MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND RUSSIA. T HE exciting state of the political
atmosphere which we are now breathing, coupled also with that power of causing excitement which belongs to all great orators, has given the world at large a strangely mistaken view of Mr. Chamberlain's now famous speech. We do not deny that the speech was exceedingly grave, and worthy of the fullest and most anxious consideration ; but the newspapers, both here and abroad, seem to have mis- conceived its special character in a manner quite extra- ordinary. Some critics have declared that it was directed chiefly against France, and was a notice to M. Hanotaux that he must yield in West Africa. Others have regarded it as primarily intended to show the world at large that the Anglo-Saxons on both sides of the Atlantic mean to have their own way, in spite of all "foreign" interference ; while a third set of commentators have asserted that the speech was a notice to the Germans that we are prepared to ally ourselves with them. In spite, however, of the very injudicious allusion to the Devil and the long spoon, and the hostility obviously shown to Russia, hardly any one seems to have realised that the " operative " part of the speech was solely con- cerned with Russia, and that its whole raison d'être was hostility to, and distrust of, Russia. Throughout Mr. Chamberlain's speech Russia, and no one else, is the enemy.
The main thought and argument of the speech are perfectly clear and intelligible. Mr. Chamberlain lays extreme stress upon the vast importance of the Chinese question. It is now, he tells us, not a matter of ports „. or provinces, but of the whole Chinese Empire. It is, in his view, of absolutely vital importance to prevent China, as a whole, falling under the dominion of Russia. In other words, Mr. Chamberlain clearly attaches to the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire the sort of importance which forty years ago our statesmen attached to the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. That the continuance of that Empire was to be secured at all hazards was regarded by the politicians of a past generation as a matter settled beyond doubt and argument. But, urges Mr. Chamberlain, it is im- possible for us to preserve the integrity of the Chinese v Empire single-handed. If the possibilities of a single- handed war in favour of China are faced fairly and squarely, it must be admitted that we should be unable to ac- complish our ends. Russia would not be able to conquer us, but we, not being a military Power, would be unable to prevent her dominating China. Still, the necessity for maintaining the independence of China remains as vital as ever. It follows, therefore, that we must give up the isolation which we have maintained for the last forty-five years, and seek allies in the work of stopping Russia. Just as to stop her in Turkey we needed and obtained military allies, France and Sardinia, so now to stop her in China we need military help. Of course we shall lose a great deal by giving up our isolation and our independence, and by adopt- ing the policy of alliances, but if we are to stop Russia there is no choice. And Russia must be stopped, for the door in China must be kept open. Therefore, we must change the basis of our foreign policy and adopt the policy of alliances. To strengthen his contention, Mr. Chamberlain brought another argument, and one which we admit is of very considerable force. As long as we are isolated and unallied there is always the danger of a combination being got up against us. In a word, every one in the school is inclined to hate the boy who is on nobody's side, but walks about with his hands in his pockets and lets it be known that his cousin Jonathan is the only fellow he cares to speak to. —' Never mind about that top you say I bagged from you, or that black eye you got from Jones, let's all agree to go for that fat beast Bull.'—Unquestionably the only way to meet the risk of a combination is to make an alliance with one or other of the great factions. The validity of this reason for forming alliances entirely depends, however, upon the chances of a combination being arranged. But whether this is likely can only be known to Cabinet Ministers of the first rank, and it is therefore of little avail for outsiders to discuss the point. Such is the position which Mr. Chamberlain lays before the country. It is an invitation to the nation to enter upon a policy of alliances with some of the great Continental Powers. We leave outside for the moment the question of the Anglo-Saxon Alliance, partly because we have treated it at length elsewhere, but still more because it is really an entirely separate matter. The Anglo-Saxon Alliance is founded not on political convenience, but on identity of sentiment and identity of the higher political interests. It would not, besides, help us, except indirectly, in a. struggle with Russia, for America, like ourselves, is a non- military Power, and could only give what we can ourselves supply, ships and money. For present purposes, then,. Mr. Chamberlain's argument is for an alliance with a Continental Power, or group of Powers,—and that group could hardly be any other than Germany, Austria, and possibly Norway and Sweden, since that last-named. Power is extremely afraid of becoming a second Finland.
