21 MAY 1859, Page 14

THE INDIAN ARMY REPORT.

STATESMANSHIP cannot be put in commission. If ever the report of a body of commissioners or committee men exhibits a complete mastery of the subject, it is not because the commission or the committee has played the part of a statesman, but because there has been a statesman in the body who has prompted the report. The large blue book just presented to both Houses of Parliament as the " Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Organization of the Indian Army, together with the Minutes of Evidence and Appendix," is an example of what we have said. It would, we are convinced, have been far more satisfactory if some one of the Commissioners—General Peel, Lord Stanley, or the Duke of Cambridge, had himself been forced to consider the whole body of the evidence laid before the Commissioners, and had told us the sum and substance of it, Practieally, the report amounts to little more than that technical evasion which is wiled "reporting the evidence." Do not let us be unjust to the Com- missioners. We have no doubt that they have conscientiously done the best they could. They have, however, been overlaid by the sense of responsibility, and by their deference for each other. They have given us back the string of twelve questions laid before them, slightly moralized, with an opinion appended to each, and some very qualified " recommendations," which are almost avowedly a compromise, and they add nine spontaneous and origi- nal recommendations. The questions were, the terms on which the Army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown ; the permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces after the restoration of tranquillity ; the right proportion of European to Native troops in the several arms ; the formation of a local European amps, or the service of India by reliefs from the line maintaining only one Imperial army ; the maintenance of any Native Artillery ; the formation of regular or irregular corps, with some other points of a subordinate character. The main recommendations of the commissioners are,—that a European force should be maintained in India to the amount of 80,000,--50,000 in Bengal, and 15,000 in each of the other two Presidencies ; that the proportion of any Native force should not under present circumstances exceed that of the European force by more than two to one in Bengal, and three to one in Madras and Bombay ; that the Artillery should be mainly a European force, with exceptions for stations detrimental to the European constitu- tion • that the Native cavalry be irregular ; that the Native in- fantry be mainly regular, with a proportion, left to the discretion of local authorities, of irregular regiments by way of expe- riment.

With regard to the formation of a local army or reliefs from the line, the committee are so divided that they can offer no recom- mendations as a body. The majority and minority present sepa- rate propositions, the one in favour of a consolidation of the Euro- pean Army, and the other of a separate Indian Army. The notion of the majority is, that the Line regiments would be less expensive, would possess a higher prestige ; would enjoy a higher character, and therefore preserve better discipline ; and would secure for the Line itself opportunity of exercise in the field of India. The commissioners in the minoritystand up for the esprit de corps think of the local body ; thk that their plan would bethe more economical • and hold that the separation of the corps would be a wholesome check on the hasty withdrawal of European troops from India. The minority observe, that amongst the witnesses their view is supported by the present Governor-General in India, by Lord Ellenborough, by the Governor and Commander-in-chief of Madras, the Commander-in-chief of Bombay, the Military Se- cretary in India, Sir John Lawrence and the Punjaub Commis- sioners, Sir James Outram, Sir Richard Hussey -Vivian, the Adjutant-General of the Bengal Army, Colonel Holland, Colonel Durand, and Mr. J. P. Willoughby ; while the majority which supports the opposite view consists almost exclusively of officers of the Line, the exceptions being two civilians, Sir George Clerk, and Sir Charles Trevelyan, and one Indian officer, Sir Archdale Wilson. Both sections of the commission, however, uphold the positive necessity of maintaining a certain European force in India.

