21 MAY 1881, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

TT is impossible to speak too strongly of the conduct of those members of the Tory party who, with the Morally Post as their organ, and a connection of Sir Henry Layard, Mr. Montague Guest, as their momentary mouthpiece, are endeavouring, apropos of this Tunisian question, to produce a rupture between England and France. That France has behaved badly in the matter, and set a most dangerous pre- cedent, is unfortunately undeniable. Her conduct has been hardly better than our own in Afghanistan. She has intended, indirectly, to bully Italy, just as we intended, indirectly, to bully Russia ; and to acquire " a position," as we sought to acquire " a frontier ;" and she has done it at the expense of a Prince weaker oven than Shere Ali, a Prince who has not the nerve either to fight or fly. That her conquest is for the benefit of the world may be admitted—we admit it most fully—but her methods of procedure, the false assurances by which Ttaly was lulled, the professions of friendship by which the Bey was paralysed, the tricky treaty under which France takes all power in Tunis, without accepting all responsibility for Tunis, are all cruel injuries to the European system, which cannot work unless statesmen will keep decent faith. But the im- morality of French diplomatists, however grievous, or however ominous, is not a reason either for declaring war, or abandon- ing an alliance which is essential not only to Great Britain, but to the world. The result of the French action, even if it deserves to be called a plot, is a gain, not an injury, to

civilisation, It not only does not weaken this country, but by increasing the area within which her Fleet can act, it distinctly increases her hold on France, which, more- over, has taken on herself a new and, as it may prove, a very severe task, more especially if, as is rumoured, she intends to make Gabes a point d'appui for further advances and groat military explorations to the South. An African India may increase alike the prestige and the usefulness of France, but it will not increase her strength. To make of the affair a ground of war, as the Post advises, or of active remonstrance, as Mr. Guest suggests, is therefore foolish,—and all the more so, because those who give such counsels are well aware that the hostility must be futile. France, alleging, with perfect justice, that she was despoiled of two provinces in 1870, with- out European interference, refuses to submit her conquest to Europe ; and Germany, in language of unusual direct- ness, has endorsed her refusal. English people, as a body, are careless about Tunis, are not afraid of French progress anywhere but in Egypt, and are utterly disinclined for active interference. At the same time, the French, who have been humiliated for ten years, are exulting in their success, and just iu the mood to,seele a diplomatic triumph in a blunt re- fusal to tolerate any interference. All, therefore, that the Tories can hope to effect by bitter speeches urging interfer- ence is to revive the old jealousy between the two countries, which for so many hundred years impeded the progress of both, and to obtain for the Government of Groat Britain a diplomatic defeat.

