ever there was a case for rejecting the appeasement of an odious regime, this is it.
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