The original recommendations of the commissioners are princi- pally masters of detail ; but one we rejoice to see recorded unani- mously ; it is that the Native Army should be oomposed of dif- ferent nationalities and castes ; and, as a general rule, mixed promiscuously throughout each regiment. This is the Bombay system, which we have years back so emphatically pointed out as opposed to the Bengal system. It reverses the judgment of the Commander-in-chief in Bombay, who was just upon the point of introducing the Bengal system of high caste, separate enlistment, when the mutiny broke out. The specific proposals of the volume we shall examine more in detail; our business now is with the construction of the report itself, and with its relation to the whole Government of India. With all deference for the Commissioners, whose indivdnal cha- racter and conscientious discharge of duty we should be amongst the first to vindicate, we cannot but think, that misled probably by repeated and high examples, they have omitted the principal duty that lay before them. They give us " opinions" : what we wanted was a complete and succinct view of Information. Very few opinions are worth any attention which are conveyed in any other form than a simple statement of facts ; and especially on a grave occasion like the present, we less want the opinions of any man, however distinguished, than a concentrated view of the facts. The public did not assist at the inquiry, did not examine

the Commissioners, could not hear the tone of their voice, and has very imperfect means of comparing the authority of the several witnesses on the several points. For one man may be the highest authority on one matter, and subordinate to another in a second matter. The chief use of the inquiry therefore was, to collect all the information that could be derived from the witnesses or any others, if they could be found ; and to embody it in a lucid nar- rative. If opinions were appended, they should have been dis- tinct ; but even so, not a single opinion ought to have been ha- zarded without preceding it by the salient facts upon which it rested. We have before noticed the growing habit on the part of committees and commissioners of evading this duty ; which we allow to be arduous, but which is essentially necessary in a Go- vernment so complicated as ours.

The Report points out a far graver and more paramount fault, which we must not, however, charge against the Commissioners, but against those who are answerable for the government of In- dia ; and we sincerely evince our admiration for the qualities which Lord Stanley has shown, when we point this charge most particularly at him. To scrutinize the organization of the Indian Army as it has been, to compare the system of each Presidency, to examine the relative proportion which has hitherto been main- tained between the European and the Native force, to ask what are the military exigencies of the different systems,—all these were manifest duties on the part of a Commissioner and Indian statesman like Lord Stanley. Sir Robert Peel—the highest statesman we have had for many years, and no meanjudge of other men's character—used to say that his brother Jonathan possessed a better intellect than he had ; and we have reason to believe that General Peel is a man of clear head and most ele- vated feeling. There are other men of very great ability on the Commission, and no one will question the heartiness, sincerity, or practical information of the Duke of Cambridge. But unques- tionably the inquiry ought to have been conducted from a much more elevated point of view. The question of military organi- zation, whether European or Native, cannot be separated from the political state of India, or from the economical state. We do not mean simply the economy of the military department, but the economy of the Indian people,—their industrial condition and the prospects of their commerce. Several of the witnesses have justly remarked, that the restoration of " tranquillity," as it is vaguely called, may be only such as to justify a partial with- drawal of European troops ; but that it is a condition very diffe- rent from that absolute quiet which we may anticipate at a fu- ture day. Hence the report is dealing with a period of transi- tion, yet it vaguely lays down rules for the future, and confounds empirical expedients with principles. " We have a very exten- sive empire in India," says Sir George Clerk, " and, therefore, must have the people with us." It is, in fact, absurd to attempt, but above all for England, a free country to attempt to govern any people save through that people itself ; and the best force for maintaining India against disorder at home, or invasion without, is a Native Indian force ; a weapon pointed, if you like, with the skill and iron of the European temperament, but with a body suited to the climate and the regicn. The same principles apply to the political government and to the military control as to the commercial system, which we have hitherto left uncultivated in India, while we are paying a heavy fine in the impossibility of making both ends meet. We have stated facts which recommend a colonization of India by the em- ploying, that is by the leading class ; and we have shown how, as we believe we shall be able to show still further, how India herself and her indigenous population may be able to yield pro- duce in a ratio of increment such as the Anglo-Saxon common- wealth has alone exhibited hitherto. It is physically impossible for Europeans to conduct all that vast process with their own in- dividual hands ; it will be done by informing Native hands and disciplining Native eyes. We must teach the Natives to see from our point of view ; to feel that their happiness lies in our keep- ing. The same principles which are true in this commercial sec- tion of the question are equally dominant in the political and military sections ; and the three cannot be taken separately, un- less statesmanship waives its functions merely to go through the forms of administration in commission.