MARGINAL COMMENT
By HAROLD NICOLSON
SOME years ago I wrote for the Oxford University Press a small handbook or manual on diplomacy. My main contention was that of the many qualities which the ideal negotiator must possess the most essential is that of reliability. The success of British diplomacy during the golden century from 1814 to 1914 was not wholly due to the effortless superiority which we then enjoyed ; the pax britannica may have been based upon our command of the seven seas, but our dominance might have aroused a coalition against us had it not been for the excellent reliability of our diplomatic technique. When we departed from our own standards, as at the out- set of the South African war, we found that all manner of latent animosities combined against us ; but on the whole we were able during those hundred years of mastery to avoid creating such resent- ment in the world as would lead to a combination of Powers anxious to dispute our authority. Some foreign critics have contended that our remarkable immunity to coalitions was due to the fact that we did not possess any foreign policy at all. This seems to me an exaggerated interpretation of our natural empiricism and of our traditional dislike for long-term planning or commitments in advance. Our policy was successful since it was founded upon those sound principles which Sir Eyre Crowe defined in his famous memorandum of January 1st, 1907. According to Sir Eyre, we were obliged by our geographical and economic situation to base our foreign policy upon certain abiding principles. Being a small and over-populated island situated off the peninsula of Europe and dependent for our living upon imports from overseas, we were forced to maintain mari- time supremacy against all possible enemies. He would not, I imagine, have regarded the United States as a possible enemy. But if this supremacy were not to provoke a coalition against us, then we must identify our policy with the primary interests of the majority of European Powers. These primary interests were inde- pendence and prosperity. Great Britain, therefore, must always be opposed to the domination of Europe by any single Power and must always adopt the policy of free trade. These principles amounted, in Sir Eyre Crowe's opinion, to " laws of nature."
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This admirable definition strikes us today as out of date. We are no longer powerful enough to enjoy the luxury of benevolent opportunism. Our self-preservation in these days has got to be planned. But if our foreign policy for these sad reasons must now be more definite and more precise, the means by which that policy is furthered and maintained must continue to follow those principles which our grandfathers found so efficacious. Our diplomacy must remain as reliable as it was during the golden age. I did not, in my manual, suggest that the reliability of British diplomacy arose from any superior moral endowments on our part. I contended only that, being a nation of shopkeepers, we approached diplomacy from the commercial point of view. The Germans, being a military race, approached diplomacy from the military point of view ; for them it was war by other means. In their diplomatic technique they reflected the conceptions of the military mind ; you thus had the surprise attack, the flanking movement, the feint, and the trial of strength or Kraftprobe. Our own methods on the other hand were similar to those of a powerful and old-fashioned bank. We sought to create and stimulate credit, to establish confidence, to exercise moderation and to avoid adventure. Knowing that the only diplo- matic triumphs are those which are never proclaimed, we did not boast or bluster ; we remained perfectly calm and quiet. In fact we were reliable.
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In defining the components of reliability I placed predision on the same level as truthfulness and loyalty. I contended that diplomacy, or the art of negotiation, was not in any way akin to the art of conversation. It was the method by which agreed documents could be exchanged in precise and ratifiable terms. So great was the importance of getting everything in writing that the diplomatist should be a wary conversationalist, and should seek on every im- portant occasion to fortify what he said or heard by confirmatory notes or memoranda. Such notes or aides-mentoire should be written before, rather than after, the interview takes place ; the habit of committing to paper the remarks which one intends to make adds clarity, precision and caution to one's ensuing interviews. The deeply regrettable episode which arose after the conversation between M. Molotov and the United States Ambassador at Moscow might have been avoided if General Bedell-Smith had composed his "rough notes " a little less roughly and before he drove to the Kremlin. Had he adopted this habit he might have realised in time that the communication which he was about to make was liable to mis- interpretation and that it would be wiser therefore to write it out neatly in advance. The resultant fiasco has led people to accuse the American diplomatist of "amateurishness." That is a rude and unnecessary word to use ; Americans, since they adopt our own business approach, make excellent diplomatists. The mistake which all Ambassadors who have not been trained to the career are apt to make is to believe that they can say things to the Molotovs of this world "off the record." An Ambassador is always on the record ; and it is a wise precaution to ensure that his remarks are neatly typed in advance. When he sees them in typescript, he may come to the conclusion that they had better not be made.
A classic instance of the dangers of diplomacy by conversation was once told me by a German friend of mine who assured me that it was true. As he had himself once been German Foreign Secretary, I believed, or half-believed, what he said. It concerned the annexation by Austria of the duchies of Bosnia and Herzogovina in 1908. Count von Aerenthal, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, was well aware that this action would lead to the danger of war with Russia and that before taking such a provocative step he was bound to consult, or at the very least to inform, his ally Germany. He also knew that at that date the German Government were not prepared either to repudiate their Austrian ally or to risk a world war. He therefore arranged a stratagem by which he could warn Germany without his warning being taken seriously. He invited the German Ambassador, with whom he was on terms of .intimacy, to lunch alone with him at a distant suburban restaurant which was famous for its wine. They sampled many bottles of Rhine and Mosel wines, and it became clear towards the end of luncheon that the Austrian Foreign Minister was more than slightly intoxicated. The conversa- tion at that stage turned upon the Balkan problem, and Count von Aerenthal began to abuse the Serbian Government. " The situa- tion," he blustered, " has become intolerable. The Triple Alliance is being rendered ridiculous in the face of all the world. The time has come when I must teach the Slays a lesson. I know what I shall do. I shall annex Bosnia and Herzogovina. I shall do that suddenly on October 6th next. Now don't tell me, my dear Ambas- sador, that I did not warn you." He did annex the duchies on October 6th, and when the German Government protested, the Count replied that he had given their Ambassador ample warning and had even informed him of the actual date.
* * * * No, diplomacy, as General Bedell-Smith has come to learn, is not the art of conversation. In the days of the old diplomacy, of course, it was sometimes possible to hold valuable conversations without the risk of betrayal. The new diplomacy has not as yet discovered its own formula. Yet I believe that there are certain lines upon which that formula might be devised. It is, as I have so often said, essen- tial to distingush between foreign policy and negotiation. Policy should never be secret, in the sense that no citizen of a free country should be committed to engagements, which may entail war, with-. out his knowledge and without those engagements being approved by Parliament. But negotiation must always be confidential and can never be public. That surely is'a very simple truth.
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