We have stated Mr. Chamberlain's contention as fully and as fairly as we know how, but we cannot say we approve of or agree with it. We do not object per se to the proposed alliance with Germany or the Triple Alliance, and think that it is very possible that such an alliance might, if it were of a purely defensive kind, help to secure the peace of the world. What we object to is the notion that Russia is the enemy. We cannot disguise our disgust at the prospect of drifting back into the position of treating Russia as our deadly enemy merely in order to maintain the integrity and independence of a derelict Empire. We have tried that sort of policy before, and we cannot say that it has been a success. We have failed to keep the Turkish Empire together, and all that remains to us from the attempt is the jealousy and antagonism of Russia. It is. true that Abd-ul-Hamid still lives on, but compare the Turkish Empire now with what it was when we spent a hundred millions and sacrificed a hundred thousand lives to keep it inviolate. Is it not very possible that if in thirty years' time we find that the Chinese Empire has gone, or half gone, we shall not be- one penny the worse ? Our objections to entering upon a policy of maintaining the independence and- integrity of the Chinese Empire are not objections off' sentiment or of rigid principle, but of conveuience. Im the first place, that policy is, in fact, a dog-in-the-manger, policy. We do not mean to take China, or any part of it, ourselves ; but we will not let any one else have it. Now, that is a policy which, in our opinion, can never pay. It. is certain to make us enemies among the Powers who are hungry, or who think they are hungry. Next, we very much,• doubt whether it will pay us politically or commercially. We are by no means sure that Russia could so easily dominate China as is always assumed. No doubt. Russia, if left alone, could, and would, get control at. Pekin. But who will guarantee that directly that con- trol began to be exercised the Southern, Middle, and, Eastern provinces of the Empire would not revolt, and that Thibet would not throw off its allegiance ? If they did, Russia would not find it an easy task to put down the rebellions, for an Asiatic Empire- on the crumble (as we found in India from 1770 to 1820) is not an easy place to rule. But let us take the worst, and admit that Russia could, and, would, take all China.. Are we so certain that our trade would be so greatly injured ? We do a pretty good trade as it is with the Black Sea and the Baltic. Ought we to assume that Russia would be able, or would try, to close the door of China ? If Russia took China she would want to develop it. But is it conceivable that she could develop it without our aid ? Most certainly she could.. not. She would want rails, and machines, and engines,. and cloth goods, and a hundred other things, and half of them would be bought here or carried in English ships.. Depend upon it, a Russian Provincial Governor, be he never so benighted a Protectionist, is a less obstacle to commerce than a gang of lazy, corrupt, and hopelessly ignorant Mandarins. The trade bogey is, to our mind, an entire delusion. Of course, the question remains over,— Would not Russia, the mistress of China and her four hundred millions—supposing complete conquest to take place—be a State of such terrific power that all the world must bow before her? We do not believe it. Vast territorial acquisitions do not increase the force of a State,—witness the failure of the Persians to conquer Greece, while Alexander, who possessed no territory to speak of, overran the world. The power of a State rests in the courage, energy, and morale of its inhabitants. Russia, we do not deny, possesses all these qualities, and in a high degree, but if they do not make her a danger now they will not make her a danger when most of the energy is being used up in keeping down four hundred million men in pig-tails,—all incapable of being cowed by military executions and all capable of forming secret combinations to which Nihilism is the merest child's play. Even if Russia has China- Thibet we can easily take if China really falls into Russia's lap—she has no more power of injuring us than she has now. If she wants to invade India she can do so quite as well to-day as when she rules from Pekin. But China touches no other British posses- sion. Russia will not attack us in Canada, or Australia, or Africa, or in Great Britain the more easily because her flag flies over the Forbidden City. As it seems to us, then, it would be madness to make a fixed enemy of Russia for fear she may some day take China. If she does, and does not also command the sea, we may feel quite certain that we shall be able to give a very good account of ourselves. But even if we dreaded Russia as much as the most frenzied Russophobe, we should not want to rush at Russia just now. A new Crimea at Port Arthur would cost £100,000,000 and lead to nothing, or, say, to as much as did the last Russian War. It would be far better to spend that £100,000,000 on building and manning fifty extra battle- ships and fifty fast cruisers. If the money went that way, instead of treating Port Arthur as we did Sebastopol, we should indeed have the whip hand of Russia. If our Jingoes want empire and the power to take a high line with foreign Powers, let them build ships, not make useless land wars, for they will find that plan is far more successful. Let us hope that this view of the case will finally recommend itself to the Government. When they have time to recover from the shock given them by the diplomatic methods of Russia, they will see that nothing has really been lost except possibly a little of Russia's honour—though on that point there has been a good deal of exaggeration—that there is no need to excite ourselves about China, and that if we build ships and keep our powder dry we shall still be able to exem- plify Bacon's dictum that the command of the sea " is an abridgment of empire." The command of the sea and the friendship of the other half of our race : let these be our watchwords, for thus strengthened we need fear no foe.
To begin the new century with another hunting of the Snark, in the shape of defending the integrity and in- dependence of a rotten and indefensible Empire, would be the height of folly. The notion is a veritable political nightmare, and one from which we feel sure the Govern- ment and the country will ultimately shrink in horror and disgust.
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