We have no fear of war with France, but we fear that many even among grave politicians, deceived by our history since 1856, have forgotten what the old situation of affairs was, when England and France were supposed to be natural enemies, when every change of Government in Paris caused a preoccupation in London, when the idea of invasion was never wholly absent from statesmen's minds, when the French Admiralty could not build a new ship without a com- motion among English alarmists, when Liberals were ready to vote millions for Channel fortifications, when British Estimates, British armaments, British policy all over the world were mainly regulated by dread of France, or defiance of France. It is not thirty years since the one subject of thought after the Coup d'Etat was the chance of a war a outrance with France, a war which would have mortgaged all the industry of a genera- tion, since statesmen whispered of the necessity of a conscrip- tion, since journals as grave as the Economist assumed war to be inevitable and discussed its immediate results. The shadow of France darkened all English life, and British Cabinets could not act, or legislate, or tax without first considering what direction the ambition of their mighty neighbour might by possibility take. England has been rid of that stifling weight for a generation, but if the Tories fancy it could be in future lightly borne, they utterly misapprehend the situation of the world. We will just tell them what a dangerous and lasting difference with France would mean. It would mean that in Europe we must double the Channel Fleet, and finish at once all southern fortifications, and build new fortifications on the Irish coast ; that we must increase the Army by twenty thousand men, and raise the Volunteers by at least a third ; that we must, await in a suspense fatal alike to commerce and to credit a " transaction" with Germany by which France might recoup,. „ herself for Lorraine by absorbing Belgium, and that men of ' weight and soberness would daily warn us of some weak place: in the armour of our coasts. It would mean that all dis- affection in Ireland would become treasonable correspondence with a possible foe. It would mean that in Africa the Egyptian. arrangement would break down, and that we must expend half. our strength in watching lest we be taken by surprise on the Canal ; that in America our dangerously vague treaties about_ Newfoundland would produce incessant squabbles ; and that in Asia we should be subject to menaces to which the hostility- of Russia is a' bugbear. The Cabinet of Pekin could not be- kept from attacking us, if it thought maritime Europe divided,, or if France intrigued against British interests ; while India would be quaking with alarm at the possible action of a Power which would have 50,000 "European " soldiers in Cochin, which has a permanent port of entry into India, and which could by a•. telegraphic message to Saigon compel us to accumulate an army,. a strong army, in British Burmah. The force which is to subdue Tonquin could reach Bhamo and Maulmain more- easily. In Australia and New Zealand every consideration must be postponed till it was certain that no descent was intended from New Caledonia, and that the French squadrons in the Pacific were of normal dimensions. There is not a corner of the world, not a sea, not a British possession, in. which we should not instantly find our Fleets weighted with new burdens, our commerce hampered with new precautions, our Colonies worried with now fears. And all for what ? In- order that we might be safe against a Power from which we want no territory, which we do not desire to weaken, lest Germany rule the world, and with which our permanent interests. are nearly identical. In Europe, in Asia, in Egypt, we can and do work with France ; and while we so work, lawless ambition, cannot manifest itself, and the objects of civilisation are- attained with a tithe of what otherwise would be most ex- hausting friction. Imagine, to take a single instance, and not the most important, the position of the Suez Canal, which. involves the whole Indian trade, while France and England. were believed to be approaching war. Peace, cordial peace,. between England and France, is security for the commerce,. and in a less degree for the people, of half our world. If we• abandon it, we rouse between two nations which at home. almost touch, and abroad are everywhere neighbours, a jealousy which for thirty years all wise men have been endeavouring, to soothe, and which may last for a hundred years, inflicting every year on both countries some new burden.

And why are we to incur this horrible responsibility ?. In order to punish a few French statesmen who, fretting under a sense that France was not sufficiently visible in Europe,. have accomplished, in an underhand and tricky manner, a feat which, if it had been accomplished openly and fairly„ would have excited no suspicion and very little annoyance. Because they have acted as unscrupulously as we ourselves. did, not three years ago, therefore we are to make it easier for Prince Bismarck to pursue any plan he may have for crippling France or "arranging " with France, and more imperative for France to support that Russia which Tories, profess to dread. That must be the end, if we are to accept such mad counsel, and make Tunis a cause of quarrel, or of that kind of negotiation which is nothing but veiled war. We do not believe that the professed anxiety for the rights of the Sultan can be so much as sincere among men who approved the occupation of Bosnia and the demand for Cyprus ; but granting that it were, why is England to pro- tect a despotic and destructive Power, which never yields to English influence, which seeks nothing in Tunis but tribute, and which, if it has any claim to suzerainty there, bases the claim on a quasi-religious authority, which Christians are under no obligation to respect ? As Mr. Gladstone pointed out on Tuesday, France has never acknowledged the Sultan's authority in Tunis ; and though we did, we have never hesitated, when convenient, to set it aside. We bombarded Algiers, as he says, to purfish piracy when the Dey became intolerable, without asking the Sultan's leave ; nor in August, 1858, did we consult him, when the Shereef of Mecca was brought to reason by the bombardment of Jeddah. If we are to interferer

it must be to punish France, not to protect the Sultan ; and to punish France, we must sacrifice an alliance which makes half the world secure. France will be punished soon enough, so far as she deserves, by the suspicions she has excited, and the burdens she has knelt down in the mud to take up.